Skip to main content

Adaptive Proofs for Networks of Partial Structures

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics

Part of the book series: Trends in Logic ((TREN,volume 45))

  • 662 Accesses

Abstract

The present paper expounds a preferred models semantics of paraconsistent reasoning. The basic idea of this semantics is that we interpret the language L(V) of a theory T in such a way that the axioms of T are satisfied to a maximal extent. These preferred interpretations are described in terms of a network of partial structures. Upon this semantic analysis of paraconsistent reasoning we develop a corresponding proof theory using adaptive logics.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For a detailed investigation of the inconsistency of classical electrodynamics, see [8].

  2. 2.

    The term consolidation is borrowed from belief revision theory (see, e.g., [9].).

  3. 3.

    Cf. [17]. For a critical discussion of this doctrine, see H. Wansing et al.: On the methodology of paraconsistent logic (this volume).

  4. 4.

    See [6] for a related strategy of dealing with inconsistencies.

  5. 5.

    See [8, Chap. 2] for a detailed exposition of this inconsistency.

  6. 6.

    This part is based on [1], which develops the network formalism as a paraconsistent semantics of theoretical terms.

  7. 7.

    Unlike a simple pragmatic structure in [7], a partial structure does not contain a set P of sentences that are taken to be true in the correspondence sense.

  8. 8.

    Partial structures are used here as a generalization of intended applications. An intended application of a theory-element \(\mathbf {T}\) leaves the \(\mathbf {T}\)-theoretical terms undetermined. This can be represented as follows: if \(R_k\) is \(\mathbf {T}\)-theoretical, \(R_k=\emptyset \). Partial structures, however, are a bit more flexible as they allow us to have a partial determination of the \(\mathbf {T}\)-theoretical terms for a given intended application.

  9. 9.

    This understanding generalizes the standard definition of being a substructure. Unlike the standard definition, it is not required that a substructure and its superstructure share the same slots of relations.

  10. 10.

    The question of whether \(<_s\) is smooth (in the set of all L(V) interpretations) for axiomatic theories T with an uncountable set of applications must be left for future research.

  11. 11.

    We should note that the presently defined inference relation deviates from the one defined in [10, 14]. They define the relation in such a way that \(\varphi \) must be verified by all classical models of A that are preferred on a given ordering <. This inference relation, however, is obviously not paraconsistent.

  12. 12.

    A strict partial order < is modular iff the relation R(xy) defined by \(x \not<y \wedge y\not <x\) is an equivalence relation. There might be cases where the axioms are not ordered in a modular fashion, which would require some modifications of Definition 7. For simplicity, a modular ordering among the axioms is assumed.

  13. 13.

    This is a simplification because the energy levels are only relatively stable. An electron may jump from one level to another.

  14. 14.

    Where \(\mathbf {L}\) is a logic, a formula \(\varphi \) is \(\mathbf {L}\)-contingent iff there is an \(\mathbf {L}\)-model that falsifies \(\varphi \) and one that verifies \(\varphi \).

  15. 15.

    We hope it is clear for the reader that we do not claim to define a new adaptive logic here, but rather apply existing logics to provide a new solution for an interesting problem, viz. providing a proof theory for the Modular Semantics inference relations.

References

  1. Andreas, H. (201x). Networks of partial structures. under review.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Balzer, W., Moulines, C. U., & Sneed, J. (1987). An architectonic for science. The structuralist program. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Batens, D. (2007). A universal logic approach to adaptive logics. Logica Universalis, 1, 221–242.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Benferhat, S., Dubois, D., & Prade, H. (1997). Some syntactic approaches to the handling of inconsistent knowledge bases: A comparative study part 1: the flat case. Studia Logica, 58(1), 17–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Brewka, G. (1991). Belief revision in a framework for default reasoning. In Proceedings of the Workshop on The Logic of Theory Change (pp. 602–622). London: Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Brown, B., & Priest, G. (2004). Chunk and permeate: a paraconsistent inference strategy. part 1: the infinitesimal calculus. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33, 379–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. da Costa, N., & French, S. (2003). Science and partial truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  8. Frisch, M. (2005). Inconsistency, asymmetry, and non-locality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  9. Hansson, S. O. (1999). A textbook of belief dynamics. Theory change and database updating. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Kraus, S., Lehmann, D., & Madigor, M. (1990). Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics. Artificial Intelligence, 44, 167–207.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Meheus, J., Straßer, C., & Verdée, P. (2016). Which style of reasoning to choose in the face of conflicting information? Journal of Logic and Computation, 26(1), 361–380. doi:10.1093/logcom/ext030.

    Google Scholar 

  12. Putte, F. V. D. & Straßer, C. (2012). Extending the standard format of adaptive logics to the prioritized case. Logique Et Analyse, 220, 601–641.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Rescher, N., & Manor, R. (1970). On inference from inconsistent premisses. Theory and Decision, 1(2), 179–217.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  14. Shoham, Y. (1988). Reasoning about change: Time and causation from the standpoint of artificial intelligence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Sneed, J. (1979). The logical structure of mathematical physics. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  16. Straßer, C. (2014). Adaptive logics for defeasible reasoning (Vol. 38). Trends in Logic Cham: Springer. Applications in Argumentation, Normative Reasoning and Default Reasoning, Heidelberg.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Wagner, G. (1991). Ex contradictione nihil sequitur. In Proceedings of the 12th IJCAI (pp. 538–543), Sidney, Australia.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Holger Andreas .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing AG

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Andreas, H., Verdée, P. (2016). Adaptive Proofs for Networks of Partial Structures. In: Andreas, H., Verdée, P. (eds) Logical Studies of Paraconsistent Reasoning in Science and Mathematics. Trends in Logic, vol 45. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_2

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics