Constructing Cause in International Relations

Lebow, Richard Ned

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-40027-3_6

Richard Ned Lebow³

Part of the book series: Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice ((PAHSEP,volume 3))

243 Accesses

Abstract

Social science is the ultimate Enlightenment project. Through reason it aspires to order and understand the social world, and implicitly to reorder it on the basis of this knowledge. The Enlightenment and social science alike were inspired in part by breakthroughs made by scientists in early modern Europe in understanding the physical world. The work of Galileo, Torricelli, and Newton generated the expectation that the physical world might be understood in terms of law-like statements, all of which could be unified in a larger theoretical edifice. Social science—also influenced by socio-political reflection and pre-Darwinist biology—modeled itself on this understanding of physics, which is still reflected in positivism and its various guises.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution

eBook: USD 16.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Softcover Book: USD 54.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Hardcover Book: USD 54.99; Price excludes VAT (USA)

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

1.
This text was first published as: “Constructing Cause in International Relations” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), Chap. 1 (pp. 12–45). ISBN: 9781139699273. The permission to republish this text was granted on 24 June 2015 by Clair Taylor, Senior Publishing Assistant, Legal Services, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
2.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VIII.1.5.
3.
Social science is also the product of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century socio-political reflection that developed independently of the natural sciences. The writings of Vico, Rousseau, and Saint-Simon were especially notable in this regard. Pre-Darwinist biology, and its organicism, vitalism, and proto-functionalism, also contributed to social science. These diverse strands of development conceived of cause in different ways and encouraged diverse perspectives in social science. A standard narrative developed that downplays diversity and emphasizes the scientific component, especially classical mechanics.
4.
By indeterminate physicists I mean that one cannot predict the future state of the system.
5.
Gleick, Chaos; Nicholas and Prigogine, Exploring Complexity; Bak and Chen, “Self-Organized Criticality”; Byrne, Complexity and the Social Sciences; Urry, Global Complexity; Jervis, System Effects.
6.
Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie and Dappled World.
7.
King, Keohane, and Verba’s, Designing Social Inquiry, Chap. 1.
8.
Kinkaid, “Mechanisms, Causal Modeling, and the Limitations of Traditional Multiple Regression”.
9.
Salmon, “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation”.
10.
Clore, “Cognitive Phenomenology” and Clore et al., “Affective Feelings as Feedback”; Damasio, Descartes’ Error; Gray, Psychology of Fear and Stress; Marcus, Neuman, and Mackuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgment; McDermott, “Feeling of Rationality”; see Lebow, “Achilles, Neuroscience and International Relations,” for a review.
11.
Lebow, Why Nations Fight.
12.
Schutz, “Social World and the Theory of Social Action” and “Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation”; see Searle, Construction of Social Reality, on the social construction of concepts and facts.
13.
Lebow, Cultural Theory of International Relations.
14.
Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, pp. 24–40.
15.
Lebow, Forbidden Fruit, Chap. 1 elaborates on this claim.
16.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, IV.II.14–15, V.1.3–5.
17.
Newton, Principia, p. 92.
18.
See Strawson, Secret Connexion, for Hume as a realist, and Richman, “Debating the New Hume,” for a refutation. See Read and Richman, NewHume Debate, for a fuller discussion.
19.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, III.2 and VIII.1.5.
20.
Turner, Social Theory of Practices, p. 9.
21.
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, Judgment under Uncertainty.
22.
Lange, “Causation in Classical Mechanics”.
23.
Healey, “Causation in Quantum Mechanics”.
24.
Shimony, Search for a Naturalistic World, p. 151; Dickson, “Non-Relativistic Quantum Mechanics,” pp. 390–1.
25.
Reichenbach, “Kausalproblem in der Physik” and “Principle of Causality and the Possibility of its Empirical Confirmation”.
26.
Schlick, “Kausalitat in der gegenwartigen Physik”; Stoltzner, “Logical Empiricists”.
27.
Mackie, Cement of the Universe, p. 60.
28.
Feynman, Character of Physical Laws, p. 147.
29.
Skyrms, ‘EPR’.
30.
Bohm, “A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of ‘Hidden’ Variables, I and II” and Causality and Chance in Modern Physics.
31.
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, “Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete?”.
32.
Sklar, Physics and Chance, p. 5.
33.
Lange, “Causation in Classical Mechanics”.
34.
Sklar, Physics and Chance, Chaps. 5–7.
35.
Ibid.
36.
Arafune and Fukugita, “Physical Implications of the Kamioka Observation of Neutrinos from Supernova 1987A”; Bionta, Blewitt, Bratton et al., “Observation of a Neutrino Burst in Coincidence with Supernova 1987A in the Large Magellanic Cloud”.
37.
Smolin, Life of the Cosmos, p. 77.
38.
Waldner, “Transforming Inferences into Explanations”.
39.
Aristotle, Physics 7.1–2, 8.4–5; Metaphysics, 2.2.
40.
Clatterbaugh, Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy and “Early Moderns”.
41.
Hobbes, De Corpore, I.75–6, 102, 122.
42.
Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, Essay 4, Chap. 3.
43.
Mill, System of Logic, Book III, Chap. 5, Sect. 3, pp. 215–18; Psillos, Causation & Explanation, pp. 59–66.
44.
Russell, “On the Notion of Cause”.
45.
See Dewey and Bentley, “Knowing and the Known”; Davidson, “Action, Reason and Cause” and “Causal Relations,” for a recent statement of this argument.
46.
Chernoff, Power of International Theory, pp. 54–5; Jackson and Nexon, “Paradigmatic Faults in International-Relations Theory.” Notable exceptions include Nagel, Structure of Science; Hempel, “Function of General Laws in History”.
47.
Hempel, “Logic of Functional Analysis”.
48.
Woodward and Hitchcock, “Explanatory Generalizations”; Lebow, Cultural Theory of International Relations, Chap. 1. See Byrne and Uprichard, “Useful Complex Causality,” for a more upbeat take. They are optimistic about addressing causation in what they call situations of “restricted complexity,” where it emerges from simple systems whose parameters are known.
49.
McKim and Turner, Causality in Crisis?
50.
Carnap, Logical Structure of the World, p. 264.
51.
Carnap, Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, p. 192; Schlick, “Kausalität in der gegenwärtigen Physik” and “Causation in Everyday Life and in Recent Science”.
52.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, §6.37.
53.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VIII.1.13.
54.
Strawson, Secret Connection, pp. 84–5; Broughton, “Hume’s Ideas about Necessary Causation” and “Hume’s Skepticism about Causal Inferences”; Wright, Skeptical Realism of David Hume; Beebee, Hume on Causation; Blackburn, “Hume and Thick Connexions”; Richman, “Debating the New Hume” and the other essays in Read and Richman, New Hume Debate.
55.
Kneale, Probability and Induction.
56.
Mumford, Dispositions and “Causal Powers and Capacities”; Ellis, Scientific Essentialism; Molnar, Powers.
57.
Mill, System of Logic; Ramsey, “Universals of Law and Fact”; Lewis, “Causation”.
58.
Ellis, “Causal Powers and the Laws of Nature” and Scientific Essentialism; Ellis and Lierse, “Dispositional Essentialism”.
59.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 4.17, offers the example of trying to explain bread in terms of its chemical composition. See Russell, “On the Notion of Cause,” for the quote.
60.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §304; also Carnap, Logical Structure of the World, p. 264; Ayer, “What Is a Law of Nature?”.
61.
van Fraassen, “To Save the Phenomena,” Scientific Image and Empirical Science, for the views of a leading proponent of this approach. See Jackson, Conduct of Enquiry in International Relations, for a perceptive analysis of the two schools of thought.
62.
Psillos, “Regularity Theories”.
63.
van Fraassen, Laws and Symmetry, pp. 38–9.
64.
Ibid.
65.
Williamson, “Probabilistic Theories”.
66.
Lange, “Causation in Classical Mechanics”.
67.
Mach, Science of Mechanics; Pearson, Grammar of Science.
68.
Russell, “On the Notion of Cause”.
69.
Frank, Causality and Its Limits.
70.
Ibid., Philosophy of Science, pp. 238–9.
71.
Whitehead, Concept of Nature, Chap. 3.
72.
Rescher, Process Philosophy.
73.
Ibid., p. 22.
74.
Salmon, “Why Ask, ‘Why?’,” Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World and Causality and Explanation; Dowe, “Causal Process Theories”; Davidson, “Causal Relations” and “Laws and Cause”.
75.
Harre, ‘Powers’; Harre; and Madden, “Natural Powers and Powerful Natures” and Causal Powers; Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science; Cartwright, Dappled World and Hunting Causes and Using Them.
76.
Patomaki, After International Relations; Kurki, Causation in International Relations; Wight, Agents, Structures and International Relations.
77.
Bhaskar, Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation, p. 61; Patomaki, “Concepts of ‘Action,’ ‘Structure’ and ‘Power’ in ‘Critical Social Realism’”.
78.
Bhaskar, Possibility of Naturalism, pp. 15–16; Chakravartty, Metaphysics for Scientific Realism, p. 108.
79.
Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, pp. 46–7.
80.
Mumford, “Causal Powers and Capacities”; Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations, pp. 72–111, for an excellent overview.
81.
Beebee, “Causation and Observation”.
82.
See Harre; and Madden, “Natural Powers and Powerful Natures” for quote, and Causal Powers.
83.
Bhaskar, Realist Theory of Science, pp. 46–7.
84.
Harre, Philosophies of Science; Harre and Madden, “Natural Powers and Powerful Natures” and “Exploring the Human Umwelt”.
85.
Patomäki, “Telling Better Stories about International Relations” and After International Relations, Chap. 5.
86.
Cartwright, Dappled World, p. 50.
87.
Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie; Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, Dappled Worldand Hunting Causes and Using Them.
88.
Giere, “Models, Metaphysics and Methodology”.
89.
Woodward, Making Things Happen, p. 357.
90.
Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, XII.138; Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation.
91.
Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, pp. 67–8.
92.
Dewey and Bentley, “Knowing and the Known”.
93.
Scriven, “Explanations, Predictions and Laws”.
94.
Mackie, Cement of the Universe, pp. 34–9.
95.
Psillos, Causation & Explanation, pp. 90–1; Kim, “Causes and Events”.
96.
Mackie, Cement of the Universe; Psillos, Causation & Explanation, pp. 81–92.
97.
Davidson, “Causal Relations”.
98.
Anscombe, “Causality and Determination”.
99.
Ducasse, Truth, Knowledge and Causation and Causation and Types of Necessity.
100.
Kratochwil, “Of False Promises and Good Bets”.
101.
Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp. 381–405.
102.
Martin, “Power for Realists”.
103.
Godfrey-Smith, “Causal Pluralism”.
104.
Lebow, Cultural Theory of International Relations, Chap. 1.
105.
Psillos, “Regularity Theories”.
106.
Ramsey, “Universals of Law and Fact”; Lewis, ‘Causation’.
107.
Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, p. 21.
108.
Psillos, “Regularity Theories”.
109.
Quine, “Natural Kinds”; Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast.
110.
Cartwright, How the Laws of Physics Lie.
111.
Venn, Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic, p. 98.
112.
Lebow, “What Can We Know?” [see also Chap. 2 in this volume].
113.
Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”; Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions; Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes”; Feyerabend, Against Method. For a sophisticated counter-argument, see van Fraassen, Empirical Stance.
114.
Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, p. 3.
115.
Ibid., p. 3.
116.
Morrison, “Capacities, Tendencies and the Problem of Singular Causes”; Psillos, Causation & Explanation, pp. 195–6.
117.
Wight, “They Shoot Dead Horses Don’t They?”; Patomaki, After International Relations.
118.
Psillos, “Regularity Theories”.
119.
Kurki, Causation in International Relations; Jackson, Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Department of War Studies, King’s College London, London, UK
Richard Ned Lebow

Authors

Richard Ned Lebow
View author publications
You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Richard Ned Lebow .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Department of War Studies, King's College London, London, United Kingdom
Richard Ned Lebow

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Lebow, R.N. (2016). Constructing Cause in International Relations. In: Lebow, R. (eds) Richard Ned Lebow: Major Texts on Methods and Philosophy of Science. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40027-3_6

Download citation

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40027-3_6
Published: 02 September 2016
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-40026-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-40027-3
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics