Abstract
Like so many of Hegel’s pithy observations, this one is suitably enigmatic. I am drawn to it because it can be read to capture, avant la lettre, and with admirable brevity, the implications of recent work on identity in psychology, analytical philosophy and political theory. This research indicates just how elusive the concept of the self is, conceptually and empirically. As many philosophers contend, the self may be an illusion, but one that is central to the well-being of modern people. As Hegel suggests, we appear in multiple guises by virtue of our numerous self-identifications, but invariably think of ourselves in the singular. Given the contradictions between our self-understandings and those of science, we have a strong incentive to keep the former under wraps. My goal in this book is to shed light on conceptions of identity and their associated practices. Following in the footsteps of Hegel, my end goal is to think about the relationship between identity, and politics and ethics.
Most analytical philosophers and neuroscientists question the existence of the self. Some deny its existence altogether, and describe consciousness as a never-ending stream of fleeting sensations and reflections on them. For others, there is a ‘minimal’ or phenomenological self, an illusion to be sure, but a powerful one that provides meaning to our lives and guidance in our interactions with others. If selfhood is questionable, identity, which rests upon the foundation of the self, is an even more dubious concept. Westerners—and many other people—would be as shocked by the thought that they do not possess a self as they would be by the suggestion that they are without a gender. More remarkable still, most Westerners believe in the face of all the evidence to the contrary that their identities are consistent and unique.
Highly respected scholars in diverse fields (e.g. Clifford Geertz, Erik Erikson, Paul Ricoeur and Anthony Giddens) encourage this illusion, as do prominent philosophers (e.g. Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor) who want to ground ethical systems in such identities. They write in an era when our discourses reveal the near-metastasis of the word self, which is now attached via a hyphen to an almost endless list of words. These include self-image, self-seeking, self-esteem, self-knowledge, self-consciousness, self-reference, self-preservation, all of which have a positive valence. In part, my project is aimed at pulling the empirical rug out from underneath such claims, but more importantly, in understanding why they are made. What accounts for our fixation on the self in the modern era, and more so still in the last half-century? What kinds of identity projects has modernity spawned? What accounts for this variation, and to whom do different constructions of identity appeal? Could we recognize ourselves as fragmented and question the status of the alleged selfhood on which our identities are based? If so, what would be the ethical consequences?
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Notes
- 1.
This text was first published as: The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). The permission to republish it here was granted on 24 June 2015 by Clair Taylor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- 2.
Hegel, “Preliminary Conceptions.”
- 3.
This insight can also be attributed to William James and George Herbert Mead. See James, Principles of Psychology; Mead, Mind, Self and Society; Markus, “Self-Schemata and Processing of Information about the Self.”
- 4.
Among philosophers there are, roughly speaking, two schools of thought. The ‘reductionist’ view, made prominent by David Hume, and more recently associated with Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, denies the notion of a persistent core self. The “non-reductionist” position, whose modern statement derives from John Locke, maintains that there is a core self that persists through various stages of life.
- 5.
Phenomenological is used here in its traditional continental sense to describe lived experience and its subjective dimensions.
- 6.
Yack, Fetishism of Modernities, pp. 32–5.
- 7.
Gillespie, Theological Origins of Modernity, pp. 44–68, on Petrarch. Masters, Fortune is a River, dates modernity to an encounter between Leonardo and Machiavelli at the beginning of the sixteenth century.
- 8.
Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem.
- 9.
Baudelaire, “Painter of Modern Life.”
- 10.
Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society.
- 11.
Swaine, Liberal Conscience.
- 12.
Noyes, “Subjunctive Worlds.”
- 13.
Noyes, “Subjunctive Worlds.”
- 14.
Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 129 (German pagination in margins).
- 15.
Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, p. 112.
- 16.
These claims are made by the social identity theory and self-categorization theory research programs.
- 17.
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Sects. 10, 13, and Antichrist, Sect. 11.
- 18.
Ibid., emphasis in original.
- 19.
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Sect. 13. Also see Beyond Good and Evil, ss. 17–20, Thus Spake Zarathustra, and Will to Power, s. 585a. Nietzsche nevertheless offers an ambivalent account of what he calls slave morality. He clearly dislikes slave morality because it is characterized by cleverness and ingenuity. It can nevertheless be quite powerful and shape the world in which persons live, and accordingly have a more positive dimension. This can be seen in Nietzsche’s fascination with St. Paul. While disapproving of his project, he was deeply impressed by Paul’s ability to create a new religion, a new grand myth that shaped and changed the world.
- 20.
On Schopenhauer see Magee, Philosophy of Schopenhauer; Saffranski, Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy. On Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, Seigel, “Problematizing the Self.”
- 21.
Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, Sect. 13. Also Beyond Good and Evil, ss. 17–20, Thus Spake Zarathustra, and Will to Power, s. 585a.
- 22.
Ibid., ss. 689, 1067 and Thus Spoke Zarathustra, pp. 227, 312.
- 23.
Radden, “Multiple Selves.”
Schneewind, “Use of Autonomy in Ethical Theory.”
- 24.
Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, p. 210.
- 25.
Deci and Ryan, “Motivational Approach to Self: Integration in Personality,” and “The ‘What’ and ‘Why’ of Goal Pursuits.”
- 26.
Burckhardt, Civilization of the Renaissance, pp. 81–5,184–99, for the original statement of this argument.
- 27.
Morris, Discovery of the Individual.
- 28.
Haskins, Renaissance of the Twelfth Century; Gaunt, “Martyr to Love”; Southern, Making of the Middle Ages and Medieval Humanism; Strayer, Reign of Philip the Fair and Medieval Origins of the Modern State; Hanning, Individual in Twelfth-Century Romance, pp. 2–3; Fajardo-Acosta, Courtly Seductions, Modern Subjections, pp. 1–6.
- 29.
Schneewind, Invention of Autonomy.
- 30.
Gillespie, Theological Origins of Modernity, esp. pp. 44–68.
- 31.
Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, p. 2.
- 32.
Oxford English Dictionary, vol. II, pp. 409–11, vol. I, p. 847.
- 33.
Hirschman, Passions and the Interests.
- 34.
Jones and Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory, p. 1.
- 35.
Examples include As You Like It, II.vii.139–43, Merchant of Venice, I.i.77–79, Henry IV, Part II, I.i.154–60. Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, pp. 14–25; Righter, Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play, pp. 64–7; Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, pp. 13–15; Agnew, Worlds Apart, pp. 14–16, 149–94; Van Laan, Role Playing in Shakespeare.
- 36.
Jones and Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory, pp. 1–4; Orgel, Impersonations, pp. 103–4; Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self, pp. 177–9.
- 37.
Jones and Stallybrass, Renaissance Clothing and the Materials of Memory, p. 35.
- 38.
Vasari, Opere, vol. IV, p. 74; Goffen, Renaissance Rivals, p. 194; Nesselrath, “Raphael and Pope Julius II.”
- 39.
Hartt and Wilkins, History of Italian Renaissance Art, p. 263.
- 40.
Lyons, Invention of the Self, pp. 40–54; Bloom, Shakespeare; Morris, Discovery of the Individual, pp. 16–17, 79–86, describes the temporary appearance of the genre in the mini-Renaissance of 1050–1200, notably in the writings of Otloh of Saint Emmeram, Guibert of Nogent and Peter Abelard. In English, Chaucer’s Wife of Bath’s Tale qualifies as fictional autobiography.
- 41.
Montaigne, Essays; Olney, Metaphors of Self, pp. 51–88; Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, pp. 84–7.
- 42.
Elton, “Shakespeare and the Thought of His Age”; Bloom, Shakespeare.
- 43.
“Goethe’s Works,” in The Works of Thomas Carlyle (London: Chapman and Hall, 1905), vol. XXVII, p. 438, quoted in Lynch, Economy of Character, p. 3.
- 44.
Lyons, Invention of the Self, p. 55; Freeman, Character’s Theater, pp. 189–90.
- 45.
Lyons, Invention of the Self, pp. 55–74. Boswell, Journey to the Hebrides.
- 46.
Postle, Sir Joshua Reynolds, pp. 60, 77 and the differences between Reynolds’ portraits of ordinary versus prominent people; Wendorf, Sir Joshua Reynolds; Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self, ch. 4 and pp. 268–71, on how individualized Sir Joshua Reynolds’ portraits of members of the Society of Dilettanti (1777–9) were in comparison to an earlier portrait by George Knapton.
- 47.
Wieland, Geschichte des Agathon; Berman, Politics of Individualism; Norton, Beautiful Soul; Carrithers, Collins and Lukes, Category of the Person, pp. 46–82; Buckley, Turning Key, p. 14.
- 48.
Quoted in Gergen, Saturated Self, p. 20.
- 49.
Wilde, “Critic as Artist.”
- 50.
Watt, Rise of the Novel; Steedman, Past Tenses, for the standard interpretation; Armstrong, How Novels Think, pp. 5–6.
- 51.
Lynch, Economy of Character; Kay, Political Constructions; Laden, Self-Imitation in the Eighteenth Century; Freeman, Character’s Theater; Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self.
- 52.
Rousseau, Emile, p. 234.
- 53.
Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality Among Men, pp. 115–16.
- 54.
Du Bois, Souls of Black Folk, p. 5. Ellison, Invisible Man, makes a similar argument about the black “invisible self” living within white society.
- 55.
Linton, Study of Man; Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure; Parsons, Structure of Social Action; Turner, “Role and the Person”; Jackson and Burke, “Status and Symptoms of Stress”; Lenski, “Social Participation and Status Crystallization”; Stryker and Macke, “Status Inconsistency and Role Conflict”; Zhang, “Status Inconsistency Revisited.”
- 56.
Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Part III, Sect. 2; Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, pp. 91–102.
- 57.
Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 332.
- 58.
Rousseau, Confessions.
- 59.
Barresi and Martin, “History as Prologue” also make this point.
- 60.
Brubaker and Cooper, “Beyond ‘Identity.”
- 61.
Olson, What Are We?, finds that definitions of the cognate self are so different and unrelated to one another to suggest the word be discarded from our vocabulary.
- 62.
Ibid.
- 63.
Onuf, “Parsing Personal Identity.”
- 64.
Taylor, Sources of the Self; Seigel, Idea of the Self; Martin and Barresi, Rise and Fall of Soul and Self, over more extensive overviews of the development of this concept.
- 65.
Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, p. 9.
- 66.
Machinist, “Voice of the Historian in the Ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean World.”
- 67.
Onians, Origins of European Thought, pp. 84–9.
- 68.
Vernant, “Intimations of the Will in Greek Tragedy.”
- 69.
Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, xvi, p. 112, notes the derivation of persona, which he compares to an actor on stage. Mauss, “Categorie de Personne”; Agnew, Worlds Apart, pp. 98–103.
- 70.
Cicero, De Offices, I, 30:107, 110, 35:126.
- 71.
Snell, Discovery of the Mind, on Greek conceptions.
- 72.
Plato, Phaedo, 70a and Republic, 608d; Aristotle, De Anima.
- 73.
Plotinus, Enneads, pp. 295, 339.
- 74.
Augustine, City of God, p. 248.
- 75.
Bossy, “Medieval Debates of Body and Soul.”
- 76.
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, ch. 27.
- 77.
Hobbes, Leviathan and De Cive; Tuck, Hobbes; Garrett, “Forum: The Idea of Self.”
- 78.
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
- 79.
Wahrman, Making of the Modern Self, p. 191.
- 80.
Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, ch. 27.
- 81.
Reid, Essays, p. 276; Wolterstorff, Thomas Reid and the Story of Epistemology.
- 82.
Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, vol. II, p. 350.
- 83.
Butler, “Human Nature and Other Sermons.”
- 84.
Martin and Barresi, Naturalization of the Soul on the general replacement of the soul by the self. For this process in France, Gauchet, Disenchantment of the World, pp. 162–4; Baker, “Enlightenment and the Institution of Society”; Bell, Cult of the Nation in France, ch. 1.
- 85.
Hume, “On the Immortality of the Soul.”
- 86.
Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, I.1.3, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2 and 3; Rosenberg, “Identity and Substance in Hume and Kant.”
- 87.
Bundle theory finds its most radical exponent in Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained, who dismisses our sense of continuity as an illusion that we impose on our perceptions.
- 88.
Hume, Treatise on Human Nature, VIII.1.17.
- 89.
Hume, Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, VIII.1.7.–8.
- 90.
Mendelssohn, Gesammelte Schriften, 3/1, pp. 96–104.
- 91.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B413-15; Kitcher, “Kant on Self-Identity”; Rosenberg, “Identity and Substance in Hume and Kant”; Falkenstein, “Double Edged Sword?”.
- 92.
Kant, Critique of Practical Reason; Guyer, “Transcendental Deduction of Categories,” for an overview.
- 93.
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A271-B327.
- 94.
Shell, Kant and the Limits of Autonomy, p. 2.
- 95.
Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and the Foundation of Inequality Among Men, pp. 115–16.
- 96.
Ibid., pp. 147–60.
- 97.
Ibid., pp. 174–5.
- 98.
Rousseau, Social Contract, ch. 3, pp. 252–3.
- 99.
Herder, Herder on Social and Political Culture; Heinz, Herder und die Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus.
- 100.
Erikson, Identity and the Life Cycle, vol. I, p. 22, and Identity: Youth and Crisis; Rogers, On Becoming A Person.
- 101.
Rokeach, Three Christs of Ypsilanti, p. 310.
- 102.
Rice, Disease of One’s Own; Davis, “Healing and the Fragmented Self.”
- 103.
Mauss, “Categorie de Personne.”
- 104.
Geertz, “‘From the Native’s Point of View.’”
- 105.
Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity.”
- 106.
Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 47.
- 107.
MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 201.
- 108.
Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity, pp. 54, 75.
- 109.
Erikson, Childhood and Society; Ricoeur, “Narrative Identity.”
- 110.
Theiss-Morse, Who Counts as an American?; Kessler and McKenna, Gender; Ortner and Whitehead, Sexual Meaning; Money, Gay, Straight, and In-Between; Feinstein, Real Men Don’t Eat Quiche.
- 111.
Zahavi, “Unity of Consciousness.”
- 112.
Abelson, “Script Processing in Attitude Formation and Decision-Making”; Gergen and Gergen, “Narrative Form and the Construction of Psychological Science”; Robinson, “Sampling Autobiography”; Brewer, “What is Autobiographical Memory?”; Neisser, “Self-Narratives”; Barclay, “Composing Protoselves Through Improvisation.”
- 113.
Edwards and Potter, “Chancellor’s Memory”; Edwards, Potter and Middleton, “Toward a Discursive Psychology of Remembering”; Gergen, “Mind, Text, and Society.” For criticism, Baddeley, “Is Memory all Talk?”; Hyman, “Multiple Approaches to Remembering”; Neisser, “Psychology of Memory and the Socio-Linguistics of Remembering.”
- 114.
Halbwachs, Cadres sociaux de la mémoire and Topographie legendaire des Evangiles en Terre Sainte. Alexandre, ed., Memoire collective, pp. 73–90, for Halbwachs’ work and its reception.
- 115.
Durkheim, Elementary Forms of the Religious Life; Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication; and the large corpus of more recent literature on collective memory.
- 116.
Vygotsky, Mind in Society, Bartlett, Remembering.
- 117.
Schacter, Searching for Memory and Cognitive Neuropsychology of False Memory.
- 118.
Allport and Postman, Psychology of Rumor; Bartlett, Remembering; Singer, Repression and Dissociation; Rubin, Remembering Our Past; Conway et al., Theoretical Perspectives on Autobiographical Memory; Collins, Gathercole, Conway and Morris, Theories of Memory.
- 119.
Neisser, Memory Observed.
- 120.
Bohannon and Symons, “Flashbulb Memories.”
- 121.
Schwartz, “Social Context of Commemoration.”
- 122.
Wegner, White Bears and Other Unwanted Thoughts; Pennebaker and Harber, “Social Stage Model of Collective Coping.”
- 123.
Neisser, “John Dean’s Memory”; Spence, Narrative Truth and Historical Truth; White, “Recall of Autobiographical Events”; Polkinghorne, “Narrative and Self-Concept”; Neisser, Perceived Self; Neisser and Fivush, Remembering Self.
- 124.
Kafka, Trial.
- 125.
Koestler, Darkness at Noon.
- 126.
Maslow, Motivation and Personality and Toward a Psychology of Being.
- 127.
Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart.
- 128.
Larmore, Les pratiques du moi and “Alessandro Ferrara’s Theory of Authenticity”; Gecas,.
- 129.
“Self-Concept as a Basis for a Theory of Motivation”; Ferrara, Reflective Authenticity and “Authenticity Without a True Self”; Vannini and Williams, Authenticity in Culture, Self, and Society.
- 130.
Gilmore and Pine, Authenticity, p. 43.
- 131.
Durkheim, Rules of Sociological Method and Suicide.
- 132.
Berger and Luckmann, Social Construction of Reality.
- 133.
Hobbes, Leviathan.
- 134.
Hobbes, Leviathan.
- 135.
Musil, Man Without Qualities, p. 30.
- 136.
Baars, In the Theatre of Consciousness, unconvincingly draws on neuroscience to make the case for an underlying implicit self.
- 137.
Onuf, “Parsing Personal Identity.”
- 138.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception; Thompson, Mind and Life.
- 139.
Gurwitsch, “Nonegological Conception of Consciousness.”
- 140.
Siderits, “Buddhist Non-Self”; Metzinger, Being No One and “No-Self Alternative”; Zahavi, “Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self.”
- 141.
Parfit, Reasons and Persons and “Unimportance of Identity”; Metzinger, “No-Self Alternative,” for different understandings of this position.
- 142.
Zahavi, “Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self”; Henry and Thompson, “Witnessing from Here.”
- 143.
Albahari, Analytical Buddhism; Zahavi, “Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self.”
- 144.
Legrand, “The Bodily Self”; Legrand and Ruby, “What is Self-Specific?”.
- 145.
Bermudez, “Bodily Awareness and Self-Consciousness”; Tsakiris, “Sense of Body Ownership”; Henry and Thompson, “Witnessing from Here.”
- 146.
Strawson, “The Minimal Self’ and Selves.
- 147.
Zahavi, “Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self.”
- 148.
LeDoux, Synaptic Self, p. 31, on the inability to reconcile psychological understandings of identity with brain function.
- 149.
Gallagher, ‘Introduction’; Campbell, “Personal Identity.”
- 150.
Shoemaker, “On What We Are.”
- 151.
Perry, “Essential Indexical.”
- 152.
Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 208.
- 153.
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, and “Narrative Identity.” Schechtman, “Narrative Self.”
- 154.
Nelson, “Narrative and the Emergence of a Conscious Self’; Donald, Origins of the Modern Mind and Mind So Rare. See also the pioneering work of Sarbin, Narrative Psychology; Bruner, “Life as Narrative” and Acts of Meaning; Polkinghorne, Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences and “Narrative and Self-Concept.”
- 155.
Dennett, “Self as Center of Narrative Identity.”
- 156.
Lamarque, “On the Distance between Literary Narratives and Real-Life Narratives.”
- 157.
Menary, “Our Glassy Essence”; Hermans, “Dialogical Self” on Pragmatism and identity.
- 158.
James, Principles of Psychology, p. 294.
- 159.
Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic; Menary, “Our Glassy Essence.”
- 160.
Holquist and Clark, Mikhail Bakhtin; Hermans, “Dialogical Self.”
- 161.
Berger and Luckman, Social Construction of Reality.
- 162.
Gergen, Saturated Self and “Social Construction of Self.”
- 163.
Foucault, Archeology of Knowledge, “What is Enlightenment?” For the quote, History of Sexuality, vol. I, p. 112.
- 164.
Lyotard, Inhuman, p. 5.
- 165.
Foucault, Madness and Civilization and Discipline and Punish; Lawlor, “Postmodern Self.”
- 166.
Foucault, Madness and Civilization.
- 167.
Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.”
- 168.
Derrida, Of Grammatology, ‘Difference’ and Speech and Phenomena.
- 169.
Lyotard, Differend. Seigel, Idea of the Self, pp. 603–50, for an excellent discussion of postmodernist understandings of identity.
- 170.
Ricoeur, Oneself as Alternative.
- 171.
Parfit, “Unimportance of Identity,” offers a parallel construction.
- 172.
Bem, “Self Perception” and “Self-Perception Theory,” for perhaps the strongest statement of this relationship. See also Hopf, “Logic of Habit in International Relations.”
- 173.
Milosz, Captive Mind, pp. 54–81.
- 174.
Gergen, Saturated Self and “Social Construction of Self.”
- 175.
Lebow, Between Peace and War, ‘Introduction.’
- 176.
Lebow, “Identity and Self-Identification.”
- 177.
Lebow, “Ethics and Identity.”
- 178.
Winter and Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century; Lebow, “Memory of Politics in Postwar Europe”; Fogu and Kansteiner, “Politics of Memory and the Poetics of History.” For overviews of the memory field, Olick and Robinson, “Social Memory Studies”; Kansteiner, “Finding Meaning in Memory.”
- 179.
Hall, Government and Local Power in Japan; Barshay, “Doubly Cruel,” on the case of Japanese feudalism and capitalism.
- 180.
Woolgar and Pawluch, “Ontological Gerrymandering.”
- 181.
King, Keohane and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry.
- 182.
Friedman, “Social Self and the Partiality Debate”; Erskine, Embedded Cosmopolitanism makes some of the same points in an international context.
- 183.
Bartelson, Genealogy of Sovereignty; Lawson and Shilliam, “Beyond Hypocrisy?”.
- 184.
Lebow, The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves (Cambridge: University Press, 2012).
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Lebow, R.N. (2016). The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves. In: Lebow, R. (eds) Richard Ned Lebow: Key Texts in Political Psychology and International Relations Theory. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 4. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39964-5_5
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