Abstract
This paper offers an extended critique of a position I call Mariomania. Mariomaniacs believe that, if there is life on Mars, even if it is merely microbial, we must “leave Mars to the Martians.” The justification for this sort of claim is less than clear, but seems to revolve around a strong notion of intrinsic value. Such positions encounter major pragmatic problems, however, since ethical rules based on strong intrinsic value tend to be inviolate in character. Attempts to apply Mariomaniacal ideals will thus encounter the same sorts of difficulties that plague other supposedly inviolate ethical principles, such as the Prime Directive from Star Trek. These types of concerns no doubt account in part for the unpopularity of Mariomaniacal ideas as revealed in a poll of both lay and professional ethical audiences. After examining some of the problems that plague Mariomania, I offer an outline of a counter-argument that stresses the opportunity costs humanity would incur by foregoing exploitation of Mars , showing that there are good moral reasons for human interests to be given pride of place when they conflict with those of Martian microbes.
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- 1.
Our initial reaction might also be to value Martian microbes highly because they are very rare—the only other form of life beyond Earth. However, finding life on Mars would actually be a good indication that life is ubiquitous in the universe.
- 2.
The terms Mariophile and Mariomaniac are meant as blanket terms covering all those who share these broad conclusions, though they might do so in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons.
- 3.
York goes on to argue that, even if Mars is lifeless, an Aldo Leopold style “land ethic” may still be morally required.
- 4.
It’s important to separate two distinct claims here: (1) that some beings have a special, intrinsic, moral value and (2) that human beings are the only ones on Earth in this category. The first is a theoretical claim while the second is empirical. In particular, it is quite unfair to accuse Kant of unprincipled anthropomorphism, as he would have welcomed other beings to the community of intrinsic value had he been convinced they could reason in the requisite fashion.
- 5.
Cockell (2011) has distanced himself from full-blown Mariomania in more recent work.
- 6.
It should be noted that the problem is not with intrinsic value per se, but rather with the strength of this value. It’s certainly possible to defend a weaker notion of intrinsic value such that entities with intrinsic value are not necessarily more valuable than those without it. This restores our ability to negotiate conflicts between interests, but only by reintroducing the problem of the moral marketplace, since saying Martian microbes are intrinsically valuable in this weaker sense does not tell us much about how they should be treated relative to other beings.
- 7.
It is perhaps worth noting the obvious here—that both the UN and Federation are clearly talking about our duties towards other humans, or at least other creatures with abilities much like humans. So even if we wholeheartedly endorse these principles in this context, it certainly does not follow that they apply to microbes.
- 8.
Indeed, the necessity of these kinds of moves can cause great confusion about the nature of morality. Thus, students in their first ethics classes will often say things like, “Well, this is not the moral thing to do, but it’s the right thing,” suggesting that the right thing to do is often different from our moral principles. Obviously, this sort of confusion can greatly undermine our faith in the possibility of an objective morality—the defense of which is, at least historically, the point of inviolate principles in the first place.
- 9.
To be sure, there are other problems with the Prime Directive. For example, it often seems to be little more than an instance of the naturalistic fallacy. In this particular case, it has also been argued that it invokes a particularly unsavory form of social Darwinism (Dvorsky 2007).
- 10.
This recent posting by an editor of Scientific American on their blog expresses concern about restrictions on scientific investigations of Mars based on an overly strong desire to prevent forward contamination of Martian microbes. The co-Chairs of NASA’s planetary protection commission posted a defense of their policies which draw, not on Mariomaniac arguments, but rather on purely pragmatic considerations as to how best to do the science. This is a crucial distinction, because there is much more consensus on both the scientific value of Martian life and the best way to conduct the science (at least in the short term) than on more abstract considerations of moral value.
- 11.
They are alive, though since this is a property shared with all life on Earth, it doesn’t help much in deciding relative ethical value. It might also be argued that they have the potential to develop these other ethically salient properties and thus deserve moral privilege on this basis. It is certainly possible to argue this way, though again such potential is presumably quite common. Moreover, plausibility is strained considerably when we realize that the timeframe needed for evolution to realize this potential is probably on the order of several billion years.
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Smith, K.C. (2016). The Curious Case of the Martian Microbes: Mariomania, Intrinsic Value and the Prime Directive. In: Schwartz, J., Milligan, T. (eds) The Ethics of Space Exploration. Space and Society. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39827-3_14
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