Abstract
Truth exists and we can know it. The universe (all there is) also exists and we can know it. Further, universals exist and we can know these, too. Any skepticism about truth, reality, or universals is self-refuting. There are two kinds of truth: ontological and epistemological, comprising existence and our understanding of existence. Tremendous disservice has been done by ignoring this distinction. There are two modes of truth: necessary and local or conditional. A necessary truth is proposition that is so based on a chain of reasoning from indubitable axioms or sense impressions. A local truth, and most truths are local, is so based on a set of premises assumed or believed true. From this seemingly trivial observation, everything flows, and is why so-called Gettier problems and the like aren’t problems after all. Science is incapable of answering questions about itself; the belief that it can is called scientism. Faith, belief, and knowledge are differentiated.
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Notes
- 1.
I keep this definition throughout the book unless otherwise specified.
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Briggs, W. (2016). Truth, Argument, Realism. In: Uncertainty. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39756-6_1
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