Abstract
In 1920, in Norway, the mood was bleak. Incomes from shipping, fisheries, and timber exports were decreasingly able to finance imports of necessities. It is significant that in the official history of Norges Bank, much space is used to discuss fishing volumes, fish prices, and freight rates, e.g. p. 215 (my translation): “In 1919, fishery was good. 657.000 tons were fished. Prices at first hand were not bad…and substantially better than in 1917 and 1918. In 1920, fishery was less good––only 484.000 tons were fished––and prices were much lower than the previous year.” It was explained that the drop in fishing volumes and prices in 1920 was partly caused by the sales of stocks built up during the war years. The stocks were sold in a market where capacities were being rebuilt elsewhere.
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Notes
- 1.
Jahn, Eriksen & Munthe (1966) Norges Bank gjennom 150 År (Norges Bank) p. 215.
- 2.
cf. E.Engebretsen (1948) Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse 1848–1948 (Oslo), p. 270.
- 3.
As reprinted in Jahn, Eriksen & Munthe (1966), p. 216.
- 4.
cf. Jahn, Eriksen & Munthe (1966), p. 298.
- 5.
cf. H. Skånland (1967) Det norske Kredittmarked siden 1900 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå), p. 165.
- 6.
Statistisk Sentralbyrå (1994) Historisk Statistikk, pp. 624–25.
- 7.
cf. Statistisk Sentralbyrå (1994) Historisk Statistikk, pp. 622–28, and H.I. Matre (1992) Norske Kredittinstitutioner 1850–1990, NORAS, rapport nr. 42.
- 8.
The first banking act was passed in 1924. For a discussion of this banking act, see Steffen Elkiær Andersen (2010) The Evolution of Nordic Finance (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 221–22 and 229–30. In 1924, a banking inspection was also created.
- 9.
“…mange av avdelingene hadde gitt lån som neppe under noen forhold kunne forsvares.” Jahn, Eriksen & Munthe (1966) Norges Bank gjennom 150 år (Norges Bank), p. 229.
- 10.
“For Norges Bank vil målet være å holde kursen mest mulig stabil. Vi trenger sårt til ro og banken vil således, som kommisjonen ønsker, innrette sin politikk derefter.” Here quoted from Jahn, Eriksen & Munthe (1966) Norges Bank gjennom 150 år (Norges Bank), p. 249.
- 11.
Particularly Den norske Creditbank (now DNC Nor) and Bergens Privatbank (since the early 1990s part of DNC Nor. After much discussion with the government and in the Storting, the rescue came from Norges Bank alone.
- 12.
They did not all exist simultaneously. Some were merged or closed down over the years. For more details, see Steffen Elkiær Andersen (2010) The Evolution of Nordic Finance (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 128–2, 223–4, and 228–33.
- 13.
Here quoted from Jahn, Eriksen & Munthe (1966), pp. 303–04, where the original English text has been reproduced in Norwegian translation.
- 14.
cf. Hanisch, Søilen & Ecklund (1999) Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 20. århundrede (HøyskoleForlaget), p. 151.
- 15.
It would be a misunderstanding of Frisch to regard him as a “Soviet style” socialist. To Frisch, a planning of production and investments just seemed more likely to lead to “reasonable” results than the random accidents of market mechanisms.
- 16.
”Lov on adgang til regulering af penge- og kredittforholdene af 25. juni 1965.
- 17.
cf. Nanisch, Søilen & Ecklund (1999) Norsk økonomisk politikk i det 20. århundre”, (HøyskoleForlaget), pp. 150–61, and pp. 181–87.
- 18.
“…å være et rådgivende organ og et bindeledd mellom de deltagende institusjoner. Den skal særlig drøfte retningslinjene for bankenes utlån, deres likviditet og stilling forøvrig, i samsvar med de prinsipielle linjer for den økonomiske politikk som statsmaktene til enhver tid har trukket opp.” Here quoted from Kaare Petersen (1982) Kredittpolitikken i Støpeskjeen (A/S Hjemmet-Fagpressen), p. 84. K. Petersen was the general manager of the Norwegian Bankers Association 1961–77, and 1978–82 member of the board of governors of Norges Bank.
- 19.
Gunnar Jahn had been general manager of Statistisk Sentralbyrå (1920-46), finance minister in the all-party coalition government (1945), and head governor of Norges Bank (1947 – 54). Co-author of Norges Bank gjennom 150 år (1966).
- 20.
“Stiller en sig det spørgsmål om vi styrker vår utenlandske kreditt ved at Staten nå går til innløsning av aksjene i Norges Bank, bliver svaret ubetinget nej…vår erfaring fra alle de ganger vi har været i kontakt med utenlandske kretser er at en realisasjon av denne tanke vil være egnet til å svekke Norges kreditt.” Here quoted from Jahn, Eriksen og Munthe (1966) Norges Bank Gjennom 150 År (Norges Bank), p. 412.
- 21.
Lov av 8. july 1949.
- 22.
“…Regjeringa har funni det rett å slå fast, også reint formelt, at Norges Bank er ein statsbank fullt og heilt, på same måten som i…våre granneland som Danmark og Sverike og i ei rekkje andre européiske land.” Here quoted from Jahn, Eriksen og Munthe (Norges Bank, 1966), p. 411.
- 23.
If the gold was still booked at the 1928 par value, which it seems to have been, it would have been heavily undervalued in the spring of 1949. After the September 1949 devaluation of most western European currencies it would have been even more undervalued. In 1946 the Bank’s gold holdings were booked at NOK 406 million, and in 1950 at only 243 million, approximately the same value as in the second half of the 1930s (Historisk Statistik, 1994, p. 618). It is, however, unclear if any gold had been sold in the meantime.
- 24.
The source here is Jahn, Eriksen og Munthe (Norges Bank, 1966). It is, of course, possible that the cellars of Norges Bank contain material which can cast some light on this question.
- 25.
cf: K.Petersen (1982) Kredittpolitikkenni støbeskjeen (A/S Hjemmet-Fagpresseforlaget), p. 154: ”Norge fikk en penge- og kredittpolitisk lov mere omfattende enn noe andet land i den vestlige verden.” My translation: ”Norway got a money and credit policy act more comprehensive than any other country in the Western world.”
- 26.
Older observers may still remember outfits like Global Finans and Nevi Finans, which arranged credits directly between companies with temporary excess liquidity and other companies with temporary liquidity needs.
- 27.
Much has been written in the Scandinavian languages on the Scandinavian banking crisis in the late 1980s, including several official reports. For a summary in English, see Steffen Elkiær Andersen (2010) The Evolution of Nordic Finance (Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 237–40. An official report in English was produced by Norges Bank (2004) The Norwegian Banking Crisis (Occasional Papers no 13).
- 28.
One of the largest banks (DNB) contested this treatment in court, and the shareholders were allowed to keep about 50 % of the share capital.
- 29.
“I forbindelse med en utredning av hvilke funksjoner Norges Bank skal tillegges, hvordan den skal organiseres og innpasses i styringsverket, bes komitéen komme med forslag til endring av lov av…1875 om Pengevesenet og lov av 1892…om Norges Bank, samt eventuelle andre lover og bestemmelser som komitéen…finner det ønskelig å endre…” Here quoted from the committee’s final report (”Lov om Norges Bank og pengevesenet”, NOU 1983: 39), p. 20.
- 30.
I am grateful to Jan F. Qvigstad, executive director of Norges Bank, for having pointed this out to me.
- 31.
I am grateful to Jan F. Qvikstad, executive director of Norges Bank, for making this clear to me.
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Andersen, S.E. (2016). Norges Bank and the Four Criteria. In: The Origins and Nature of Scandinavian Central Banking. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39750-4_10
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