Abstract
This chapter explores the results at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907, detailing a number of subsidiary arms negotiations at The Hague. The Admiralty sought limits on aerial bombardment, the use of naval mines, and the conversion of merchant ships to auxiliary cruisers, in each case raising questions of arms control. At the conference, the Foreign Office consciously sought to deflect questions of strategic interest, focusing upon humanitarian arguments to provide cover for ulterior motives. The chapter sets out the relative successes and failures of these initiatives while noting the inability of the Conference to resolve the overall question of the naval arms race.
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Notes
- 1.
The London Times, as quoted in Punch, or the London Charivari, July 10, 1907, Vol. CXXXIII, (1907), at 25. The Times article covered discussions on declarations of war at The Hague.
- 2.
Tate, The Disarmament Illusion, 340–45; Dülffer, Regeln Gegen Den Krieg? 326–27; Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference, 215–19; Morris, “English Radicals’ Campaign,” 391–93.
- 3.
See Jonathan Steinberg, “The Copenhagen Complex,” Journal of Contemporary History 1, no. 3 (1966).
- 4.
Whether or not Germany intended to honor law in a future war remained another question. See Hull, A Scrap of Paper.
- 5.
On further overlap of rules of war and naval arms limitation at the Second Hague Peace Conference, see Keith Neilson, “The British Empire Floats on the British Navy” in McKercher, Arms Limitation and Disarmament.
- 6.
Regarding the 1874 Brussels Conference, see Derby to Loftus, July 4, 1874, in FO 412/16; regarding the 1899 Hague Conference, see Davis, The United States and the Second Hague Peace Conference, 12–13, 28.
- 7.
Matthew S. Seligmann, “New Weapons for New Targets: Sir John Fisher, the Threat from Germany, and the Building of HMS Dreadnought and HMS Invincible, 1902–1907,” International History Review 30, no. 2 (2008): 316–17.
- 8.
Despite leaving considerable records on the Hague Conference and other legal topics, Satow wrote little about arms limitation. While he extensively commented on the immunity of private property, there were few marks on arms control memoranda in his possession. This is not entirely surprising as there were fewer contentious legal principles to decide with armaments as compared to maritime law.
- 9.
Untitled, The (London) Times, May 1, 1907, at 9, col. E.
- 10.
Grey to Bryce, May 6, 1907, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VIII.
- 11.
Note by Satow, May 13, 1907, Id. Considering Grey’s fixation on limitation of military budgets, the absence of this method is interesting.
- 12.
Crowe to wife, June 15, 1907, Crowe Mss., MS. Eng. D. 2901.
- 13.
Memorandum by Sir Edmond Elles, enclosure in Fry to Grey, July 9, 1907, No. 42, FO 412/87, Further Correspondence Respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague (July 1907).
- 14.
James Brown Scott, ed., The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: Translation of the Original Texts: The Conference of 1907, Volume III, (New York, Oxford University Press 1921), p. 153–4.
- 15.
Fry to Grey, June 17, 1907, in FO 412/86.
- 16.
Nelidov, June 15, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. I, 47, 48.
- 17.
A year later, Grey would fully express his views on the Anglo-German naval arms race, noting that no other issue divided the two states, thus competition in armaments caused the rift, rather than followed it. Memorandum by Grey, Aug. 6, 1908, Gooch and Temperley, eds., British Documents, Vol. VI. This same outlook can be seen in the Foreign Office desire for an exchange of information at The Hague, which could alleviate the arms race by demonstrating its self-reinforcing nature, without addressing underlying international tensions.
- 18.
Fry to Grey, July 16, 1907, in FO 412/87. Moreover, Nelidov later stated that Great Britain was merely “giving expression to its own preoccupations,” in leading the crusade for arms limitation. Nelidov, Aug. 17, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. I, 92.
- 19.
Fry to Grey, July 16, 1907, in FO 412/87.
- 20.
Fry, Aug. 17, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. I, 88–90.
- 21.
Nelidov, Aug. 17, 1907, Id., 93.
- 22.
“Final Act, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908).
- 23.
International lawyers generally held that the label of an agreement, whether declaration, convention, or treaty, carried less weight than the actual obligation contained in a document. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, Vol. I, Peace 551–52. However, a voeu was a specific usage for non-binding statements, and the framing of the arms statement as a resolution was a means of differentiating what would otherwise be a weak obligation from an outright non-binding view.
- 24.
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. 1, 137.
- 25.
Technically, a party generally had the right to make interpretive declarations and reservations upon the signing of a treaty, which could release them from specific obligations. However, as a practical matter, the inclusion of the resolution in the final act of the conference implied the general consent of the parties.
- 26.
Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907, Vol. 1, 139.
- 27.
As a point of law, as opposed to the practical question of limiting the pre-war arms race, this should not be underestimated. A similar principle of law, the Martens’ clause, which noted vaguely that the means of injuring an enemy are not unlimited, has since developed into a key premise underlying the laws of warfare. “Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908): Art. 22.
- 28.
“Declaration Concerning Aerial Bombardment, July 29, 1899,” American Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 Supplement (1907).
- 29.
The declarations regarding poison gas and dum-dum bullets remained in effect until renounced, thus were not on the 1907 agenda.
- 30.
Lord Reay, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 148. Fortunately, following this pious speech, no one noticed that Great Britain was the only great power non-signatory of the 1899 Aerial Bombardment Declaration.
- 31.
Id. The British were not alone in advocating this stance. Austro-Hungarian delegate Szilássy noted that aerial bombardment in 1907 was “not indispensable” making regulation more practical. Szilássy, Aug. 7, 1907, Id., 146. The regulation of aerial bombardment included an interesting question – did law follow military technology, or could it lead? While the British, Austro-Hungarian, and other delegations believed that law could lead, by stifling a new technology, other delegates believed that law could only follow military developments, and channel conduct into acceptable bounds. Italian delegate De Robilant held that scientific progress could not be halted, “to-morrow we will have armored automobiles armed with rapid fire guns … and it will become more and more difficult, … to prevent balloons from being armed in their turn and using their arms.” De Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 150.
- 32.
It would be another one to two years before the British public truly awakened to the risks of aerial warfare, and this belated recognition was partly occasioned by the early cross-channel flights by Blériot, partly by belief that bomb-carrying German airships were already prowling over English skies. Alfred Gollin, The Impact of Air Power on the British People and Their Government, 1909–1914 (London: Macmillan, 1989), 49, 70–71. Nonetheless, the War Office recognized the threat and gave its wholehearted support to international regulation. War Office to Foreign Office, July 8, 1907, in FO 412/87.
- 33.
“Declaration Prohibiting the Discharge of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Aerial Bombardment Declaration].
- 34.
Renault, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 147.
- 35.
See Amourel, Aug. 14, 1907, Id., 14; “Hague Land Warfare Convention 1907,” Art. 25.
- 36.
1907 Hague Aerial Bombardment Declaration. The Italian delegate Tornielli expressed the opinion that the use of two separate legal instruments indicated that the general prohibition contained in the rules of war did not cover aerial bombardment and sought express inclusion of a prohibition. Tornielli, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 153. This different interpretation took on practical dimensions following Italian aerial bombardment of Libyan villages in the 1911–1912 Italo-Turkish War. See “The Use of Balloons in the War between Italy and Turkey,” American Journal of International Law 6, no. 2 (1912).
- 37.
An Italian delegate actually pointed out that the advances made by its ally Germany were forcing the pace of development. See de Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 150. Germany possessed an advantage in dirigible aircraft construction, while France led the world in airplanes.
- 38.
Szilásy, Aug. 7, 1907, Id., 146.
- 39.
This is not unusual in arms control, and is sometimes referred to as a “no first use” rule. The 1925 Geneva Protocol forbade the use of chemical weapons, while still allowing possession. This served a deterrent function, by allowing states to retaliate if a violation did occur.
- 40.
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 149.
- 41.
Scott, ed., Hague Conventions, 223–24. In contrast, Great Britain was the only great power not to have ratified the 1899 declaration. However, all the great powers did sign the Convention Regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare, with only Italy having failed to ratify it by 1914, increasing the likelihood that aerial bombardment would fall under legal prescription in a future conflict. Scott, ed., Hague Conventions, 222–23, 36, et. seq.
- 42.
1907 Hague Aerial Bombardment Declaration.
- 43.
Memo by Sir E. Elles respecting the Three Declarations of 1899, Enclosure No. 2 in Fry to Grey, Aug. 13, 1907, in Further Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 412/88, (Aug. 1907). As evidence, the author of this passage noted that Great Britain had been induced to accede to the Expanding Bullets Declaration by weight of public opinion.
- 44.
Similarly, the customary prohibition on chemical and biological weapons slowly developed during the twentieth century, and despite similar predictions early in the century that these scourges would become hallmarks of modern conflict, their use has been decidedly limited. See Scott A. Keefer, “International Control of Biological Weapons,” Nova Journal of International and Comparative Law 6 (1999).
- 45.
De Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 151. However, it should be noted that prior to the First World War, most pilots were self-trained enthusiasts, rather than militarily instructed soldiers, thus might not necessarily fall under military discipline. In the conflicts involving airpower prior to 1914, the pilots were often mercenaries hired following the outbreak of war. See Wilmot E. Ellis, “Aerial-Land and Aerial-Maritime Warfare,” American Journal of International Law 8, no. 2 (1914): 261.
- 46.
De Robilant, Aug. 7, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 151.
- 47.
1907 Hague Aerial Bombardment Declaration.
- 48.
Ottley to Fry, Sep. 1, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, Sep. 2, 1907, in Further Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 412/89, (Sep. 1907).
- 49.
Submarine Automatic Mines, Mar. 13, 1905, at 1, CAB 4/1/52 B.
- 50.
Id.
- 51.
Ottley to Fry, June 21, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, June 24, 1907, in FO 412/86. Ottley also presented a novel proposal to ban the use of torpedoes at night, ostensibly to prevent the occurrence of another Dogger Bank-type incident. However, he noted that Great Britain possessed more submarines than Germany, and that unlike torpedo boats, these vessels could effectively fire torpedoes during daylight. Ottley, Restrictions on the Use of Locomotive Torpedoes at Night, Enclosure No. 2, in Fry to Grey.
- 52.
Ottley to Fry, June 21, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, June 24, 1907, in FO 412/86.
- 53.
Admiralty to Foreign Office, June 28, 1907, in FO 412/86.
- 54.
“There will always be a lingering doubt in the mind of an Admiral commanding a fleet as to how far he is justified in accepting a mere paper assurance from an enemy, as being really a binding and effective guarantee against a treacherous torpedo attack at night.” Ottley to Fry, June 21, 1907, Enclosure 1 in Fry to Grey, June 24, 1907, in FO 412/86.
- 55.
Ottley, June 27, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings Vol. III, 524.
- 56.
Satow, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 381.
- 57.
1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 526.
- 58.
Id., 391–92. The British delegation doubted the sincerity of the German proposal, Commander Segrave, a naval expert, claiming that the offer was only made after it was clear that a majority would oppose it. Memo by Commander Segrave, Enclosure No. 1 in Fry to Grey, Sep. 30, 1907, in Further Correspondence respecting the Second Peace Conference at the Hague, FO 412/90, (Oct.–Dec. 1907). The United States also unsuccessfully attempted to reintroduce a total ban of unanchored mines. Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 405.
- 59.
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 405. Article 1 of the final convention prohibited the laying of unanchored mines that did not become harmless after one hour, anchored mines that did not become harmless if they broke free from their moorings, and torpedoes that did not become harmless when missing their target. “Convention Relative to the Laying of Submarine Mines, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908) [hereinafter1907 Hague Submarine Mine Convention]. The weapons remained legal as long as they met the safety requirements.
- 60.
Legal authorities generally defined territorial waters as three miles from the low water mark of the coastline.
- 61.
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 662.
- 62.
Siegel, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 380.
- 63.
Id., 417.
- 64.
Satow, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 382.
- 65.
Marschall, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 385. On subsequent German conduct in the First World War, see Hull, A Scrap of Paper, 155.
- 66.
Satow, Sep. 17, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 381.
- 67.
At stake was the question of whether mines could be fitted with devices rendering them harmless within a fixed period of time, or after becoming untethered. Expert opinion was mixed. A Dutch delegate suggested that if the law was set, surely “science will not be slow in finding means to meet it satisfactorily.” Röell, Sep. 17, 1907, Id., 417. On the more general question of an outright ban on unanchored mines, it was argued that once a weapon had been used, it could no longer be forbidden. Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings III, 404.
- 68.
1907 Hague Submarine Mines Convention, Art. 7.
- 69.
Article 2 contained a provision banning the use of mines “with the sole object of interrupting commercial navigation.” Id. The phrase “sole object” caused some concern. Like the ban on artillery shells designed for the “sole object” of spreading poisonous gas, it did not prohibit the use of weapons for more than one purpose. Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 414–15.
- 70.
1907 Hague Submarine Mines Convention, Art. 1.
- 71.
Id.
- 72.
Id., Arts. 11 & 12. The specificity of these provisions would prevent the question from disappearing from the Hague agenda, a threat faced by overall arms limitation. On the subsequent British stance towards mines, see Hull, A Scrap of Paper, 156–157 and Nicholas A. Lambert, Planning Armageddon: British Economic Warfare and the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012) 180–181; Lambert, Fisher’s Naval Revolution, 271. By 1913, Britain considered using the negative votes by states at The Hague to justify harsh mine warfare against commerce. Id.
- 73.
Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat; Seligmann, “New Weapons,” 316–17. See also Marder, The Anatomy of British Sea Power, 102–04.
- 74.
Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 747.
- 75.
Behr, Aug. 3, 1907, Id., 920–21.
- 76.
See Satow memoranda of Aug. 22, 1907, Ernest Satow MSS, PRO 30/33/10/16.
- 77.
Siegel, July 12, 1907, Scott, ed., 1907 Proceedings, Vol. III, 811.
- 78.
Id., 811–14.
- 79.
Lord Reay, July 12, 1907, Id., 813. Belligerent warships possessed certain rights to stop and inspect neutral cargoes on the high seas, creating a risk if a neutral merchant ship failed to recognize and halt for a converted merchant cruiser.
- 80.
Fusinato, Aug. 30, 1907, Id., 991.
- 81.
Id., 992.
- 82.
Lammasch, July 12, 1907, Id., 810.
- 83.
Lord Reay, Aug. 3, 1907, Id., 921.
- 84.
“Convention Relative to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War Ships, Oct. 18, 1907,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 1/2 Supplement (1908): Arts. 1 & 4.
- 85.
Id.: Art. 6.
- 86.
Id.
- 87.
There were two arguments currently advanced at the time of the conference regarding state freedom of action in areas where the law remained silent. The older view held that in the absence of clear regulation, a state remained free to take any action desired. See, generally, George B. Davis, “The Launching of Projectiles from Balloons,” American Journal of International Law 2, no. 3 (1908). The newer view, as contained in the Martens’ clause, held that the unwritten law of nations still forbade some conduct.
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Keefer, S.A. (2016). The Second Hague Peace Conference. In: The Law of Nations and Britain’s Quest for Naval Security. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39645-3_7
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