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The Shapley Value on a Class of Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information

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Intelligent Decision Technologies 2016 (IDT 2016)

Part of the book series: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies ((SIST,volume 56))

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Abstract

In this paper, we study cooperative TU games in which the worths of some coalitions are not known. We investigate superadditive games and the Shapley values on a class of cooperative games under incomplete information. We show that the set of the superadditive complete games and the set of the Shapley values which can be obtained from a given incomplete game are polytopes and propose selection methods of the one-point solution from the set of the Shapley values.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Business Administration, Daito Bunka University, 1-9-1, Takashimadaira Itabashi-ku, Tokyo, 175-8571, Japan

    Satoshi Masuya

Authors
  1. Satoshi Masuya
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Satoshi Masuya .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Maritime University, Gdynia, Poland

    Ireneusz Czarnowski

  2. Artificial Intelligence Department, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid, Spain

    Alfonso Mateos Caballero

  3. KES International, Shoreham-by-sea, United Kingdom

    Robert J. Howlett

  4. University of Canberra, Canberra, South Australia, Australia

    Lakhmi C. Jain

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Masuya, S. (2016). The Shapley Value on a Class of Cooperative Games Under Incomplete Information. In: Czarnowski, I., Caballero, A., Howlett, R., Jain, L. (eds) Intelligent Decision Technologies 2016. IDT 2016. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, vol 56. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39630-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39630-9_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-39629-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-39630-9

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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