Abstract
A bargaining problem is a cooperative game in which players are permitted to negotiate before the game is played. Bargaining theory can be used to economic interactions such as union negotiations, international trade agreements, and duopolies. A general theory of bargaining games thus has a wide application to many areas of economics and political science.
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McCool, J., Davis, I. (2016). Almost Fair: Conjoint Measurement Theory and Score-Based Bargaining Solutions. In: Bajo, J., et al. Highlights of Practical Applications of Scalable Multi-Agent Systems. The PAAMS Collection. PAAMS 2016. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 616. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39387-2_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39387-2_18
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