Abstract
This chapter reviews the four steps of the argument against consequentialism and highlights controversial premises. In doing that, it shows how future research could conceivably strengthen the case against consequentialism further. It also comments on the conclusiveness of the argument and suggests that it merely shifts the burden of proof to the proponents of consequentialism.
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Notes
- 1.
Critical views about moral status can be found in various places in the literature. For a brief overview, see footnote 10 in Chap. 1.
- 2.
On the idea of group agency, see, also, the recent work done by List and Pettit (2011).
- 3.
It should be noted, however, that this would be a very radical claim. Some moral theorists have, in fact, claimed that all moral theories can be “consequentialized .” (e.g. Portmore 2007) They claim that for every non-consequentialist moral theory there is a consequentialist analogue which implies the exact same moral verdicts. The claim that all moral theories are, in fact, forms of consequentialism goes much farther than this and has not, as far as I know, been proposed by anyone in the moral-philosophical debate.
- 4.
Note that it is always possible to devise a moral theory that trivially matches all provisional moral fixed points. This can be done by drawing up principles which simply record them on a case-by-case basis. Such a trivial moral theory, however, would certainly not be acceptable since it would not have anything to offer in the way of systematicity.
- 5.
Strictly speaking, even if it was possible to demonstrate this, there would still be a chance that the best moral theory is consequentialist. Here is why. In our case against consequentialism we looked only at a narrow range of provisional fixed points. It may be that all consequentialist moral theories violate some of them and that there is an alternative moral view that does not. It may, nevertheless, turn out that, on the whole, consequentialist doctrines can accommodate comparatively more (or more important) provisional fixed points than that alternative theory. In that case, they would, of course, be preferable to the latter.
- 6.
Non-evaluative forms of consequentialism do not evaluate the moral status of an act based on a single measure of goodness. Rather, they rely on two such measures. The state of affairs that results from an act is evaluated, firstly, in terms of its moral goodness. Secondly, it is assessed from the perspective of the agent’s self-interest. Then, a non-evaluative, supplementary “value” is computed from the results of both evaluations. It, in turn, is taken to be the basis of moral evaluation. See, also, footnote 19 in Chap. 3, which briefly discusses non-evaluative forms of consequentialism.
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Mukerji, N. (2016). Conclusion. In: The Case Against Consequentialism Reconsidered. Theory and Decision Library A:, vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39249-3_6
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