Abstract
This chapter discusses the metaethical underpinnings of the argument against consequentialism. It introduces the Rawlsian Approach to theory evaluation in normative ethics which proposes a criterion for the adequacy of moral theories. Various interpretations of this idea are discussed before they are translated into a workable method that can be used to criticize consequentialist doctrines. This method allows trolley cases to play a crucial role. Hence, the chapter finishes off with a discussion of their characteristics, uses, and justification.
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Notes
- 1.
On this point, see also Pettit (1997/2007).
- 2.
An instructive discussion of the realist position is offered by Sayre-McCord (2011). For a concise general examination of anti-realism, see Joyce (2009). Moral anti-realists are commonly partitioned into non-cognitivists and error theorists. Non-cognitivists believe that our moral persuasions are not apt for truth or falsity. They suggest that they are, rather, expressions of emotional attitudes (cf., e.g., Barnes 1934, Ayer 1952, 102–120 and Stevenson 1937) or prescriptions (cf., e.g., Hare 1961; Gibbard 1990). Error theorists believe that moral views can have a truth value, but think that all our moral judgements are false. The classic statement of such a view is found in Mackie (1977).
- 3.
For a summary article on moral naturalism , see Lenman (2008).
- 4.
I am grateful to Julian Nida-Rümelin for pointing out to me that my argument does not cover versions of consequentialism that follow Hare’s justificatory approach.
- 5.
For a detailed defence, however, see Daniels (1996).
- 6.
Similarly, Appiah (2008, 113) uses an analogy between reasons for perceptual belief and reasons for action (as opposed to reasons for normative beliefs that we are interested in).
- 7.
Maria Mukerji suggested this example .
- 8.
Note that this sense of “intuition” is different from the sense in which some moral intuitionists have employed the term. They have apparently taken self-evident truth as a defining characteristic of an intuition (cf. Lillehammer 2011, 184).
- 9.
- 10.
Even critics of consequentialism have conceded that this idea seems prima vista trivially true (cf., e.g., Nida-Rümelin 1993, 1).
- 11.
The example is taken from Singer (1972). We have already used part of it on page 8.
- 12.
E.g., Bernard Williams has this to say about simplicity: “If there is such a thing as the truth about the subject matter of ethics (…) why is there any expectation that it should be simple? In particular, why should it be conceptually simple, using only one or two ethical concepts, such as duty or good state of affairs, rather than many? Perhaps we need as many concepts to describe it as we find we need, and no fewer." (Williams 1985, 17; emphasis in the original).
- 13.
This fact is illustrated, e.g., by Classic Utilitarianism which is often described as both a highly systematic and a rather simple doctrine.
- 14.
Parfit (2011, xlii) ascribes this dictum to Kant .
- 15.
To be sure, our talk of a “trade-off” should not be taken too literally. It does not suggest that there are precise, quantitative measures for the overall intuitive fit and systematicity of a moral theory or a single metric on which both can be compared. A moral theory may be evaluated in terms of both its intuitive fit and its systematicity based on a “‘seat of the pants’ feel.” (Putnam 1981, 132) The appropriate trade-off relation, i.e. the overall fit of the theory with our evaluative criteria as a whole, may be determined in the same way.
- 16.
In fact, both rejected intuitive fit as an evaluative criterion.
- 17.
There are, of course, innumerable possibilities when it comes to the concrete shape of the respective moral-epistemological theory. For our purposes, however, a rough classification suffices.
- 18.
Sandberg and Juth (2011) employ a similar distinction between what they call “practical” and “theoretical” intuitions though they draw it in terms of a different criterion. They take them to have different objects. Practical intuitions, they say, are intuitions about cases which is what we call low-level intuitions. Theoretical intuitions are intuitions about moral principles and, apparently, certain metaethical questions too (e.g. the question “what morality is about”). Theoretical intuitions in Sandberg’s and Juth’s sense should normally be high-level intuitions. There may, however, be instances of intuitions about very specific moral principles which apply only to very few cases. These are, then, theoretical low-level intuitions.
- 19.
Some authors have distinguished a further category, to wit, mid-level principles (cf., e.g., Bell 2007, 71).
- 20.
Note, however, that this is not the most common reading of Sidgwick . Many philosophers follow Rawls (1971/1999) who, drawing on Schneewind (1963), claims that Sidgwick endorsed RE which is the approach favoured by Rawls himself. I believe that Sidgwick was misinterpreted by Rawls and Schneewind and that the remarks he makes about common-sense morality were falsely taken to represent his own views.
- 21.
Some may think that Immanuel Kant would also fit the description of TD since he undoubtedly pursued moral philosophy in a top-down fashion. His ambition was to develop a system in which every moral proposition is justified in terms of one supreme principle of morality: the Categorical Imperative. For this reason, some have seen him as a proponent of the TD approach to intuitive fit (cf. Singer 2005). But this would be a mistake since Kant never accepted intuitive fit as an evaluative criterion for moral theories (cf. Nida-Rümelin 2002, 22).
- 22.
John Rawls explicitly rejects TD to which he refers as the “Cartesian” view. He says that “[t]here is no set of conditions or first principles that can be plausibly claimed to be necessary or definitive of morality and thereby especially suited to carry the burden of justification” (Rawls 1971/1999, 506).
- 23.
A further major exponent of BU is Frances Kamm . She explicitly states BU in Kamm (2007, 5) and Kamm (1996, 10–12). Interestingly, even the utilitarian philosopher and economist John Harsanyi has, at times, made remarks that may be read as expressing a sympathetic attitude towards BU: “Should the axioms of my ethical theory turn out to possess morally unacceptable practical implications,” he says, “(…) then I must be always willing to revise my axioms” (Harsanyi 1977b, 26).
- 24.
For an argument to that effect, see Mukerji (2014).
- 25.
It should be noted that many philosophers regard empirical considerations as beside the point when it comes to the evaluation of moral theories. Drawing on well-known ideas predominantly by Hume (1888/1960) and Moore (1903/1959), they argue that there is a metaphysical divide between the spheres of ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ and that moral facts are distinct from and not definable in terms of natural facts. Ethics, they say, is hence autonomous in the sense that no empirical facts could conceivably influence the moral question whether a given action is right or whether a given moral theory is adequate. In reply to such concerns, it should be stressed that empirical arguments do not generally claim that normative propositions follow straightforwardly from empirical propositions (Mukerji 2015). Hume’s and Moore’s points are usually conceded. It is claimed, however, that certain information about the workings of our moral faculty may be useful when it comes to figuring out which principles are justified. But their justification may itself be independent from empirical matters. An analogy may be useful to drive home the point. Consider our visual sense. It is normally reliable and helps us to figure out what goes on in the world around us. But there are optical illusions (e.g. the Müller-Lyer illusion that we considered on page 20). We should, therefore, be interested in understanding the conditions under which these illusions arise. For, when they obtain, we are, it seems, well advised to put less faith in our visual perceptions than we normally do. Similarly, we may believe that our moral sense is normally reliable. But there may be certain facts about it that cast doubt on its judgements in certain situations.
- 26.
Note, however, that the criterion of consent is not universally accepted (cf., e.g., Smart 1956, 346).
- 27.
This point has been made by other authors, e.g. by Ross (1939, 88).
- 28.
It should be noted that philosophers have recognized the existence of framing effects before psychologists did. Williams (1970), e.g., describes the phenomenon in the context of the issue of personal identity and suggests that intuitions about a given scenario can differ under two equivalent descriptions.
- 29.
To be sure, participants were not asked specifically for their moral intuitions in these cases. But since their own self-interest was not at stake in either case, it is reasonable to suppose that their favoured choice is based on moral considerations only (cf. Sinnott-Armstrong 2008, 55).
- 30.
There are various types of framing effects and not all of them depend on the wording of cases. A quite famous sequence-related framing effect is associated with the work of the philosopher Peter Unger . To discredit intuitions about cases Unger (1996) remarks that in moral thought experiments – most notably the “trolley cases” due to Foot (1978, 19–32) and Thomson (1976, 1985) – there are usually only two choice options. And we tend to have strong intuitions for or against, respectively, one of the options. Using his “Method of Several Options ,” he attempts to show that our intuitions about which option is right change as we add further options to the choice problem.
- 31.
Participants were asked to report on a 9-point scale how strongly they approved/disapproved of the killing. Killing the man in the footbridge case received an average rating of 3.89 (standard error 0.22). Killing the man in the remote footbridge case received an average approval of 5.14 (standard error 0.20).
- 32.
Indeed, the claim that many of our intuitive judgements about particular cases are based on emotional responses is confirmed by a number of recent neuroimaging studies performed by the psychologist and philosopher Joshua Greene (cf. Greene 2008). Greene showed that certain judgements about cases are associated with increased neural activity in emotion-related areas of the brain (e.g. posterior cingulate cortex, medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala).
- 33.
Crisp (2006, 24) makes essentially the same point.
- 34.
I am indebted to Martin Rechenauer who suggested to me that disagreement about cases may be seen as the embodiment of a more deeply rooted disagreement about moral principles. This point also seems to be acknowledged by Norcross (2008, 66) who says that he is “all too aware that non-consequentialists’ intuitions diverge radically from [his] own” consequentialist intuitions and by Prinz (2010, 387) who remarks that “[p]hilosophers intuitions are not theory-neutral ” which, as he hypothesizes, may be “one reason why philosophers seem to have different intuitions about the same cases.”
- 35.
My view is corroborated by a remark by Shelly Kagan . He makes the point that “typically when we think about cases, we are only thinking about kinds of cases.” (Kagan 2001, 61–62; emphasis in the original) This suggests that different specifications of a case structure can be seen as the same case. On the same point, see also Appiah (2008, 84–85).
- 36.
This example is taken from Taurek (1977).
- 37.
One might, however, draw a generally sceptical lesson from all of this and conclude that neither low-level nor high-level intuitions are reliable (cf. Singer 2005, 349). I find this hardly plausible. In many areas, our intuitions are very unreliable in isolation. But we would not conclude from this that we cannot make progress in these areas. Consider, e.g., probability theory. Many simple card tricks are able to fool us because our intuitions about probabilities are very unreliable. Nevertheless, human beings were able to develop a probability calculus based on intuitive considerations which, over time, got more and more formalized. And this probability calculus is very reliable, e.g., in predicting the frequency of future events. Since we are not concerned with the issue of scepticism we can put this issue aside. An instructive overview over sceptical positions on ethics can be found in Sinnott-Armstrong (2006).
- 38.
These three possible replies are inspired by Timmons (2008, 93) suggestions as to how a deontologist can defend herself against Greene’s attack on their theory.
- 39.
Another possible strategy is to argue that the capacity for ethical intuition is an a priori faculty (cf. Lillehammer 2011, 176). It is very unlikely to work. So, for reasons of scope, we shall put it aside.
- 40.
It should be noted, however, that the precise purport of the Humean thesis is unclear. At least on some interpretations, it is clearly false, as Prior (1960) has shown. Consider a factual proposition E. From E we can derive E v N, where N is a normative proposition. There are only two possibilities. E v N is a normative proposition. In that case, an Ought-proposition can be derived from an Is-proposition. Or it is factual. In that case, however, it is possible to derive N from ¬E and E v N which are factual propositions. So Ought-propositions can be derived from Is-propositions in any case. For a thoroughgoing treatment of the problem identified by Prior , see Schurz (1997).
- 41.
In recent times, the exponents of a new movement in Philosophy called “Experimental Philosophy ” have vigorously defended the relevance of empirical data for philosophical theories (Knobe and Nichols 2008). On the relevance of psychological findings for moral philosophy, see also Driver and Loeb (2008), Greene (2008), and Prinz (2010).
- 42.
This diagnosis is confirmed, e.g., by Huebner et al. (2009, 4).
- 43.
- 44.
It is, admittedly, quite a stretch to associate this view of moral reasoning with Kant since Kant’s moral system is purely based on reason and does not allow moral intuition any role to play (cf. Kant 1785).
- 45.
For this reason, Sinnott-Armstrong (2006, 194) moots the principle that we need an independent reason to believe intuitions that we have in situations where we are “emotional in a way that clouds judgment.” This caveat is important. The principle advises caution only when it comes to emotions which cloud our judgement. And these might not be all emotions.
- 46.
Such comparisons are necessary, in particular, when it comes to “impossibility results” (e.g. Arrow 1951/1963), which show that certain axioms cannot logically co-exist. In that case, the theorist has to drop at least one to ensure consistency.
- 47.
Elsewhere, I have briefly discussed this strategy (cf. Mukerji 2013c, 306).
- 48.
It can be argued that at least the second strategy runs into difficulties when certain types of agent-relative consequentialist theories are taken into consideration (cf. Mukerji 2013a, 114–117).
- 49.
It seems that PFPA is implicitly recognized in many moral-philosophical tracts. In addition, there is a number of authors who have emphasized that the approach plays a great role in the practical application of the Rawlsian Approach. See, e.g., Daniels (1996, 28), Mulgan (2007, 58), Nida-Rümelin (2002, 34–35), Otsuka (2006, 110) and Rawls (1971/1999, 18).
- 50.
Social choice theory has shown that weak seeming moral judgements may turn out to be logically incompatible. An example which illustrates this is an impossibility theorem proved by Sen (1970b). It is called the “Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal” and shows that a minimal notion of individual rights is incompatible with the Weak Pareto Principle .
- 51.
In addition, it might be mentioned that the possibility of inconsistency seems to be confined to abstract level fixed points. Fixed points about cases cannot be inconsistent unless they concern the same case. As will become clear in Sect. 6.1, our argument relies entirely on fixed points about cases.
- 52.
Foundationalists who are non-sceptics believe, in addition to that, that there are self-justifying moral beliefs. This assumption is necessary to avoid scepticism. It is easy to see why. The foundationalist criterion of justification is perfectly compatible with the sceptical view that no moral belief fulfils it because there might, after all, be no self-justifying moral beliefs.
- 53.
- 54.
Note that the idea of a tragic choice is often mixed up with that of a moral dilemma. A moral dilemma is (i) a situation in which the agent is confronted with a choice between a number of options all of which are wrong or (ii) a situation in which at least two mutually exclusive options for acting are obligatory (cf. Vallentyne 1989). A tragic choice is “merely” a choice between options that are all bad.
- 55.
- 56.
The distinction we use corresponds to Karl Popper’s distinction between the different uses of thought experiments in science (and especially in quantum theory), viz. the apologetic use and the critical use (cf. Popper 1959/2005, 464–480).
- 57.
We have already come across this scenario on page 22.
- 58.
- 59.
See, also, Wood (2011, 67).
- 60.
Of course, the scientist need not immediately reject the theory if it turns out that it does not capture all data points. There are always ways of accounting for recalcitrant evidence which are compatible with the truth of the theory (cf. Lakatos 1970). Similarly, a moral theorist need not reject a moral principle if it violates one or more out of a number of provisional fixed points. As we explained on page 40, PFPA is subject to a proviso. Should it turn out that no moral theory can, in fact, accommodate all of our provisional fixed points, the fact that a given theory violates one of these points cannot, by itself, count as counter-evidence against it.
- 61.
A further consideration that might be brought up to motivate the use of trolley cases is given by Amartya Sen . He writes that “in many of the common cases, intuitions based on quite different principles tend to run in the same direction, so that it is impossible to be sure of the basis of an overall judgment.” (Sen 1982, 14) Therefore, it may be hard for a moral theorist to establish that her favoured theory is the best explanation for our moral intuitions if only common cases are used. If our intuitions about these cases can be explained by a large number of normative factors, the moral theorist will have a hard time arguing that her explanation should be chosen. “In order to do the discrimination,” Sen says, “we choose examples such that different principles (…) push us in different directions.” (Sen 1982, 14) Sen’s reasoning, I believe, provides a good motivation for the constructive use of trolley cases, but is less relevant to our destructive use.
- 62.
I am indebted to Michael von Grundherr for making me aware of this objection.
- 63.
It is hard to pin down, of course, what a reasonable threshold for substantial disagreement is.
- 64.
The description of the case was as follows: “Ned is walking near the train tracks when he notices a train approaching out of control. Up ahead on the track are 5 people. Ned is standing next to a switch, which he can throw to turn the train onto a side track. If the train hits the object, the object will slow the train down, giving the men time to escape. The heavy object is 1 man, standing on the side track. Ned can throw the switch, preventing the train from killing the 5 people, but killing the 1 man. Or he can refrain from doing this, letting the 5 die.” (Hauser et al. 2007, 5) The question that was asked was “Is it morally permissible for Ned to throw the switch?” (Hauser et al. 2007, 5)
- 65.
In fact, much unlike Sidgwick , Kamm explicitly advises her readers to ignore the intuitive judgements of others. She does that since she believes that “much more is accomplished when one person considers her judgments and then tries to analyze and justify their grounds than if we do mere surveys” (Kamm 2007, 5).
- 66.
As we shall see below, however, some theorists deny this.
- 67.
- 68.
This position is called retributivism and is commonly associated with Immanuel Kant , who expressed the view in his Metaphysics of Morals (Die Metaphysik der Sitten). See, in particular, his infamous thought experiment of the dissolving civil society (cf. Kant 1803, 229).
- 69.
Note, however, that the chosen illustration is not a conclusive demonstration, as it presupposes a particular model of normative factors on which the property of an act to alleviate suffering is seen as an autonomous factor. This model can be rejected. Alternatively, we may distinguish between acts that alleviate the suffering of an innocent person and acts that alleviate the suffering of a guilty person that results from a just punishment. We can, then, take the former to be a right-making feature and the latter to be a wrong-making feature. This would resolve the difficulty in the present case.
- 70.
However, see Sorensen (1998, 272–273) for a critical rejoinder to Kagan’s argument.
- 71.
Hare (1981, Chap. 8) gives a similar justification for Objection 4. As he argues, our intuitions are the product of our moral upbringing. He believes that “however good these may have been, they were designed to prepare [us] to deal with moral situations which are likely to be encountered” and that, therefore, “there is no guarantee at all that they will be appropriate to unusual cases.” (Hare 1981, 132).
- 72.
- 73.
An argument much like that was suggested to me by Andreas Suchanek in personal conversation. I believe that this way of thinking is common amongst scholars whose predominant focus is applied ethics .
- 74.
See, in particular, sections VIII through XIII in Pogge (2000).
- 75.
The sense in which the term “pluralist” is used here should not be confused with the sense in which it was used above. In Sect. 1.2.1, we called a moral theory pluralist if it contained more than one foundational moral principle. Here we call it pluralist if it contains different moral principles for different realms. A moral theory can be pluralist in the one sense but not in the other.
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Mukerji, N. (2016). Metaethical Foundations. In: The Case Against Consequentialism Reconsidered. Theory and Decision Library A:, vol 51. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39249-3_2
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