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Probabilistic Model Checking of Security Protocols without Perfect Cryptography Assumption

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Book cover Computer Networks (CN 2016)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 608))

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Abstract

This paper presents the description of a new, probabilistic approach to model checking of security protocols. The protocol, beyond traditional verification, goes through a phase in which we resign from a perfect cryptography assumption. We assume a certain minimal, but measurable probability of breaking/gaining the cryptographic key, and explore how it affects the execution of the protocol. As part of this work we have implemented a tool, that helps to analyze the probability of interception of sensitive information by the Intruder, depending on the preset parameters (number of communication participants, keys, nonces, the probability of breaking a cipher, etc.). Due to the huge size of the constructed computational spaces, we use parallel computing to search for states that contain the considered properties.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Computer and Information Sciences, Czestochowa University of Technology, Częstochowa, Poland

    Olga Siedlecka-Lamch & Jacek Piatkowski

  2. Institute of Computer Sciences, Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

    Miroslaw Kurkowski

Authors
  1. Olga Siedlecka-Lamch
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  2. Miroslaw Kurkowski
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  3. Jacek Piatkowski
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Olga Siedlecka-Lamch .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Silesian University of Technology, Gliwice, Poland

    Piotr Gaj

  2. Silesian University of Technology, Gliwice, Poland

    Andrzej Kwiecień

  3. Silesian University of Technology, Gliwice, Poland

    Piotr Stera

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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

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Siedlecka-Lamch, O., Kurkowski, M., Piatkowski, J. (2016). Probabilistic Model Checking of Security Protocols without Perfect Cryptography Assumption. In: Gaj, P., Kwiecień, A., Stera, P. (eds) Computer Networks. CN 2016. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 608. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39207-3_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39207-3_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-39206-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-39207-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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