Abstract
A central question in drug policy is how control efforts should be divided among enforcement, treatment, and prevention. Of particular interest is how the mix should vary dynamically over the course of an epidemic. Recent work considered how various pairs of these interventions interact. This paper considers all three simultaneously in a dynamic optimal control framework, yielding some surprising results. Depending on epidemic parameters, one of three situations pertains. It may be optimal to eradicate the epidemic, to “accommodate” it by letting it grow, or to eradicate if control begins before drug use passes a DNSS threshold but accommodate if control begins later. Relatively modest changes in parameters such as the perceived social cost per unit of drug use can push the model from one regime to another, perhaps explaining why opinions concerning proper policy diverge so sharply. If eradication is pursued, then treatment and enforcement should be funded very aggressively to reduce use as quickly as possible. If accommodation is pursued then spending on all three controls should increase roughly linearly but less than proportionally with the size of the epidemic. With the current parameterization, optimal spending on prevention varies the least among the three types of control interventions.
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Notes
- 1.
Possesion arrests include “possession with intent to distribute”, which is essentially a distribution charge, but offenders arrested for simple possession are less likely to be incarcerated and when they are, they serve shorter sentences. Note that many of those involved in distribution also use drugs, but generally it is not the use per se that leads to their incarceration.
- 2.
Infrequent or “light” users may have fewer alternative suppliers, but they account for a modest share of all consumption because they use so much less, per capita, than do heavier users.
- 3.
Market power is most concentrated at the export level in Colombia, and never more so than in the heyday of the Medellin “cartel”. Yet this supposed “cartel” was not able to stave off a precipitous decline in prices. In reality, the cartel was formed more for protection against kidnapping than to strategically manipulate prices. Today there are several hundred operators even at that market level.
- 4.
National budgets after 2003 have reported in a substantially different and non-comparable format. Walsh (2004) gives a quick, readable account of some of the changes in budgeting procedures and definitions.
- 5.
Notable examples include social costs borne by family members, any benefits of use of an illicit substance, valuation of a human life beyond that person’s labor market earnings, and valuation of pain and suffering associated with crime and with addiction itself.
- 6.
One partial explanation for why homicides have fallen so dramatically in New York City may be that much retail drug distribution has shifted from anonymous street markets where controlling “turf” produces profits to instances in which seller-user dyads arrange private meetings in covert locations, often using cell phones.
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Acknowledgements
This research was financed in part by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) under grant P25979-N25. We thank Gustav Feichtinger and Florian Moyzisch for their contributions to this paper.
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Appendix: Optimality Conditions
Appendix: Optimality Conditions
The current value Hamiltonian H is given by
where λ describes the current-value costate variable.
Note that it is not necessary to formulate the maximum principle for the Lagrangian, which incorporates the non-negativity constraints for the controls, since u, v, and w all turn out to be positive in the analysis described in this paper.
According to Pontryagin’s maximum principle we have the following three necessary optimality conditions:
and
Due to the concavity of the Hamiltonian H with respect to (u, v, w), setting the first order partial derivatives equal to zero leads to the unrestricted extremum, and we get the following expressions for the costate λ:
where subscripts denote derivatives w.r.t. the corresponding variables.
The concavity of the maximized Hamiltonian with respect to the state variable, however, cannot be guaranteed, so the usual sufficiency conditions are not satisfied.
With Eqs. (1)–(3) we can describe u, w, and λ as functions of A and v as follows:
Due to this simplification we can concentrate on the two variables A and v.
To gain an equation for \(\dot{v}\) we differentiate λ(A, v) with respect to time:
Setting (5) equal to the costate equation
yields:
where we insert λ(A, v) from (4) and the corresponding derivatives λ A and λ v as well as H A given by
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Caulkins, J.P., Tragler, G. (2016). Dynamic Drug Policy: Optimally Varying the Mix of Treatment, Price-Raising Enforcement, and Primary Prevention Over Time. In: Dawid, H., Doerner, K., Feichtinger, G., Kort, P., Seidl, A. (eds) Dynamic Perspectives on Managerial Decision Making. Dynamic Modeling and Econometrics in Economics and Finance, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39120-5_2
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