Abstract
This chapter tells the story of the self in Western and Eastern philosophies. The story will certainly be old news to those who have even a little background in history of Western philosophy, but here I tell the story with an eye toward its relevance in helping us understand the online self better. A distinctive feature in this chapter is that I compare and contrast the notions of the self in Western, Chinese and Indian philosophies in one chapter, something that I believe has not been done often at all. The advantage of putting together these three major intellectual traditions is that we can then see in one broad stroke how the self is understood and how aspects of the self are similar or different in these traditions, which will lead to a clearer idea on how to situate the online self within the ongoing philosophical discussions, both in the West and the East, on the topic.
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Hongladarom, S. (2016). The Self Through History. In: The Online Self. Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, vol 25. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39075-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39075-8_2
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