Abstract
Ricoeur’s The Voluntary and the Involuntary must be linked to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, first of all because of their common phenomenological “vocation”. Phenomenology of Perception concretely shows the possibility of phenomenology of a broader perspective, of the field of investigation and of application.
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Notes
- 1.
See, for example, Freud 1962b, 253–254: “Many people, as is well known, contest the assumption of complete psychical determinism by appealing to a special feeling of conviction that there is a free will. […] According to our analyses it is not necessary to dispute the right to the feeling of conviction of having a free will. If the distinction between conscious and unconscious motivation is taken into account, our feeling of conviction informs us that conscious motivation does not extend to all our motor decisions. De minimis non curat lex. But what is thus left free by the one side receives its motivation from the other side, from the unconscious; and in this way determination in the psychical sphere is still carried out without any gap”.
- 2.
“What perception does not in any sense include is an explicit judgment of reflection, such as ‘It is I who perceives, I am perceiving’. But apart from such explicit reflection, perception by its nature includes a diffuse presence to the self which is not yet a conscious grasp” (Ricœur 1966, 387).
References
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Freud, S. 1957c. The unconscious. In: SE, vol. 14: 166–215.
Freud, S. 1961d. A note on the unconscious in psychoanalysis. In: SE, vol. 12: 255–266.
Freud, S. 1962b. The psychopathology of everyday life. In: SE, vol. 6: 1–279.
Freud S. 1964. New introductory lectures on psychoanalysis. In: SE, vol. 22: 5–182.
Jervolino, D. 1993. Il cogito e l’ermeneutica. La questione del soggetto in Ricœur. Genova: Marietti.
Ricœur, P. 1966. In Freedom and nature: The voluntary and the involuntary, ed. E.V. Kohák. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
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Busacchi, V. (2016). The Unconscious as a Principally Affective Matter. In: Habermas and Ricoeur’s Depth Hermeneutics. Contributions to Hermeneutics, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-39010-9_5
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