Orbits and the ITU

De Man, Philip

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-38752-9_4

Philip De Man^3,4

Part of the book series: Space Regulations Library ((SPRL,volume 9))

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Abstract

This chapter delves into the technical regulations of the International Telecommunication Union that determine the lawful, exclusive uses of orbits by satellite systems and networks. In keeping with the broad definition of natural resources in outer space, the detailed rules of the ITU constitute a valuable example of an application of the general principles of the UN space treaties to a contested space resource, in particular considering the lack of discrimination between outer space, celestial bodies or natural resources in the formulation of these UN principles. A thorough analysis of the ITU rules on orbital registration of satellites finds that, though these resources are unanimously seen as falling under the ambit of the non-appropriation principle, they can be lawfully registered for exclusive use by one single administration. This exclusive exploitation of a limited natural resource is not limited by any specific time period, but depends solely on the condition of actual and continued use of this resource by the registering administration. The main finding of this chapter is hence that potentially permanent exclusivity in the exploitation of contested natural resources in space is not as such unlawful, but can only be granted on the condition of actual use.

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Notes

1.
The Jesus Lizard, ‘Karpis’, Goat, Touch and Go Records, 1991.
2.
See supra, footnote 2 of Introduction and accompanying text.
3.
[Note], ‘ITU tries to solve new problems without interfering with national sovereignty’, Satellite Wk. 29 May 1995.
4.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , Report on Resolution 18 of the Plenipotentiary Conference Kyoto, 1995, p. 3. The issue was also kept high on the agenda of the ITU in the years after: see ITU, ‘WRC 97 to shape development of tomorrow’s radiocommunications environment ’, 1997, available at http://www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/1997/itu-19.html, retrieved on 17 February 2011; id., ‘Scrambling for space in space: ITU Plenipotentiary to tackle «paper satellite » problem’, 16 September 2002, available at http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press_releases/2002/21.html, retrieved on 14 February 2011. ‘Paper satellites’ are defined as “satellite networks in coordination or recorded in the Master Register that are not in operation and will never be brought into use”: see D.M. Leive, Rapporteur Group SC-4 report to the Special committee on regulatory/procedural matters devoted to Resolution 18 (Kyoto, 1994), ITU Doc. SC-RG4/54 of 25 November 1996, p. 3 and 11. A distinction is sometimes made between paper satellites and virtual satellites, where the former is deemed to refer to lawful instances of temporary overfiling and the latter evokes spurious submissions amounting to an abuse of ITU procedures. The distinction is not always easy to make, however, and depends too much on the subjective interpretation of the legality of evolving practices. Finally, Perek’s observation that the issue commonly referred to as the paper satellite problem is rather one of paper radio stations is an interesting addition to the discussion, though the avenue will, for obvious reasons, not be pursued in the confines of this thesis on natural space resources: see L. Perek, ‘Rational space traffic management’, 53 Zeit. Luft- & Weltraumr. 2004, p. 576.
5.
J.C. Thompson, ‘Space for rent: the International Telecommunications Union, space law, and orbit/spectrum leasing’, 62 J. Air L. & Com. 1996, p. 279–331; S. Ospina, ‘Regulation of space resources’, in M. Benkö and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), Space law: current problems and perspectives for future regulation, Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2005, p. 263.
6.
See infra, Sect. 4.2.4.2 .
7.
See H.F. Ng, ‘Examination of coordination requests’, presentation at the ITU workshop on the efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource, held from 14 through 16 April 2014 in Limassol. See also ITU, ‘Paper chase’, 30 September 2009, available at http://www.itu.int/newsroom/media-kit/ITU-R/story2.html, retrieved on 17 February 2011 (in which it is argued that “[t]he system has proved an effective answer”). See further L. Lanneau, supra footnote 46 of Chap. 3, p. 34–35.
8.
T. Kosuge, ‘World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC-97) and its implications on commercial utilization of outer space’, 41 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1998, p. 191; P.A. Salin, supra footnote 304 of Chap. 1, p. 183; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 62 of Chap. 2, p. 74–76; id., ‘Legal issues of satellite telecommunications, the geostationary orbit, and space debris’, 5 Astropolitics 2007, p. 182–184; F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1, p. 236–237. ITU reports note that the member states are not always conscientious in paying their financial dues. See the various Statements of amounts owed in connection with invoices for the processing of satellite network filings on the ITU website, http://www.itu.int.
9.
Art. 44 (2) ITU CS . See supra, footnote 303 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.
10.
For a detailed overview of this tug-of-war, see G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union in a changing world, Dedham: Artech House, 1982, p. 252–279; D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 332–345. The formulaic representation on the basis of political North-south divisions recurs in most any account of the ITU regime in international space law doctrine: see M.S. Soroos, supra footnote 18 of Chap. 3; S. Gorove, supra footnote 272 of Chap. 1, p. 17–18; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1; S.M. Williams, supra footnote 43 of Chap. 3; R.L. White and H.M. White, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1, p. 186–188. Generally speaking, this ‘politization’ of the ITU proceedings has been lambasted: C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 112; I.H.P. Diederiks-Verschoor, supra footnote 47 of Chap. 3, p. 84. The slogans are sometimes applied to describe the legal regime governing the exploitation of the resources of celestial bodies as well: see, in particular, J.W. Benson, supra footnote 229 of Chap. 1.
11.
See ITU, Radio Regulations and Additional Radio Regulations adopted at the International radio conference, held from 16 May through 2 October 1947 in Atlantic City, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S020100002B4002PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014. See in particular ITU, Proposal submitted by the United States of America, Doc. No. 11 R, 11 March 1947, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S020100002B4813PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 4 September 2014.
12.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 68 and 71; G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 10, p. 31; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 396. The then Soviet Union also considered the act of engineering a violation of their sovereignty, although this argument of course does not hold for orbital slots . See D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 339.
13.
See supra, footnote 285 of Chap. 1.
14.
N.M. Matte, supra footnote 270 of Chap. 1, p. 157; E.D. Ducharme, R.R. Bowen and M.J.R. Irwin, ‘The Genesis of the 1985/87 ITU World Administrative Radio Conference on the use of geostationary satellite orbit and the planning of space services utilizing it’, 7 Ann. Air & Space L. 1982, p. 265–266; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 397–398 and 402; S. Wiessner, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 3, p. 230; D.M. Leive, ‘Some conflicting trends in satellite telecommunications’, 5 Mich. Yb. Int’l Legal Stud. 1984, p. 74; D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 340; R.L. White and H.M. White, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1, p. 123; F. Lyall, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 350–352; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 290–292. See ITU, Final Acts of the World administrative radio conference for space telecommunications (WARC-71), held from 7 June through 17 July 1971 in Geneva, available for purchase at http://www.itu.int/pub/R-ACT. For the EARC -63, see supra, footnote 296 of Chap. 1.
15.
IFRB Recommendation 10-A. The recommendation is available as part of the EARC -63 Final Acts, supra, footnote 296 of Chap. 1. Unfortunately, these acts are yet to be made publicly available by the ITU: http://www.itu.int/en/history/Pages/ConferencesCollection.aspx. More recent versions of the Radio Regulations no longer contain this recommendation. However, rather detailed coverage of relevant parts of the recommendation can be found in D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 399–401; D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 340–341; F. Talaie, supra footnote 138 of Chap. 1, p. 50–51.
16.
Resolution 3 (WARC-79) relating to the use of the geostationary-satellite orbit and to the planning of space services utilizing it. See ITU, Final Acts of the World administrative radio conference (WARC-79), held from 24 September through 6 December 1979 in Geneva, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S02010000394002PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014. All other ITU resolutions referred to in this chapter can be found in ITU, Radio regulations. Vol. 3: resolutions and recommendations, ed. 2012.
17.
See, in particular, Resolution 3, supra footnote 16. See further E.D. DuCharme, R.R. Bowen and M.J.R. Irwin, supra footnote 14, p. 267–269. A broadcasting-satellite service is defined in the ITU Radio Regulations as a radiocommunication service in which signals transmitted or retransmitted by space stations are intended for direct reception by the general public: No. 1.39 ITU RR. A fixed-satellite service is defined as a radiocommunication service between Earth stations at given positions, when one or more satellites are used: No. 1.21 ITU RR. For an overview of this evolution, see S. Gorove, supra footnote 42 of Chap. 3.
18.
See Vol. 2: Appendices of the 2012 ITU RR. The a priori plans adopted at the various ITU conferences have been subjected to a great deal of legal scrutiny, especially those resulting from the 1977 WARC and ORB-85 and 88 sessions. For a comprehensible overview of the main decisions at these conferences, see M. Mili, ‘World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in Regions 2 and 3) and (11.7–12.5 GHz (in Region 1)’, 20 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1977, p. 346–367; S.E. Doyle, supra footnote 44 of Chap. 3, p. 10–18; id., supra footnote 323 of Chap. 1; A.A.E. Noll, ‘Réglementation internationale relative aux télécommunications par satellites’, 21 Rev. Belge Dr. Int. 1988, p. 278–292; M.L. Smith, ‘Developments in the international law of telecommunications: remarks’, 83 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 1989, p. 386–389. For a concise overview of the main decisions reached at the 1985–88 sessions, in particular, see G.C. Staple, ‘The new world satellite order: a report from Geneva’, 80 Am. J. Int’l L. 1986, p. 699–720; S.E. Doyle, supra footnote 323 of Chap. 1; M.L. Smith, ‘The Space WARC concludes’, 83 Am. J. Int’l L. 1989, p. 596–599; N. Jasentuliyana, ‘The international regulatory regime for satellite communication: the meaning for developing countries ’, 2 Asian Yb. Int’l L. 1992, p. 49–60. For a more expansive coverage of the two sessions, see R.L. White and H.M. White, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1.
19.
See, for example, the declaration of intent in No. 3.3 App. 30 ITU RR: “[t]he associated procedures contained in this Appendix are intended to promote long-term flexibility of the Plan and to avoid monopolization of the planned bands and orbit by a country or a group of countries”.
20.
ITU Resolutions 80 and 553 recognize that the “«first-come first-served» concept restricts and sometimes prevents access to and use of certain frequency bands and orbit positions”: see Resolution 80 (Rev. WRC-07) on due diligence in applying the principles embodied in the Constitution; Resolution 553 (WRC-12) on additional regulatory measures for broadcasting-satellite networks in the band 21.4–22 GHz in Regions 1 and 3 for the enhancement of equitable access to this band. The concept is also mentioned in Resolution 555 (WRC-12) on additional regulatory provisions for broadcasting-satellite service networks in the band 21.4–22 GHz in Regions 1 and 3 for the enhancement of equitable access to this band. See also UNCOPUOS, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1, paras. 6 and 7, sub d. The Committee notes that access to unplanned frequency bands under the existing ITU regulations is governed by the principle of “first come, first served”. Recent literature perpetuates the first-come, first-served stereotype. See, for example, C.H. Lin, ‘Comprehensive review of global radiocommunication and spectrum management under radio regulations’, in C.C. Nweze (ed.), Contemporary issues on public international and comparative law: essays in honor of professor Christian Nwachukwu Okeke, Lake Mary: Vandeplas, 2009, p. 515.
21.
The paper satellite problem can even be attributed in part to the lack of understanding of the Radio Regulations by the requesting administrations. See SAT-BAG, Report to WRC-03, 27 January 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-r/archives/sat-bag/docs/2003/7-r3.html, retrieved on 20 December 2010. Leive and Estep note that there is ample evidence that many countries do not abide by the RR because they do not understand them or are not aware of some of the rules: D.M. Leive and S.D. Estep, The future of the International Telecommunication Union: a report for the 1973 plenipotentiary conference, Washington: American Society of International Law, 1972, p. 39. Some inconsistencies are also due to the piecemeal nature of the amendments made to the RR over the course of the various radiocommunication conferences. See, for example, the different time periods mentioned in No. 11.44 v. No. 11.48, and No. 11.49 v. No. 8.17 App. 30B ITU RR. On these differences, see further infra, Sect. 4.2.4.2 , footnotes 200, 202 and 225.
22.
It was already noted that the RR, though binding on the ITU member states, must be in accordance with the ITU Constitution and Convention, respectively, as they trump the administrative regulations in case of inconsistency. See supra, footnote 276 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.
23.
The importance of these principles is reaffirmed by the reference thereto in documents of the UNCOPUOS LSC. See, for example, UNCOPUOS, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1, paras. 5, 7, sub a and b, and 8, sub a.
24.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 4, p. 4, referring to the requirements of efficient utilization and equitable access as “two somewhat conflicting objectives”. See also I. Baumann, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1, p. 300–301.
25.
R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 304 of Chap. 1, p. 104; W. Hampe and R. Müller, supra footnote 25 of Chap. 3, p. 632; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 104. Matte notes that the ITU planning method is “une manière logique d’interpréter les dispositions du Traité sur l’espace, plus particulièrement à l’effet que l’espace extra-atmosphérique doit être utilisé pour le bénéfice et dans l’intérêt de tous les états”: N.M. Matte, supra footnote 293 of Chap. 1, p. 142. See, in this regard, also R.S. Jakhu, J.L. Magdelénat and H. Rouselle, ‘The ITU regulatory framework for satellite communications: an analysis of Space WARC 1985’, 42 Int’l J. 1987, p. 288; F. Lyall, supra footnote 335 of Chap. 1; S. Hobe, supra footnote 335 of Chap. 1, p. 128.
26.
On the dubious meaning of the ‘limited’ epithet in this regard, see supra, Sect. 3.1.2 .
27.
Emphasis added. This provision follows up on Recommendation 10-A, supra footnote 15. See N. Jasentuliyana, ‘Regulatory functions of I.T.U. in the field of space telecommunications’, 34 J. Air L. & Com. 1968, p. 70–71.
28.
This was even clearer in the original text of the provision, which contained an explicit link between equitable access to orbits, on the one hand, and the needs and technical facilities at the disposal of states, on the other. See Art. 33 (2) of the 1973 ITC. See further the excellent analysis in S. Gorove, supra footnote 272 of Chap. 1, p. 18; id., supra footnote 48 of Chap. 3, p. 111–113. This was also one of the general conclusions of the UNISPACE II conference: see K.-H. Böckstiegel, M. Benkö and S. Hobe, supra footnote 293 of Chap. 1, section B.IV.2, p. 2, para. 282: “[e]fficiency of use cannot be an end in itself: it is only a means of ensuring all countries equitable access to this scarce resource [of orbits in space]”. Compare A. Copiz, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 222: “[a]lthough the principle of efficient and economic operation and the principle of equitable access may not be in harmony, of the two principles, greater force ought to be given to the principles of efficient and economic operation”.
29.
See also M.L. Stern, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 882 (“ultimately, efficient utilization is not in conflict with equitable access; it is one means towards achieving that end”); C.A. Herter, ‘The electromagnetic spectrum: a critical natural resource’, 25 Nat. Resources J. 1985, p. 662. This interpretation is in line with Art. 44 (1) ITU CS , which only emphasizes the efficient use of slots. See, however, R.E. Butler, ‘The role of the ITU in the use of the geostationary orbit’, 17 Acta Astronautica 1988, p. 608. The then Secretary-General of the ITU notes that the biggest challenge facing ORB-85 was how to reconcile the goal of equitable access with that of efficient and economic use, implying that these goals are not necessarily compatible. See also O. Fernández-Brital, ‘Legal status of the geostationary orbit and ITU recent activities’, 32 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1989, p. 226.
30.
ITU procedures are initiated by ‘administrations’ rather than member states. The annex to the ITU Constitution defines an administration as “[a]ny governmental department or service responsible for discharging the obligations undertaken in the Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union, in the Convention of the International Telecommunication Union and in the Administrative Regulations”: Annex to the ITU CS for the definition of certain terms used in this Constitution, the Convention and the Administrative Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union, No. 1002. See also No. 1.2 ITU RR.
31.
See also M.L. Stern, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 880 (“equitable access does not guarantee access without the ability to launch a satellite”); L. Perek, supra footnote 325 of Chap. 1, p. 220; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 300 (“«access» in terms of equitable access presupposes reaching the geostationary orbit, which thus requires space launch capability”), citing S. Gorove, Developments in space law: issues and policies, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, p. 59.
32.
Warehousing, whether under planned or unplanned bands, may very well violate the ITU rules in spirit, if not in practice, as it appears to conflict with the concepts of efficiency and equitable access. See J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 299. See also G.O. Robinson, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 45. The author argues that an unplanned assignment system would better ensure that all future needs could be met, because it would conserve over time more of the resource for distribution as needed and it is commonly accepted that warehousing acts serve no goal of the ITU or Outer Space Treaty regime on the use of the radio-frequency spectrum or orbits. See further infra, Sect. 4.2.6.
33.
Supra footnote 308 of Chap. 1.
34.
For a detailed analysis of the Declaration and the objections of the international community thereto, see E.R. Finch, ‘The geostationary orbit and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’, 20 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1977, p. 219–225; J.F. Galloway (1977), supra footnote 328 of Chap. 1, p. 231–235; J. Busak, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 169–170; A. Górbiel, supra footnote 59 of Chap. 1 ; id., ‘The legal status of geostationary orbit: some remarks’, 6 J. Space L. 1978, p. 171–178; T. Gangale, supra footnote 326 of Chap. 1. See further N. Jasentuliyana, supra footnote 37 of Chap. 1, p. 53–56.
35.
See UNGA , Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, UN Doc. A/RES/1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962; UNGA , Permanent sovereignty over natural resources of developing countries and expansion of domestic sources of accumulation for economic development, UN Doc. A/RES/2692 (XXV) of 11 December 1970. See also OP 2, sub i of UNGA , Charter of economic rights and duties of states, UN Doc. A/RES/3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974.
36.
Section ‘§1. The geostationary orbit as a natural resource’ of the Declaration.
37.
See supra, footnote 303 of Chap. 1. Interestingly, and despite the near universal rejection of the claims made in the Bogotá Declaration, the Constitution of Colombia actually codifies the country’s claim of sovereignty over part of the geostationary orbit. In the provision outlining the territory of the Colombian state, after noting that the borders of Colombia are those established in international treaties, it is declared that “[a]lso part of Colombia is the subsoil, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, the airspace, the segment of the geostationary orbit, the electromagnetic spectrum and the space in which it operates, in accordance with international law or the laws of Colombia in the absence of international regulations” (Art. 101, para. 4). The final section of the provision arguably refers to the persisting failure/unwillingness of the international community to agree on a definition of outer space, already alluded to in the Bogotá Declaration as justification for claims over the GSO. What should be understood by the ‘space in which the electromagnetic spectrum operates’ is subject to speculation, but may theoretically extend to the entire portion of space in between the ground station and the radio station on board any satellite registered by Colombia. This far surpasses any claim made in the framework of the Bogotá Declaration, which only covered the GSO. The Constitution also adds that the territory as defined by the aforementioned provision, belongs to the nation of Colombia, “together with the public resources that are part of it” (Art. 102). The language of this provision, too, is strongly reminiscent of the 1976 Declaration and its reference to the UNGA resolutions on natural resources.
38.
A. Bückling, ‘Rechtsprobleme des Synchronkorridors’, 27 Zeit. Luft- & Weltraumr. 1978, p. 81; S. Gorove, supra footnote 293 of Chap. 1, p. 451–455; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 32 ofIntroduction; M.G. Bourély, ‘Quelques réflexions au sujet de l’orbite géostationnaire’, 13 Ann. Air & Space L. 1988, p. 229–245; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 307; T. Gangale, supra footnote 326 of Chap. 1. An obvious objection to the legal qualms with the Bogotá Declaration, however, is that the equatorial countries, in their view, could not have violated the OST as they argued the GSO not to be a part of outer space.
39.
M.G. Markoff, ‘The International Space Agency project, the Bogota Declaration and the common interests rule’, 20 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1977, p. 32; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 3 of Chap. 1, p. 88–90.
40.
G.O. Robinson, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 32–33. Compare A.G. Vicas, ‘An economic assessment of CCIR’s five methods for assuring guaranteed access to the orbit-spectrum resource’, 7 Ann. Air & Space L. 1982, p. 434–435.
41.
For an excellent analysis of this issue, see S.A. Levy, ‘Institutional perspectives on the allocation of space orbital resources: the ITU, common user satellite systems and beyond’, 16 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 1984, p. 171–202. Smith also notes that, in the history of the regulation of orbital slots through the ITU, the developing country actors did not act as a homogeneous group, but were rather divided in two groups with different political motivations. See M.L. Smith, ‘Space WARC 1985: the quest for equitable access’, 3 Boston U. Int’l L.J. 1985, p. 234–235, footnote 16 of Introduction.
42.
The example of India , Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam springs to mind: see R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 8, p. 187–188.
43.
See, for example, R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 8, p. 181–184; R.S. Jakhu and K. Singh, ‘Space security and competition for radio frequencies and geostationary slots’, 58 Zeit. Luft- & Weltraumr. 2009, p. 82–83.
44.
See infra, Sect. 4.2.2.1.
45.
See J.I. Ezor, ‘Costs overhead: Tonga ’s claiming of sixteen geostationary orbital sites and the implications for U.S. space policy’, 24 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1993, p. 915–942; D. Riddick, ‘Why does Tonga own outer space?’, 19 Air & Space L. 1994, p. 15–29; A.N. Delzeit and R.F. Beal, ‘The vulnerability of the pacific rim orbital spectrum under international space law’, 9 N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1996, p. 69–83; L.D. Roberts, ‘A lost connection: geostationary satellite networks and the International Telecommunication Union’, 15 Berk. Tech. L.J. 2000, p. 1095–1144. For a discussion of some of the disputes that followed the Tonga debacle, see F. Lyall, ‘The International Telecommunication Union: a World Communications Commission?’, 37 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1994, p. 43–45. Other examples include Papua New Guinea and Gibraltar. See also P.A. Salin, supra footnote 330 of Chap. 1, p. 51–52; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 62 of Chap. 2, p. 74–76 (noting that Intelsat , the US and Russia frequently engage in overfiling as well).
46.
A.N. Delzeit and R.F. Beal, supra footnote 45, p. 71.
47.
J.I. Ezor, supra footnote 45, p. 933; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 297.
48.
See C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 28; Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 4, p. 4; D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 11; F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 3, p. 236.
49.
For example, Leive differentiates between pre-emptive, protective, safeguard and obsolete paper satellites . See D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 11–12 and 29–30. See also K.G. Gibbons, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 153. See further the distinction between virtual and paper satellites , supra footnote 4.
50.
See, in general, F. Lyall, ‘Paralysis by phantom: problems of the ITU filing procedures’, 39 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1996, p. 187–193.
51.
For example, Intelsat argued that the actions of Tonga (only) contravened the spirit of Art. 29 of the 1989 ITC, Art. 33 of the 1982 ITC, and Resolutions 2 and 4 of the 1979 ITU WARC. See the opposition letter of Intelsat Director-General Dean Burch to the ITU IFRB of 12 June 1990, cited in relevant part in R. Oosterlinck, supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 279. On ITU Resolutions 2 and 4, see infra, Sect. 4.2.3.
52.
J.I. Ezor, supra footnote 45, p. 935; D. Riddick, supra footnote 45, p. 21; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 282. Freeland and Jakhu consider the hoarding of slots through the registration of paper satellites with the ITU “at least a form of semi-appropriation”: see S. Freeland and R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 148 of Chap. 1, no. 72. See also A. Copiz, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 223.
53.
D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap 1, p. 343. See ITU, Final Acts of the World maritime administrative radio conference (WMARC-74), held from 22 April through 7 June 1974 in Geneva, available for purchase at http://www.itu.int/pub/R-ACT.
54.
K.G. Gibbons, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 153; A.M. Rutkowski, ‘Six ad-hoc two: the Third World speaks its mind’, 4 Sat. Comm. 1980, p. 25 (citing the views of the US delegate to the ITU WARC at the time); C.Q. Christol, ‘Prospects for an international legal regime for direct television broadcasting’, 34 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 1985, p. 153–154; M.G. Bourély, supra footnote 38, p. 244; D. Riddick, supra footnote 45, p. 22–23; R. Oosterlinck, supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 278; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 299, referring to C.Q. Christol (1989), supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 215; S. Cahill, ‘Give me my space: implications for permitting national appropriation of the geostationary orbit’, 19 Wis. Int’l L.J. 2001, p. 246 (explicitly likening the wasteful inefficiencies of a priori plans to paper satellites ); P. Delville, supra footnote 29 of Chap. 2, p. 149. Apparently unaware of these views, Smith erroneously notes that “no authorities have asserted that allotment plans violate the provisions of international space law”: M.L. Smith, supra footnote 30 of Introduction p. 262.
55.
UNCOPUOS, Working paper submitted by France to the second session of the Working group on direct broadcast satellites, UN Doc. A/AC.105/62 of 29 July 1969, p. 3–4.
56.
See supra, footnotes 311–330 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.
57.
Statement of the United States delegate to the second session of the Working group on direct broadcast satellites on 31 July 1969, cited in E.M. Valters, supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 66–67. Many scholars side with the United States delegate on this issue. See, in particular, D. Goedhuis (1973), supra footnote 120 of Chap. 2, p. 227.
58.
See J.H. Glazer, supra footnote 257 of Chap. 1, p. 81; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 65 of Chap. 1, p. 22–23. Cheng also considers the continued use of prime orbital locations as possibly breaching the non-appropriation principle , likening the legal problems it raises to the problems of paper satellites : B. Cheng, ‘The 1967 Space Treaty: thirty years on’, 40 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1997, p. xxii–xxiii. The author argues that both the continued use and the non-use of space straddle the line “between occupation and appropriation” (‘occupation’ is arguably used in a colloquial manner, as both legal titles are proscribed by Article II OST ). See also R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 3 of Chap. 1, p. 181–183.
59.
B. Cheng (1997), supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 567.
60.
See infra, Sect. 5.1.
61.
A. Copiz, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 214.
62.
See, in general, Nos. 9.1, 9.3 and 9.5B ITU RR.
63.
On this subject, see further infra, Sect. 4.2.3.
64.
See Items A.1, A.2 and A.4 App. 4, Annex 2 ITU RR.
65.
See, in general, Nos. 9.27, 9.28, 9.34 and 9.41 ITU RR and App. 5 ITU RR.
66.
Nos. 9.50–9.65 ITU RR.
67.
Art. 11 ITU RR.
68.
Nos. 11.2–11.8 ITU RR.
69.
No. 11.28 ITU RR.
70.
Nos. 11.15 and 11.25 ITU RR.
71.
Nos. 11.30–11.34 ITU RR (emphasis added).
72.
Nos. 11.36–11.39 ITU RR.
73.
Footnote A.9.1 ITU RR.
74.
Footnote A.11.1 ITU RR.
75.
See ITU, Final Acts of the World radiocommunication conference (WRC-03), held from 9 June through 4 July 2003 in Geneva, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S020100002D4005PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014.
76.
Resolution 3, supra footnote 16.
77.
See ITU, Final Acts adopted by the first session of the World administrative radio conference on the use of the geostationary-satellite orbit and the planning of space services utilizing it (ORB-85), held from 8 August through 15 September 1985 in Geneva, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S02010000364002PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014; ITU, Final Acts of the World administrative radio conference on the use of the geostationary-satellite orbit and the planning of space services utilizing it (ORB-88), held from 29 August through 5 October 1988 in Geneva, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S02010000334002PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014.
78.
See Art. 3 App. 30B ITU RR.
79.
No. 5195, added to Art. 69 at ORB-88; No. 11.2 App. 30B ITU RR.
80.
No. 2.3 App. 30B ITU RR.
81.
No. 1.17 ITU RR.
82.
No. 1.18 ITU RR.
83.
Art. 6 App. 30B ITU RR.
84.
Nos. 6.5 and 6.8 App. 30B ITU RR.
85.
No. 2.2bis App. 30B ITU RR.
86.
No. 8.7 App. 30B ITU RR.
87.
WRC-12 adopted a number of additional regulatory provisions for BSS networks in the 21.4–22 GHz band in Regions 1 and 3: see in particular Resolution 552 (WRC-12) on long term access to and development in the band 21.4–22 GHz in Regions 1 and 3; Resolution 553, supra footnote 20; Resolution 554 (WRC-12) on the application of pfd masks to coordination under No. 9.7 for broadcasting-satellite service networks in the band 21.4–22 GHz in Regions 1 and 3; Resolution 555, supra footnote 20. Interestingly, however, while acknowledging that the interim measures for the use of the regulated band were on a ‘first-come first-served’ basis, which may have resulted in problems of access and use, the resolutions explicitly deny the need for adopting an a priori plan for broadcasting-satellite services in this band. In particular, such a plan “should be avoided as it freezes access according to technological assumptions at the time of planning and then prevents flexible use taking account of real world demand and technical development” (Resolutions 553 and 555). Rather than constituting a reaction to the politicized a priori v. a posteriori debate, the specific measures for the 21.4–22 GHz band were adopted to diminish the backlog in processing the notifications for frequency assignments in this band. As such, Resolution 555 expressly notes that “the number of filings made by some administrations in this band is extremely large, which may not be realistic and may be difficult to implement within the regulatory time-limit under Article 11”, thereby “limiting the possibility of successful coordination of BSS systems already submitted or planned to be submitted by other administrations”. See ITU, Final Acts of the World radiocommunication conference (WRC-12), held from 23 January through 17 February 2012 in Geneva, available for purchase at http://www.itu.int/pub/R-ACT-WRC.9-2012.
88.
No. 14.3 App. 30 ITU RR.
89.
The BSS plan was negotiated in two separate conferences. For Regions 1 and 3, the plan was adopted at the 1977 World administrative radio conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (Regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (Region 1). See supra, footnote 298 of Chap. 1. For technical reasons, the planning of Region 2 was postponed until 1983. See ITU, Final Acts of the Regional administrative conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in Region 2 (SAT-82), held from 28 February through 18 March 1983 in Geneva, available for purchase at http://www.itu.int/pub/R-ACT.
90.
Art. 4 App. 30 ITU RR.
91.
Art. 6 App. 30 ITU RR.
92.
Art. 5 App. 30 ITU RR.
93.
No. 5.2.1 App. 30 ITU RR. See further infra, Sect. 4.2.2.2.
94.
The notion ‘antecedence’ will be used throughout this chapter so as to avoid confusion between the concepts ‘prior in time’ and ‘priority’. It is preferred over the term ‘precedence’ suggested by the Chairman of the 1947 ITU Working Group cited in R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 395. As per its ordinary meaning, ‘precedence’ is synonymous with ‘importance, priority’.
95.
See also M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 161.
96.
See supra, footnote 69 and accompanying text.
97.
Lyall notes that, for space services, the date of receipt of the notice virtually becomes the date of entry into the MIFR and that as such an element of priority is attached to said date of the notice. See F. Lyall, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 370.
98.
For an excellent analysis of the ITU rules and procedures in general, see D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1; id., ‘Regulating the use of the radio spectrum’, 5 Stan. J. Int’l Stud. 1970, p. 21–52. See also G.O. Robinson, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 11.
99.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 21–24.
100.
M.A. Stull and G. Alexander, supra footnote 17 of Chap. 3, p. 493. The authors note that, even if antecedence used to be the most important factor, the primary claim to priority is currently made on the basis of conformity with the technical rules in the Radio Regulations .
101.
Art. 2, sub a and b ITU CS .
102.
No. 4.3 ITU RR.
103.
Art. 6 ITU CS . These rules are also applicable when administrations engage in international services.
104.
No. 4.2 ITU RR: “Member States undertake that in assigning frequencies to stations which are capable of causing harmful interference to the services rendered by the stations of another country, such assignments are to be made in accordance with the Table of Frequency Allocations and other provisions of these Regulations” (emphasis added).
105.
Art. 48, jo. Art. 6 ITU CS .
106.
Some authors only refer to the principles of harmful interference and conformity with applicable international law as defining the rights of administrations in orbital positions and radio frequencies, wholly omitting the antecedence principle: see, for example, S.A. Levy, supra footnote 41, p. 187.
107.
Art. 45 ITU CS , repeated in No. 0.4 ITU RR (emphasis added).
108.
Nos. 5.43 and 5.43A ITU RR.
109.
See the Annex to the ITU CS , supra footnote 30. This definition is repeated almost verbatim in No. 1.169 ITU RR.
110.
Nos. 8.5, 11.31, 11.36 and 11.42 ITU RR.
111.
Nos. 8.4 and 4.4 ITU RR.
112.
No. 11.41 and Footnote 11.41.2 ITU RR. Until recently, a provisional entry could be made definitive if all relevant assignments were in use for 4 months without any complaint of actual harmful interference . WRC-12 has eliminated this possibility.
113.
An ‘allocation’ is defined as an “[e]ntry in the Table of Frequency Allocations of a given frequency band for the purpose of its use by one or more terrestrial or space radiocommunication services or the radio astronomy service under specified conditions”: No. 1.16 ITU RR. The Table is contained in Art. 5 ITU RR.
114.
Nos. 5.23–5.26 ITU RR.
115.
Nos. 5.28–5.30 ITU RR.
116.
No. 5.31 ITU RR.
117.
Art. 40 ITU CS .
118.
No. 15.28 ITU RR. See also Art. 31 ITU RR and App. 27 ITU RR.
119.
Art. 41 ITU CS .
120.
ITU, Rules of procedure of the Radio Regulations Board, ed. 2009.
121.
Current Rule 1, sub d on No. 9.6 ITU RR in the RRB Rules of Procedure. See J. Wilson, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 266. The rule is also relied upon by the US FCC: see FCC, In re Telesat Canada petitions for reconsideration, 29 October 2010, F.C.C. 10–188, available at http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2010/db1101/FCC-10-188A1.txt, retrieved on 5 September 2014.
122.
No. 8.1 ITU RR.
123.
See, however, infra, footnote 159.
124.
See, in general, Art. 15, section VI ITU RR.
125.
No. 15.23 ITU RR.
126.
For the notion of equity in space law, see S. Gorove, supra footnote 272 of Chap. 1, p. 17 et seq.; M.L. Smith, supra footnote 41. For a recent appraisal of the equity notion in general international law, see A. Gourgourinis, ‘Delineating the normativity of equity in international law’, 11 Int’l Comm. L. Rev. 2009, p. 327–347.
127.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 98, p. 30.
128.
App. 4 ITU RR. The basic characteristics referred to here are included in the information to be submitted during the advance publication phase of the registration procedure. See supra, footnote 64 and accompanying text.
129.
No. 11.43A jo. No. 11.1 ITU RR.
130.
No. 11.43B ITU RR.
131.
See further infra, Sect. 4.2.3.
132.
No. 11.46 ITU RR.
133.
C.Q. Christol (1989), supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 220–221. The slogan has been criticized by many authors for its inaccurate representation of the ITU procedures: see S.A. Levy, supra footnote 41, p. 189; E.D. Altholz, supra footnote 293 of Chap. 1, p. 227.
134.
This point is stressed in one of the most thorough high-level analyses of the problem: see UNCOPUOS, supra footnote 327 of Chap. 1, no. 122. See also S.E. Doyle, supra footnote 327 of Chap. 1, p. 640: “[w]e have seen no nation denied access to the [GSO] and we know of no case in which a nation’s national or international communication satellite needs could not be met on a total and timely basis in the presence of international cooperation and mutual accommodation”. Staple notes that all new entrants to the ITU registration procedure have been accommodated, adding that some of the most acute coordination issues to arise were due to rules extraneous to the ITU system: G.C. Staple, supra footnote 18, p. 708. See further K.A. Baca, supra footnote 8 of Introduction, p. 1078.
135.
S.E. Doyle, supra footnote 327 of Chap. 1, p. 637.
136.
G.O. Robinson, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 31, referring in particular to the procedures for the high-frequency bands. The authors notes that “the problem with the present scheme is not that it is first-come, first-served, but that it is «everyone-come, everyone-served» until the band becomes overcrowded”.
137.
M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 47, referring to an address by Intelsat Director-General Dean Burch on July 8, 1985. See further on the misleading nature of the ‘first-come, first-served’ tagline: S.A. Levy, supra footnote 41, p. 189 (concluding that “the existing regime is thus not a first-come, first-serve [sic] system that forecloses subsequent entry”); A.M. Solana, ‘The International Telecommunication Union and the third world’s quest for equitable access to the orbit/spectrum resource’, 4 Bost. Coll. Third World L.J. 1984, p. 189, footnote 13 of Chap. 1; T. Lozanova, supra footnote 298 of Chap. 1, p. 236 (remarking that the ITU is not simply a passive recorder of frequency assignments that grants permanent priority according to the rules “who has first come, he has first received”); L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 39 (noting that the ITU abandoned the principle when the 1979 WARC decided that the use of radio-frequency bands should be guided by the principles of justice and equity, in such as way as to guarantee the use and sharing of these bands in the mutual interest of all nations).
138.
M.L. Smith, supra footnote 41, p. 234, footnote 14 of Introduction, referring to the IFRB Report to ORB-85.
139.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 21.
140.
See A.H. Ickowitz, ‘The role of the International Telecommunication Union in the settlement of harmful interference disputes’, 13 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1974, p. 87; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 35; P.K. Speck, supra footnote 278 of Chap. 3, p. 524.
141.
A. Chayes, J. Fawcett, M.Ito and A.-C. Kiss, supra footnote 298 of Chap. 1, p. 18; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 30; M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 172.
142.
No. 15.22 ITU RR.
143.
For satellite networks and systems not subject to the coordination procedure of section II of Art. 9 ITU RR, see No. 9.4 ITU RR: “[i]In the case of difficulties, the administration responsible for the planned satellite network shall explore all possible means to resolve the difficulties without considering the possibility of adjustment to networks of other administrations. If no such means can be found, it may request the other administrations to explore all possible means to meet its requirements. The administrations concerned shall make every possible effort to resolve the difficulties by means of mutually acceptable adjustments to their networks”. For satellite systems and networks subject to section II of Art. 9 ITU RR, see No. 9.5B ITU RR: “both administrations shall endeavour to cooperate in joint efforts to resolve any difficulties, with the assistance of the Bureau, if so requested by either of the parties, and shall exchange any additional relevant information that may be available”.
144.
Nos. 9.60–9.65 ITU RR.
145.
J. Wilson, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 268. See also S.D. White, supra footnote 47 of Chap. 3, p. 343.
146.
See M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 47.
147.
See supra, section “Orbital Positions for Fixed-Satellite Services” of this chapter.
148.
No. 8.5 App. 30B ITU RR.
149.
Art. 8 App. 30B ITU RR.
150.
R.S. Jakhu, ‘Developments in the international law of telecommunications: remarks’, 83 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 1989, p. 391; F. Lyall, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 394; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 296. See Nos. 6.20, 6.24 and 8.15 App. 30B ITU RR. The a posteriori aspects of the FSS coordination and examination phases are even subject to similar qualifications as the general procedure for the unplanned bands.
151.
No. 2.6 and Art. 6 App. 30B ITU RR.
152.
Art. 7 App. 30B ITU RR.
153.
No. 2.6bis App. 30B ITU RR.
154.
No. 7.5 App. 30B ITU RR.
155.
No. 7.3 App. 30B ITU RR.
156.
No. 7.6 App. 30B ITU RR.
157.
No. 5.2.2 App. 30 ITU RR. See also Nos. 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 ITU RR.
158.
No. 5.1.8 App. 30 ITU RR.
159.
The interplay between this provision and the explicit abolition of the antecedence rule may even cast new light on the interpretation of Rule H40, implying that the date of receipt is less decisive in the general procedure for unplanned bands as well. See supra footnotes 121–123 and accompanying text.
160.
Art. 4 App. 30 ITU RR.
161.
No. 4.1.25 App. 30 ITU RR.
162.
No. 4.1.26 App. 30 ITU RR.
163.
No. 2.6bis App. 30B ITU RR.
164.
See infra, Sects. 4.3.1 and 4.2.4, respectively.
165.
See J.H. Glazer (1963), supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 19–20; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 385. For the text of the draft convention, see Universal Electrical Communications Union, Draft of convention and regulations, Washington, D.C., December, 1920, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1921. Somewhat misleadingly, the draft Convention divided the prior rights granted by conferences into two categories: permanent and temporary. The tenure of a permanent prior right, however, was to extend only for 10 years from the date on which it had been allowed by the relevant international conference. Unless extended by a subsequent international conference, the right would terminate automatically at the end of the initial period of 10 years. The tenure of a temporary prior right would only extend from one international conference to the next, and unless then renewed would automatically terminate in 18 months from the date of the second conference.
166.
Resolution 4 (Rev. WRC-03) relating to the period of validity of frequency assignments to space stations using the geostationary-satellite and other satellite orbits. For Resolution 2 , see supra, footnote 297 of Chap. 1. For WARC-71 and 79, see supra, footnotes 14 and 16, respectively.
167.
F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1, p. 238. Even though PP 1 of Resolution 4 notes that “rational and efficient use must be made of the frequency spectrum and the geostationary-satellite orbit”, the other provisions and the title of the resolution refer to all space stations using the geostationary-satellite and other satellite orbits.
168.
Footnote 1 of Resolution 4 .
169.
OP 1 of Resolution 2 . The original version of the resolution stated that the registration of assignments should not grant rights in perpetuity. However, this phrasing was interpreted by Butler as meaning that registration does not grant such priority. See Butler’s advice to the Legal Subcommittee of the UNCOPUOS in Summary record of the 258^th meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held on 20 May 1976, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.258 of 23 May 1976, at 6. The current language of Resolution 2 confirms this imperative interpretation.
170.
OP 2 of Resolution 2 . These provisions should be taken into account by both the administrations and the Bureau in the resolution of harmful interference conflicts (OP 3). Through its adoption at the ORB-85 and 88 sessions, the principle contained in Resolution 2 of 1979 was elevated to a legally binding rule of international law: R.S. Jakhu, J.L. Magdelénat and H. Rouselle, supra footnote 25, p. 287.
171.
PP 1 of Resolution 4 .
172.
PP 1 and 2 of Resolution 4 .
173.
PP 6 of Resolution 4 .
174.
OP 1.1 of Resolution 4 .
175.
OP 1.2 of Resolution 4 .
176.
OP 1.3 of Resolution 4 .
177.
OP 1.4 of Resolution 4 , referring to Nos. 11.43A-11.46 ITU RR.
178.
No. 4.1.24 App. 30 ITU RR. The provision was included in the WRC-2000 at the request of the developing countries . See ITU, Final Acts of the World radiocommunication conference (WRC-2000), held from 8 May through 2 June 2000 in Istanbul, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S020100002E4001PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014.
179.
See infra, section “‘Rights’ Granted upon Plan Entering into Force” of this chapter.
180.
M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 46. The requirement to implement these advances “as soon as possible” entails a more stringent obligation for developed countries than for developing ones.
181.
Nos. 11.43A-11.46 ITU RR.
182.
Chairman Working Group 1947, cited in D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 59; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 395.
183.
S. Gorove, supra footnote 272 of Chap. 1, p. 18–19.
184.
M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 50–51.
185.
See M.L. Stern, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 879; R. Frieden, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 323.
186.
See S. Wiessner, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 3, p. 257–259; M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 50; F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1, p. 238 (“a state might in effect permanently retain the use of a particular orbit by the placement and replacement of a satellite, in spite of Resolution 4 ”).
187.
S. Wiessner, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 3, p. 258–259; R.S. Jakhu, J.L. Magdelénat and H. Rouselle, supra footnote 25, p. 280; N. Jasentuliyana, supra footnote 17, p. 54.
188.
No. 8.1 ITU RR.
189.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 98, p. 31. A recent submission by Perek to the UNCOPUOS based on a detailed comparison between the nominal positions of radio space stations and actual positions of satellites in the GSO noted that “a fairly large percentage of users” of this crowded orbit had no actual satellites at their registered positions. He called on all administrations using the GSO “to revise their space networks with a view to suspend or remove those networks from the Master International Frequency Register of the International Telecommunication Union which have not been used recently and might not be used in the immediate future”. See UN Doc. UNCOPUOS, Information paper submitted by the Czech Republic on the examination of the geostationary orbit, UN Doc. A/AC.105/2012/CRP.17 of 7 June 2012, p. 2. See also UNCOPUOS, Information provided by the delegation of the Czech Republic on the actual situation in the geostationary orbit, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/2012/CRP.25 of 14 February 2012. An updated version of this paper is available at www.geostationary.cz, retrieved on 5 September 2014.
190.
See supra, section “Priority Through Antecedence?” of this chapter.
191.
Nos. 5.43 and 5.43A ITU RR.
192.
See supra, footnote 64 and accompanying text.
193.
App. 4 in Vol. 2: Appendices of the 2012 ITU RR, p. 68.
194.
Y. Henri, ‘Satellite matters. Serving the satellite community: efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource’, ITU News 2012, available at https://itunews.itu.int/En/2064-Serving-the-satellite-community-8232%3BEfficient-use-of-the-spectrumorbit-resource.note.aspx, retrieved on 22 September 2014.
195.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , Report on the activities of the Radiocommunication Sector . Part 5: implementation of resolution 80 (Rev. WRC-2000), 20 February 2003, p. 6 (requiring that a satellite is ‘present and operating’ in a specified orbital position for a minimum of 3 months); Arnon, O. and Y. Tal, ‘Invalidation of a satellite network : from theory to practice’, presentation at the ITU/IDA 2010 workshop on the efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource, held from 17 through 18 June 2010 in Singapore, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/go/space-workshop-singapore-2010/en, retrieved on 22 September 2014 (noting that ‘use’ requires more than the mere presence of a satellite at an orbital location and that a satellite that is drifted into the location without its payload being turned on does not constitute ‘use’); J.N. Zoller, ‘Satellite regulations. Improving the international satellite regulatory framework’, ITU News 2012, available at https://itunews.itu.int/en/2063-Satellite-regulations-Improving-the-international-satellite-regulatory-framework.note.aspx, retrieved on 22 September 2014.
196.
ITU RRB , 13^th Meeting re: Europesat-1 BSS system, 6–14 July 1998, cited in O. Arnon and Y. Tal, supra footnote 195.
197.
Amended No. 11.44B ITU RR. See supra, footnote 87. This definition reflects the standing practice of the Radiocommunication Bureau prior to WRC-12: Director Radiocommunication Bureau , Report on the activities of the Radiocommunication Sector . Part 7: experiences in the application of the procedures of the Radio Regulations and other matters related to efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource, 16 September 2011, p. 6; ITU, Proposals submitted by the State of Israel for the work of WRC-12: Agenda item 7, 23 December 2011, p. 2 (both referring to 3 months rather than 90 days). The same period of continuous activity is required to satisfy the requirement of regular operation when bringing a previously suspended assignment back into use, where the date of bringing back into use constitutes the first day of the 90-day period: Footnote 11.49.1 ITU RR.
198.
No. 11.44 ITU RR.
199.
No. 11.47 ITU RR.
200.
No. 11.44 jo. Nos. 11.47-48 ITU RR. Since WRC-12, No. 11.48 ITU RR requires that the relevant administration is notified at least 6 months before the expiry date mentioned in No. 11.44. However, the latter provision, though amended in WRC-12 as well (even if merely to change the first reference to ‘assignment’ into ‘frequency assignment’) retains the reference to the 3 month information period. See further Footnote 11.41.1 ITU RR and Resolution 552, supra footnote 87.
201.
No. 11.41A ITU RR.
202.
No. 11.49 ITU RR, amended at WRC-12. In previous versions of the RR, the relevant periods were 18 months and 2 years, respectively. Possibly, the initial period of 2 years mentioned in No. 11.49 of the pre-WRC-12 ITU RR was a remnant of a reference to an earlier provision of the Regulations that has been suppressed along the way, without No. 11.49 having been properly adapted to this evolution. Indeed, No. 639BS of the 1971 Radio Regulations provided that, when, following an examination of a notice with respect to current No. 11.31 ITU RR, the Board reaches an unfavourable finding based on the probability of harmful interference to a recorded assignment for a space station which the Board has reason to believe may not be in regular use, the Board shall forthwith consult the administration responsible for the registered assignment. If it is established, after such consultation and on the basis of the information available, that the recorded assignment has not been in use for 2 years, it shall not be taken into account for the purposes of the examination in progress or any other further examination under No. 11.31 RR conducted before the date on which the assignment is brought back into use. Before the assignment is brought back into use, it shall be subject to further coordination and examination by the Board. The date on which the assignment is brought back into use shall then be entered in the Master Register. Thus, under the 1971 ITU RR, if an assignment had not been not in use for more than 2 years, it was removed from the register and re-entered only when brought back into use, bearing then the new date of entry. The at first sight quite odd lapse from 18 months to 2 years in pre-WRC-12 No. 11.49 ITU RR may be explained by reference to the precursor of this provision, No. 639DM of the 1971 ITU RR. This provision held that, when the use of an assignment is suspended for 18 months, the registering state is obliged to notify the Board of the date when the use was suspended and when the assignment is to be brought back into regular use. This is still the case at present. However, the provision added that the Board may, in case of non-compliance by the registering state, inquire of said state when it will be brought back into regular use. If the state did not respond within 6 months (thus increasing the period to a maximum total of 2 years), the Board was to treat the assignment “as one which has been established as having been out of regular use for 2 years”, once more referring to No. 639BS. The WRC-12 amendments have severed this implied link with the legislative history of the ITU RR in favour of, at the same time, increased stringency and flexibility for removing entries for non-functional satellites. The question is now whether the legal implications of a failure to comply with this aspect of current No. 11.49 ITU RR have been forfeited as well, for there is no longer an explicit reference to the powers of the Bureau to cancel and disregard entries exceeding 3 years of inactivity, nor is there an implied connection on the basis of legislative history. On the powers of the Bureau to cancel entries, see further infra, Sect. 4.2.5. For a reconstruction of the text of No. 639BS before the 1979 Final Acts, see C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 37. Finally, for a request to clarify the pre-WRC-12 text of Art. 11.49 ITU RR, see ITU, supra footnote 197, p. 3.
203.
Christol notes that the claims that priority is acquired on the basis of the ‘first-come, first-served’ principle have become less meaningful in light of the focus of the ITU rules on the need to actually used the registered assignments. See C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 64. Contra: R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 8, p. 181. See E.M. Valters, supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 76–77 (referring to the antecedence principle as “first use, first served”, rather than “first-come, first served”).
204.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 4, p. 9; D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 15–17.
205.
See, in particular, Resolution 49 (Rev. WRC-12) on administrative due diligence applicable to some satellite radiocommunication services; Resolution 80, supra footnote 20; Resolution 81 (WRC-2000) on the evaluation of the administrative due diligence procedure for satellite networks . See further Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 4; ITU, Position paper submitted by the United Kingdom and Luxembourg on due diligence considerations related to Resolution 18, 12 June 1996; Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 195; SAT-BAG, supra footnote 21; id., Action plan update at January 2003, 28 January 2003, available at http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-r/archives/sat-bag/docs/2003/6-r3.html, retrieved on 20 December 2010; Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 197. See also D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4; F. Lyall, supra footnote 50; H. Wong, ‘The paper «satellite» chase: the ITU prepares for its final exam in Resolution 18’, 63 J. Air L. & Com. 1998, p. 849–882; F. Lyall, ‘The rational, efficient and economic use of space: three suggestions’, in M. Benkö and W. Kroll (eds.), supra footnote 233 of Chap. 1, p. 386–395.
206.
See previous footnote. See also ITU Radio Regulations Board, Report on resolution 80 (WARC-97), ITU Doc. WRC-2000/29-E of 27 January 2000.
207.
Nos. 9.2A and 9.40A ITU RR.
208.
No. 9.5D ITU RR.
209.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 23.
210.
Decides 1 of Council Decision 482 (Rev. 2013) on implementation of cost recovery for satellite network filings of 21 June 2013, Document C13/112-E, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/go/space-cost-recovery/en, retrieved on 8 May 2012. See also Resolution 88 on processing charges for satellite network filings and administrative procedures; Resolution 91 on cost recovery for some ITU products and services. Both resolutions were adopted at the PP-98 conference, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1. Though no longer included in the latest versions of the ITU RR, their text is still available on the ITU website, retrieved on 3 September 2014.
211.
Footnotes 9.2B.1, 9.38.1 and A.11.6 ITU RR. In his report on suggested remedies for resolving the paper satellite problem of the ITU, Leive noted that the same rules should be applied to the systems that have already been entered into the Register: D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 24–25. See further infra, Sect. 4.2.5.
212.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 4, p. 6–7.
213.
E.D. DuCharme, R.R. Bowen and M.J.R. Irwin, supra footnote 14, p. 270.
214.
Nos. 4.1.3, 4.1.3bis, 4.1.13 and 4.1.27bis App. 30 ITU RR.
215.
No. 4.1.19 App. 30 ITU RR.
216.
No. 4.1.23 App. 30 ITU RR. Similar rules are applicable for bringing into use projected modifications to the Region 2 plan for BSS: see Nos. 4.2.6, 4.2.6bis and 4.2.21C App. 30 ITU RR.
217.
No. 5.3.1 App. 30 ITU RR.
218.
No. 5.3.2 App. 30 ITU RR.
219.
No. 6.1 App. 30B ITU RR.
220.
No. 6.31 App. 30B ITU RR.
221.
No. 6.28 App. 30B ITU RR.
222.
No. 6.33 App. 30B ITU RR.
223.
No. 8.2 App. 30B ITU RR.
224.
No. 8.16 App. 30B ITU RR.
225.
No. 8.17 App. 30B ITU RR. The periods for notifying the dates of suspension and subsequent return to regular operation used to be the same for assignments in the planned and unplanned bands, until the WRC-12 amendment of No. 11.49 ITU RR for the latter.
226.
No. 8.17 App. 30B ITU RR.
227.
Art. 7 Apps. 30 and 30A ITU RR.
228.
Art. 2A Apps. 30 and 30A ITU RR.
229.
Art. 4 Apps. 30 and 30A ITU RR.
230.
Former sections IB and II of Art. 6 App. 30B ITU RR. These sections were amended at the 2007 WRC. See ITU, Final Acts of the World radiocommunication conference (WRC-07), held from 22 October through 16 November 2007 in Geneva, available at http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/01/S020100002C4006PDFE.pdf, retrieved on 29 August 2014.
231.
Art. 6 App. 30B ITU RR, as of 17 November 2007.
232.
Decides 1 of Council Decision 482, supra footnote 210. See, for example, Footnotes 7, 8, 16 and 17 App. 30 ITU RR and Footnote 1 App. 30B ITU RR (inclusion in List ); Footnote 18 App. 30 ITU RR and Footnote 11 App. 30B ITU RR (entry into MIFR ).
233.
As such, Riddick has criticized the a priori plans of the ITU for limiting rather than protecting the goal of free access to space, since usage of a slot allotted to administration A precludes or limits the use thereof by administration B, irrespective of the actual use by A, whereas under the general ITU regime usage is only precluded if a segment is already used by another administration: see D. Riddick, supra footnote 45, p. 22–23.
234.
See No. 11.2 App. 30B ITU RR and No. 14.3 App. 30 ITU RR.
235.
See supra, Sect. 4.2.2.2.
236.
N. Jasentuliyana, supra footnote 18, p. 57 (noting that additional use provisions were introduced so that unused planned allotments could still be utilized); A.N. Delzeit and R.F. Beal, supra footnote 45, p. 77; R. Frieden, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 298, footnote 18; F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1, p. 234. See further F. Lyall, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 394; id., ‘Law of satellite communications’, in N. Jasentuliyana (ed.), Space law: development and scope, Westport: Praeger, 1992, p. 118–119; id., supra footnote 45, p. 43. Compare the suggestions for a ‘rental system’ to the same effect in T.A. Hart, ‘A review of WARC-79 and its implications for the development of satellite communications’, 12 Law. Am. 1980, p. 460–475. Stern rightly notes that the temporary use of unused allotments by another administration is impractical due to the allotments’ specific link with the territory of the administration identified in the plan: M.L. Stern, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 881. Likewise, the US delegate at the FSS planning conferences warned that it is not accurate to say that the unused orbital slots allotted to certain countries will be made available to other administrations, as “[a] plan necessarily ties a particular orbital position and frequency assignment to a specific coverage or service area. The interlocking nature of a plan would make it practically impossible for other countries to make use of unused assignments”: see A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 54, p. 25. Nevertheless, the nature of the FSS plan ultimately adopted was flexible enough to assuage these concerns. As noted by Jakhu, the nominal position of a state within the specified predetermined arc of the plan can be moved without its consent: R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 150, p. 391. Moreover, regardless of the practicality, the possibility of temporary usage by another state increases the efficient use of a limited natural resource and guarantees strict conformity of the adopted a priori plans with the general principles of the UN space treaties. See further infra, Sect. 4.2.6.
237.
No. 6.56 App. 30B ITU RR.
238.
No. 2.6bis App. 30B ITU RR. See further M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 68–169 and 173–174. However, the BSS plan recently reintroduced the requirement that the lifetime of assignments in the feeder-link List of additional uses in Regions 1 and 3 be limited to 15 years: No. 4.1.24 App. 30 ITU RR. See further supra, footnote 178 and accompanying text.
239.
See, inter alia, Apps. 25–27 of the ITU RR and the 1961 Stockholm Agreement on the planning of the BSS service in the European Broadcasting Area. See ITU, Final Acts of the Special regional European VHF/UHF broadcasting conference (ST-61), held from 26 May through 22 June 1961 in Stockholm, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/terrestrial/broadcast/plans/st61/index.html, retrieved on 5 September 2014. Lyall and Larsen note that planning efforts can include permitting others to use the reserved frequencies until a designated state wishes to use its allotment: F. Lyall and P.B. Larsen, supra footnote 318 of Chap. 1, p. 233.
240.
See supra, footnote 291 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.
241.
See supra, footnote 53.
242.
D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 344. See A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 54, p. 24–25.
243.
D.M. Leive, supra footnote 98, p. 47–48.
244.
See supra, Sect. 4.2.4.1.
245.
See No. 347, para. 14 of the 1947 ITU RR. The provision added that “[e]xceptionally, however, and only in the case of a frequency assigned to a working service for use during years of high or low sunspot activity if the frequency has not been brought into use when 3 years have elapsed from the date of receipt of the first notice, and the Board finds, after consultation with the notifying country, that the circumstances warrant the retention of the notice, the entry may be retained for not more than one further period of 3 years. […] Frequencies assigned to a working service for use during years of high or low sunspot activity may be notified to the Board for any other service for use on an interim basis and without prejudice to the earlier frequency assignment”.
246.
No. 351, para. 16 of the 1947 ITU RR.
247.
No. 350, para. 15 of the 1947 ITU RR.
248.
No. 1569 of the 1979 ITU RR.
249.
R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 396; D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 339.
250.
See supra, Sect. 4.1.1.
251.
D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 340.
252.
Ibid., p. 344.
253.
Ibid., p. 338–339. Codding and Rutkowski, however, note that the IFRB never enjoyed the actual power envisaged by the driving powers behind the 1947 constitutive instruments: G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 10, p. 26.
254.
For example, Leive notes that “an inactive entry must be retained unless an administration affirmatively takes action to cancel it”: D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 25. See also D.M. Leive, supra footnote 98, p. 44 (arguing that the IFRB should be given broader powers to strip recorded assignments of their legal recognition). See further E. Pépin, ‘General legal problems in space telecommunications’, 38 Telecom. J. 1971, p. 387; A.H. Ickowitz, supra footnote 140, p. 85; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 38 and 41; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 393; M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 49. The weak regulatory role of the ITU is also lamented in N. Jasentuliyana, supra footnote 27, p. 74–77; A. Chayes and L. Chazen, ‘Policy problems in direct broadcasting from satellites’, 5 Stan. J. Int’l Stud. 1970, p. 16–18; M.A. Stull and G. Alexander, supra footnote 17 of Chap. 3, p. 492; C.R. Stevens, ‘The geostationary orbit: the need for an integrated global policy’, 23 J. Space L. 1995, p. 189.
255.
Cited in G.A. Codding, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 245. See also G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 10, p. 119: “the IFRB was to help and suggest, but not to decide”.
256.
J.H. Glazer (1963), supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 20.
257.
See supra, footnote 102 and accompanying text.
258.
No. 11.50 ITU RR.
259.
No. 13.6 ITU RR. One may also refer to the inconclusive consequences attached to a failure of the notifying administration under Resolution 4 to cancel an assignment that is considered ‘definitively discontinued’ due to expiry of the period of operation shown on the assignment notice. Rather than cancelling the assignment, the resolution merely requires that the Bureau insert a symbol in the remarks column of the MIFR to indicate that the assignment is not in conformity with the resolution: see OP 1.1 of Resolution 4 .
260.
O. Arnon and Y. Tal, supra footnote 195.
261.
Emphasis added. See supra, footnote 200 and accompanying text.
262.
J.N. Zoller, supra footnote 195. See supra, footnote 230.
263.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , Circular letter on the removal of unused frequency assignments (Space Services) from the Master Register, ITU Doc. CR/301, 1 May 2009.
264.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 197, p. 2–3; Y. Henri, supra footnote 194.
265.
Y. Henri, supra footnote 194.
266.
No. 11.49 ITU RR.
267.
J. Christensen, Y. Hung Chang and R. Zhang, ‘Regulatory factors affecting the efficient use of the orbit/spectrum resource’, ITU/IDA 2010 workshop on the efficient use of the spectrum/orbit resource 17–18 June 2010, no. 6. The authors add that satellite operators typically only suspend an assignment once they are challenged by other administrations.
268.
J.N. Zoller, supra footnote 195.
269.
Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 197, p. 7.
270.
No. 11.49 ITU RR, as amended at WRC-12. See supra, footnote 202 and accompanying text.
271.
ITU, ‘World Radiocommunication Conference sets future course’, 17 February 2012, available at http://www.itu.int/net/pressoffice/press_releases/2012/10.aspx, retrieved on 30 April 2014. Delegations also agreed to the need for ‘improved due diligence information’, including more detailed information on the identity of the space object used for the operation of the frequency assignments.
272.
Y. Henri, supra footnote 194. See also Director Radiocommunication Bureau , supra footnote 197, p. 6.
273.
No. 13.6 ITU RR, as amended by WRC-12.
274.
See supra, footnote 295 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.
275.
Art. 2 jo. Art. 44 ITU CS .
276.
See also the recommendations on how to make the ITU process more accurately reflect actual spectrum use in D.M. Leive, supra footnote 4, p. 18–30.
277.
F. Lyall, supra footnote 50, p. 191–192; id., ‘The role of the International Telecommunication Union’, in G. Lafferranderie and D. Crowther (eds.), supra footnote 255 of Chap. 1, p. 262.
278.
Within the practical limits set by the requirement of regular use in the ITU regulations, which allows for limited periods of inactivity inherent to any practice entailing the placement of satellite systems . Though Jakhu is thus correct in pointing out that ‘regular use’ “does not imply that such use must be continuous and without interruption”, it is also clear that such a rigorous requirement would be unworkable in practice. See R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 3 of Chap. 1, p. 298.
279.
To some extent, these measures meet the need for amendments proposed by Leive, who argued in 1970 that any reservation of an assignment should be contingent upon the commencement of operations within a specified period of time, and that the retention of the right should depend on the actual regular use: D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 304 and 306–308.
280.
[Comments], ‘Developments in the international law of telecommunications: discussion’, 83 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 1989, p. 403–406 (with an interesting discussion on the legal differences between a priori and a posteriori plans). Levin therefore argues against overly detailed ITU plans, as they would all but destroy the economic value of the resource being regulated: H.J. Levin, ‘Spectrum negotiations and the geostationary satellites’, 4 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1982, p. 80. See also A.M. Rutkowski, ‘The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference: the ITU in a changing world’, 13 Int’l L. 1979, p. 309; D. Riddick, supra footnote 45, p. 19.
281.
See the critique in L. Schnapf, supra footnote 304 of Chap. 1, p. 718. A.M. Rutkowski, ‘The World Administrative Radio Conference on use of the geostationary-satellite orbit: airing the views of U.S. regulators and users’, 24 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 1985, p. 58: “a planning approach that protects hypothetical systems in the future at the expense of real systems in the present is not equitable” (emphasis added). See also M.A. Rothblatt, ‘International regulation of digital communications satellite systems ’, 32 Fed. Com. L.J. 1980, p. 432: “[t]he a priori planning approach not only does nothing to distribute the benefits of satellite communications, but actually retards the realization of benefits by balkanizing the very resource from which benefits flow”. The argument is reiterated in M.A. Rothblatt, supra footnote 42 of Chap. 3, p. 22. For this reason, the US has opposed allotment plans that are not based on demonstrated need and ability to use: G.O. Robinson, ‘The U.S. faces WARC: the U.S. position’, 29 J. Comm. 1979, p. 155–156; id., supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 27–28. See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 105.
282.
If we look at the history of the 1985–1988 sessions for planning FSS networks, it becomes clear that there never was an actual intention to establish rigid a priori plans . Upon adopting Resolution 3 of WARC 1979, which called for particular space services and frequency bands to be ‘planned’ at a future conference, the United States, supported by a number of developed countries, clarified that it interpreted the planning mandate in the resolution “as being very wide in scope, admitting of a broad range of possibilities”, all the while repeating its objections to a priori plans : statement reprinted in E.D. DuCharme, R.R. Bowen and M.J.R. Irwin, supra footnote 14, p. 278–279. See further M.L. Smith, supra footnote 41, p. 247–251.
283.
Nor can either of these approaches, as such, guarantee actual access to orbits in space for developing countries , for that matter: M.A. Rothblatt, supra footnote 42 of Chap. 3, p. 22.
284.
D.J. Fleming, E.D. DuCharme, R.S. Jakhu and W.G. Longman, supra footnote 302 of Chap. 1, p. 345–346.
285.
Wong notes that the lack of enforcement by the Bureau is the main reason why the adopted due diligence measures fail to remedy the paper satellite problem: H. Wong, supra footnote 205, p. 873–875.
286.
See J.D. Tomlinson, The international control of radiocommunications, Ann Arbor: J.W. Edwards, 1945, p. 290–291; See further D.M. Leive, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 22; F. Lyall, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 345.
287.
See supra, footnote 304 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text. See further R.L. White and H.M. White, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1, p. 214–215.
288.
G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 10, p. 118.
289.
R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 387.
290.
Ibid., p. 389.
291.
Commenting on the 1947 Radio Regulations , Jakhu notes that “[t]he right of priority had […] never been expressly recognized in the ITU Convention or Regulations and, hence, was not legally binding”: R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 394. See also I.H.P. Diederiks-Verschoor, ‘Telecommunications satellites and international law’, 21 Rev. Belge Dr. Int. 1988, p. 242.
292.
Art. 6.1, sub a of the 1947 ITU Convention.
293.
ITU statement cited in A.R. Michaelis and G.C. Gross, supra footnote 291 of Chap. 1, p. 253.
294.
G.A. Codding and A.M. Rutkowski, supra footnote 10, p. 248.
295.
Art. 1, sub a-e App. 5 ITU RR.
296.
Nos. 4.1.1 and 4.2.3 App. 30 ITU RR and No. 6.5, sub b and c App. 30B ITU RR.
297.
No. 6.5, sub a App. 30B ITU RR.
298.
Art. 1, sub f App. 5 ITU RR.
299.
See supra, Sect. 4.2.2.2.
300.
R. Frieden, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 3, p. 298, footnote 16 of Introduction.
301.
Nos. 4.1.16 and 4.2.20 App. 30 ITU RR.
302.
The reference was deleted in 1982 and replaced with the requirement that the special needs of developing countries and geographical situation of particular countries be taken into account. On this amendment, see S.E. Probst, ‘The Plenipotentiary Conference of the International Telecommunication Union, Nairobi, 1982 – a summary of results’, 77 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 1983, p. 354–359. The practical impact of the amendment is negligible, however: see S. Wiessner, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 3, p. 255–256; S. Gorove, supra footnote 278 of Chap. 3, p. 9–10. Gorove notes that the reference to the goal of guaranteeing equitable access ‘in practice’ in Resolution 3 of WARC 1979 confirms his interpretation, for “without «practice», or ability to engage «in practice», there can be no guarantee. In other words, developing countries and states with geographical specificities must still be able to actually use the geostationary orbit and not just merely assert a claim in order to avail themselves of the guarantee of equitable access”: S. Gorove, supra footnote 278 of Chap. 3, p. 7. The increased attention to the situation of developing countries since the 1982 amendment does not alter this assessment. The author adds that the preamble of Resolution 3 contained an explicit reference to equitable access as laid down in the legally binding provision of Article 33 of the 1973 ITC, which introduced the link with needs and technical facilities of states: S. Gorove, supra footnote 48 of Chap. 3, p. 111–113.
303.
For example, P. Delville, supra footnote 29 of Chap. 2, p. 145: “le Traité de l’Espace consacre une liberté d’accès à l’EEA et non un droit d’accès à l’EEA”. On the legal nature of Art. I OST , see supra, Sect. 1.2.2.2.
304.
On interests, rights and the so-called ‘shielding thesis’, see further infra, Sect. 5.1.2.3 .
305.
See, for example, D.M. Leive, supra footnote 98, p. 44–48; S. Wiessner, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 3, p. 269–273; A.M. Solana, supra footnote 137, p. 200.
306.
D. Riddick, supra footnote 45, p. 22–23.
307.
See supra, Sect. 3.1.2 .
308.
See supra, footnote 278 of Chap. 3 and accompanying text.
309.
J. Wilson, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 270.
310.
See M.L. Smith, supra footnote 10 of Introduction, p. 48–50 (arguing that usufructuary claims of exclusive rights to exploit certain mineral resources in a specified area on a celestial body do not amount to appropriation and are thus allowed by the Outer Space Treaty, as they constitute a valid exercise of the freedom to use outer space and there is no intent to appropriate); P. Delville, supra footnote 29 of Chap. 2, p. 152–153. The res communis nature of the outer space environment is often raised as an argument favouring the appropriation of space resources without granting sovereignty over the area itself. See G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 200–201; M.A. Rothblatt, supra footnote 294 of Chap. 1, p. 68; A. Copiz, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 218. Copiz argues that “orbit-spectrum use within the GSO does not create an ownership right to the area of space. Instead, application of res communis allows for the exclusive exploitation of natural resources at that location and at that time”. The author adds that, “[i]n the a priori system, nominal assignments of orbital positions would essentially give each country exclusive property rights to the GSO without the actual exploitation of the resource, which is necessary under res communis ” (p. 219).
311.
See S. Freeland and R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 148 of Chap. 1, nos. 37 and 61.
312.
See further infra on the legal situation of stations on celestial bodies, section “Exclusive Implications” in Chap. 5.
313.
M.L. Smith, supra footnote 300 of Chap. 1, p. 82.
314.
See also supra, Sect. 1.2.2.2.
315.
C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 197 (“[t]he expression postulates equality of opportunity for States with the economic and technological capacity to take advantage of opportunities in space; it neither can nor does create or give any right to the economic and technological capacity necessary to take advantage of such opportunities by one’s own action”); P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, supra footnote 46 of Chap. 1, p. 430 (referring to statements by delegations during the negotiations for the Outer Space Treaty to the effect that the main consideration of Art. I OST was not de facto equality but rather the absence of discrimination between states); J.E.S. Fawcett, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 5 (“States have equal rights of access to and use of outer space, but the principle does not assure to them equally the economic resources and technological means of exercising those rights, or the benefits to be derived from them”); S.H. Lay and H.J. Taubenfeld, supra footnote 15 of Chap. 1, p. 74; M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 331; W. von Kries, supra footnote 329 of Chap. 1, p. 29; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 3 of Chap. 1, p. 153; A.N. Delzeit and R.F. Beal, supra footnote 45, p. 75; A. Copiz, supra footnote 332 of Chap. 1, p. 219.
316.
See, for example, B. Cheng (1968), supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 578; S. Gorove, supra footnote 293 of Chap. 1, p. 448–449.
317.
M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 335.
318.
Ibid., p. 330–332 and 347–355. See also L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 57.
319.
See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 583: “[t]he inequality that the legal regime identified was an inequality of scientific and technical competence. It was not a legal inequality”.
320.
C.Q. Christol (1989), supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 217. See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 67 of Chap. 3, p. 89 (“[a]lthough States by reason of their development do not have equal space capabilities, nonetheless the space resource States are not to be denied by the non-space resource States the right to free use”); J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 300.
321.
M.L. Stern, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 3, p. 880; S. Gorove, supra footnote 272 of Chap. 1, p. 18 (“ability must be at the disposal of a country which wishes to take advantage of its guaranteed access”); id., supra footnote 278 of Chap. 3, p. 7 (“countries must actually be able to use the geostationary orbit and not just merely assert a claim in order to avail themselves of the guarantee of equitable access”); S.A. Levy, supra footnote 41, p. 183; J.C. Thompson, supra footnote 5, p. 300.
322.
S. Gorove, supra footnote 48 of Chap. 3, p. 112.
323.
Supra footnote 16.
324.
Ibid., p. 111–113. See further S. Gorove, supra footnote 85 of Chap. 3, p. 101. See also supra, footnote 302 and accompanying text.

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Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Philip De Man
Master of Space Studies, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
Philip De Man

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De Man, P. (2016). Orbits and the ITU. In: Exclusive Use in an Inclusive Environment. Space Regulations Library, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38752-9_4

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38752-9_4
Published: 22 July 2016
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