Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Space Law, Scope and Status

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Exclusive Use in an Inclusive Environment

Part of the book series: Space Regulations Library ((SPRL,volume 9))

  • 707 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter discusses the key concepts and principles relevant for the exploitation of natural resources in outer space. The chapter notes that international space law is defined as the body of rules that regulates the activities of States in the exploration and use of outer space. This approach is mirrored in the title of the main UN space treaties and their key provisions. In light of this functional approach to space law, the chapter questions the validity of traditional approaches to space resource exploitation, to the extent that they appear primarily concerned with finding physical criteria for distinguishing in the application of the principles of free use and non-appropriation, rather than with a definition of these activities. In particular, the chapter is critical of the possibility, as well as the necessity, of defining the concept of ‘celestial body’ in international space law as a means of excluding only mineral resources of celestial bodies from the application of the non-appropriation principle. The chapter finds that the most consistent way to interpret the celestial body notion in space law is one that defines it as a sphere of activities rather than as a self-standing physical phenomenon. Discussions on the exploitation of celestial bodies should therefore focus on the activity of exploitation rather than the notion of a celestial body. And given that the main principles on space resource exploitation do not distinguish between outer space and celestial bodies, their application should not distinguish between these phenomena either.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 149.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 199.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    M.S. McDougal and L. Lipson, ‘Perspectives for a law of outer space’, 52 Am. J. Int’l L. 1958, p. 412, footnote 15. Though issued before the adoption of the legal instruments on the regulation of activities in outer space, the warning should be taken at heart by anyone hoping to understand the UN space treaties.

  2. 2.

    The same obviously goes for our attempts to define the celestial body concept, infra, Sect. 2.3.1.3.

  3. 3.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 36–37. See also the definition in M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 3: “[l]e droit international public de l’espace est l’ensemble des règles juridiques qui régissent les relations internationales découlant de l’exploration et des différentes formes d’utilisation de l’espace extra-atmosphérique. II s’agit de la réglementation juridique des rapports sociaux entre Etats ou entre Etats et autres sujets de la communauté internationale; le caractère propre de ces rapports est qu’ils naissent et se développent en relation avec l’utilisation de l’espace cosmique et de ses ressources naturelles”.

  4. 4.

    I.H.P. Diederiks-Verschoor and V. Kopal, An introduction to space law, Alphen a/d Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2008, p. 7.

  5. 5.

    M. Lachs, ‘The international law of outer space’, 113 Rec. Cours 1964/III, p. 33.

  6. 6.

    A. Yokaris, supra footnote 33 of Introduction, p. 244.

  7. 7.

    The magnificent quote by Lachs prefacing the present thesis captures this characterization of space law with more clarity and eloquence than this author can ever hope to achieve. The reader is referred to supra, footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint) and accompanying text for a brief reminder of this microcosm of legal argumentation.

  8. 8.

    L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 3. Cocca is persistent in noting that “space law has, as its object, the regulation of human activity, with regard to the use of outer space in terms of world activity”: A.A. Cocca, ‘Basic statute for the Moon and celestial bodies’, 2 Il Diritto Aereo 1963, p. 142.

  9. 9.

    See J.L. Vencatassin, ‘Le champ d’application du droit de l’espace’, in E. McWhinney and M.A. Bradley (eds.), supra footnote 30 of Chap. 1, p. 10: “[c]’est […] beaucoup plus l’activité spatiale que l’espace extra-atmosphérique qui est réglementée par le Traité du 27 janvier”. Compare this with the assessment of the ICJ , who, in the determination of its jurisdiction for settling a maritime boundary dispute, noted that, in the relevant phrase of an agreement between the parties concerning the determination of a legal situation, “the object of the verb «determine» is not the maritime spaces themselves but the legal situation of these spaces”: ICJ, Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, p. 351.

  10. 10.

    R.E. Butler, supra footnote 274 of Chap. 1, p. 99 and 98, respectively.

  11. 11.

    See G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 40 (“in laying down the foundations of space law, the anthropocentric character of law must still be maintained”); C. Chaumont, supra footnote 134 of Chap. 1, p. 8 (referring to ‘la structure des sociétés humaines’).

  12. 12.

    L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 85 and 87. In the discussion on the boundary between airspace and outer space, the author reveals himself as a functionalist pur sang, defining space law as “l’ensemble des règles régissant les activités de nature spatiale quel que soit le lieu dans lequel elles s’exercent” (p. 88). See also the focus on activities in the definitions suggested by L.I. Araújo, ‘Droit spatial’, 9 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1966, p. 150; H. Machado (1966), supra footnote 62 of Chap. 1, p. 152.

  13. 13.

    K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 260 of Chap. 1, p. 266.

  14. 14.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 37.

  15. 15.

    R. Quadri, supra footnote 54 of Chap. 1, p. 524.

  16. 16.

    S. Wiessner, ‘The art of the possible: a review of Space-WARC 85–88’, 32 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1989, p. 266.

  17. 17.

    M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 105.

  18. 18.

    E.g. G. Gál, ‘«The peaceful uses of outer space» – after the Space Treaty’, 10 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1967, p. 129.

  19. 19.

    See infra, Sect. 2.2.3.

  20. 20.

    As such, see G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 112. See also the definition of space law offered in L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 3: “[l]es normes qui constituent le droit de l’espace régissent les activités humaines qui peuvent être localisées dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique ou sur les corps célestes”.

  21. 21.

    J.L. Vencatassin, supra footnote 9, p. 10.

  22. 22.

    The historical phrasing of the demarcation issue is predicated on the ostensibly unbridgeable division between functionalists and spatialists, divided along the alleged need, or not, for a strict dividing line to separate airspace from outer space, or whether to rely, instead, on the space activity notion as delineating the scope of space law. Without entering into the details of this complicated debate, a fundamental nuance requires to point out that the functional term ‘space activities’, too, can only be defined by reference to their locational field of application, i.e. outer space, including celestial bodies. See M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 39–40: “les deux éléments – local et fonctionnel -, liés respectivement au milieu et à l’utilisation, doivent nécessairement figurer dans toute formulation juste de l’activité spatiale. Le critère de la finalité spatiale, introduit en droit positif, comporte lui-même l’élément local, car il est opposé à la notion d’espace extra-atmosphérique. […] Les notions de lieu et celle de la finalité paraissent être liées de façon plus intime que ne l’admettent les constructions fondées sur l’assimilation, même partielle, du milieu aérien à l’espace cosmique”. Similarly, for the definition of the scope of the space treaties in general, and of all provisions with corresponding scope, we should look at the meaning of the outer space and celestial body notions, despite the undeniably functional basis of the space treaties.

  23. 23.

    See supra, Sect. 1.2.1.1 .

  24. 24.

    See, in particular, R. Gardiner, supra footnote 144 of Chap. 1, p. 297–298, and cited case law.

  25. 25.

    M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 44.

  26. 26.

    R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 3 of Chap. 1, p. 151; K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 260 of Chap. 1, p. 267.

  27. 27.

    R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 164.

  28. 28.

    Compare N.M. Matte, Space activities and emerging international law, Montreal: McGill University, 1984, p. 271–274.

  29. 29.

    See the definition proposed in French doctrine: L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 4, supported in P. Delville, ‘Réflexions sur le principe de non appropriation de l’espace extra atmosphérique et des corps célestes’, 63 Rev. Fr. Dr. Aér. & Spatial 2009, p. 138.

  30. 30.

    The Oxford dictionary entry for ‘exploration ’ even reveals a specific connotation tailored to the search for resources, such as mineral deposits: see http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/exploration?q = exploration. Though the reference is by no means determinative, keeping in mind our apprehension for using lay reference works in determining the ordinary meaning of a legal term, the connotation is noteworthy.

  31. 31.

    See S. Gorove, supra footnote 34 of Introduction p. 97–98. See further the discussion of the notion with reference to the opinion of a number of noted space law scholars as addressed to the author in private correspondence in E. Fasan, supra footnote 24 of Introduction, p. 229–231. See also the reference to a Russian dictionary entry for the term ‘use’ as meaning the application of something for a particular purpose in E.G. Vassilievskaya, ‘Notions of «exploration» and «use» of natural resources of celestial bodies’, 20 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1977, p. 476.

  32. 32.

    See the warning of the French representative during the OST negotiations, who noted that, “while the principles established by the Treaty would no doubt be easy to apply in the case of the exploration of space, their application would be more difficult when State activities involved exploitation, and particularly where simple occupation had to be distinguished from appropriation”: summary record of the fourteen hundred and ninety-second meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly, held on 17 December 1966, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/SR.1492 of 17 December 1966, p. 430. The statement already reveals the distinct importance of terminology in the context of international space law: while ‘exploitation’ appears to be used as a synonym for ‘use’, ‘occupation’ is likely used in its vernacular meaning, rather than legal. See further K.-H. Böckstiegel, ‘Reconsideration of the legal framework for commercial space activities’, 33 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1990, p. 3; R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 163. Not content with the current level of terminological unclearness, some authors wish to further add to the confusion by proposing additional concepts such as ‘exploratory utilization’ to the space law nomenclature: T. Masson-Zwaan and J. White, ‘Use of particular terms and language in discussions on the legal regime to govern the uses of outer space resources’, in McGill University Center for Research of Air and Space Law (ed.), supra footnote 136 of Chap. 1, p. 410.

  33. 33.

    Peyrefitte notes that the use of outer space necessarily refers to activities that apply outer space to goals different from those that are its natural finality. In other words, ‘use’ refers to space activities that are in effect “uniquement tournées vers la terre et non vers l’infini de l’univers”: L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 230 and 232–233. We agree with the gist of the argumentation, for it turns the finality of the activities from knowledge of space itself to the activities of mankind with respect to space. However, the terrestrial focus is misleading in that it appears to suggest that activities exploiting natural resources in space for use in space or on celestial bodies themselves would not be covered by the notion. To be sure, some authors tend to distinguish between the legal regime governing the use of natural resources that are brought back to Earth and those that are used in space. See, among many others, S.M. Williams, supra footnote 61 of Chap. 1, p. 158 (“the case is, naturally, different, when these resources are taken to Earth and commercialized”). This is another discussion entirely, however, and one whose resolution is intimately related to the identification of natural resources as a subject of law. See infra, Sect. 3.3.2 and section “Value realization v. benefit” in Chap. 5 . In any case, this discussion does not detract from the finding that such activities, whatever their locus, constitute a form of use.

  34. 34.

    See the definitions of the notion suggested in, for example, E.G. Vassilievskaya, supra footnote 31, p. 474 (referring to a definition by ICJ Judge Vereshchetin as denoting “any activities in outer space which are aimed not only at the development of scientific knowledge about outer space itself”); K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 260 of Chap. 1, p. 266; L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 4–7 and 231–232. A decidedly idiosyncratic interpretation of the concept is offered by Cocca, who apparently equates ‘use’ with ‘occupation’, yet distinguishes it from ‘utilization’: A.A. Cocca, supra footnote 137 of Chap. 1, p. 16–17.

  35. 35.

    Summary record of the sixty-third meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held on 20 July 1966, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 of 20 October 1966, p. 8. See also the delegate’s remarks in Summary record of the sixty-ninth meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held on 27 July 1966, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.69 of 21 October 1966, p.5–6.

  36. 36.

    Summary record of the sixty-third meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held on 20 July 1966, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.63 of 20 October 1966, p. 8.

  37. 37.

    P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, supra footnote 46 of Chap. 1, p. 431. See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 68; L. Viikari, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 91–92.

  38. 38.

    See, for example, E. Fasan, ‘Basic principles regarding the celestial bodies’, 6 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1963, s.p.; E. Brooks, ‘Control and use of planetary resources ’, 11 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1968, p. 344; O. Fernández-Brital, supra footnote 26 of Introduction, p. 196; A. Kiss, supra footnote 22 of Introduction, p. 765; E.G. Vassilievskaya, supra footnote 31, p. 473 and 475–476; A. Bückling, supra footnote 136 of Chap. 1, p. 41; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 201 of Chap. 1, p. 448; K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 243 of Chap. 1, p. 7; D. Goedhuis, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 219; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 464; R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 3 of Chap. 1, p. 151; A.D. Webber, supra footnote 37 of Chap. 1, p. 1429; E.R.C. van Bogaert, Aspects of space law, Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1986, p. 41; M.L. Smith, supra footnote 10 of Introduction, p. 47; G.M. Danilenko, supra footnote 331 of Chap. 1, p. 242; K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 43; id., supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 561; S. Hobe, Die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der wirtschaftlichen Nutzung des Weltraums, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1992, p. 66; S.E. Doyle (1998), supra footnote 233 of Chap. 1, p. 114; K.N. Metcalf, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 163 and 221; T. Gangale, supra footnote 37 of Chap. 1, p. 41–42; S. Hobe, ‘[Outer Space Treaty:] Article I’, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, no. 36. Some authors even consider use and exploitation to be synonymous: see F. Tronchetti, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 223.

  39. 39.

    Christol concludes a detailed discussion on the meaning of the notion ‘use’ in the Outer Space Treaty as follows: “[o]n the basis of this analysis, taking into account the terms of Article 1 [sic], the meaning accorded to the words of the agreement at the time of its negotiation, the meaning assigned by publicists both contemporaneously with the negotiation of the agreement and recently, the practices of the space-resource States both prior to and following the entry into force of the Treaty, and the denials addressed to the claims put forward in 1976 by eight equatorial States, it may reasonably be concluded that the free and equal use and exploration and free access provisions of Article 1, par. 2 encompass non-exclusive rights on the part of all States to engage in exploitative [sic] activities”: C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 42. See further S.E. Doyle (2001), supra footnote 233 of Chap. 1, p. 315–316.

  40. 40.

    Art. I, para. 2 OST . See infra, Sect. 2.2.3.

  41. 41.

    Supra footnote 56 of Chap. 1.

  42. 42.

    UNGA , Question of the peaceful use of outer space, UN Doc. A/RES/1348 (XIII) of 13 December 1958, PP 4. The relevant paragraph noted the desire to “promote energetically the fullest exploration and exploitation of outer space for the benefit of mankind ”.

  43. 43.

    See K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 34–35.

  44. 44.

    C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 68; S. Hobe (2009), supra footnote 38, no. 14. Additionally, the common heritage of mankind clause in the Moon Agreement does not oppose commercial uses of space resources either: UNCOPUOS LSC, Background papers on specific issues falling within the mandate of the Working Group on status and application of the five United Nations treaties on outer space, UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2004/CRP.6 of 29 March 2004, p. 3.

  45. 45.

    See, in general, K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 260 of Chap. 1; id., ‘Die kommerzielle Nutzung des Weltraums’, in K.-H. Böckstiegel (ed.), supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 277–306.

  46. 46.

    On the latter’s qualification as a natural resource, see infra, Sect. 3.1.2 .

  47. 47.

    See the resolution of the International Law Association proclaiming that “under the terms of the Treaty on outer space the stationing of geostationary satellites is a legally permissible use of outer space”: International Law Association, Report of the fifty-sixth conference, held from 29 December 1974 through 4 January 1975 in New Delhi, London: International Law Association, 1976, p. xix. See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 68.

  48. 48.

    R. Wolfrum, ‘Einzelne Formen der Nutzung des Weltraums - Geostationäre Umlaufbahn’, in K.-H. Böckstiegel (ed.), supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 364. See also G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 268.

  49. 49.

    See in particular B. Cheng, supra footnote 106 of Chap. 1, p. 90; Z.A. Paliouras, supra footnote 8 of Chap. 1, p. 44.

  50. 50.

    K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 43–44. Compare K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 45, p. 278.

  51. 51.

    Report of the Ad hoc UNCOPUOS, p. 25.

  52. 52.

    See further infra, Sect. 3.2.2.

  53. 53.

    PP 5 MA.

  54. 54.

    See supra, footnote 200 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, see F. Tronchetti (2010), supra footnote 6 of Introduction, p. 507–508. The author argues that “the Moon Agreement makes a clear distinction between exploration , use, and scientific research [sic], which are regulated under the res communis omnium concept, and exploitation, which falls under the concept of the common heritage of mankind ”. However, the cited passage is fraught with inconsistencies, not in the least the separation between use and exploitation of – one can only assume – areas and resources, in light of the indiscriminate scope of application of the CHM principle in Article 11 (1) MA.

  55. 55.

    Art. 11 (5) MA.

  56. 56.

    See infra, Sect. 3.4.

  57. 57.

    This relationship has been thoroughly researched, albeit from a different angle, in K.N. Metcalf, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1.

  58. 58.

    C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 196–197.

  59. 59.

    For an in-depth coverage of these provisions and their significance for natural resources, see O. Dörffer, supra footnote 342 of Chap. 1, p. 39–72. The list is obviously not limited to Arts. I, II and IX OST solely. It may be expanded with a wealth of other articles in both the OST and the MA. In the interest of clarity, however, the present chapter will only deal with the most fundamental provisions on the use of natural resources in space. Other provisions will be covered at appropriate points throughout the dissertation.

  60. 60.

    See C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 275; L. Szaloky, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 177; C.Q. Christol (1984), supra footnote 30 of Introduction p. 220–221; K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 562–563; L. Viikari, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 92–93.

  61. 61.

    Tronchetti even goes so far as to argue that Art. II OST must be considered a “structural norm” of space law, which is, somehow, “something more than a usual customary rule but less than a jus cogens norm”: F. Tronchetti (2008), supra footnote 6 of Introduction, p. 279. The justification for the creation of this ad hoc category of international law norms is based on the intrinsic relevance of the non-appropriation principle to the entire system of international space law. Paliouras also describes Art. II OST , rather than Art. I OST , as such, “because the normative rationale of virtually every rule of international space law is «shaped» by this rule as a principle systemic parameter”: Z.A. Paliouras, supra footnote 8 of Chap. 1, p. 38.

  62. 62.

    R.S. Jakhu and S. Freeland, supra footnote 143 of Chap. 1, p. 382. See further R.S. Jakhu, ‘Legal issues relating to the global public interest in outer space’, 32 J. Space L. 2006, p. 31–110.

  63. 63.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 330; R. Wolfrum, supra footnote 69 of Chap. 1, p. 279; K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 44.

  64. 64.

    See supra, Sect. 1.2.2.2.

  65. 65.

    Sub d of the provision.

  66. 66.

    For a detailed discussion of this provision and suggestions for further reading, see S. Marchisio, ‘[Outer Space Treaty:] Article IX’, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 169–182. See also K.-H. Böckstiegel, supra footnote 260 of Chap. 1, p. 271. Consultations may also be requested if feared that activities of other states could cause harmful interference .

  67. 67.

    H. Bittlinger, ‘Das Gebot der Rücksichtnahme’, in K.-H. Böckstiegel (ed.), supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 125–126.

  68. 68.

    See infra, Sect. 4.2.

  69. 69.

    Art. 11 (3) MA.

  70. 70.

    C.Q. Christol (1984), supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 224.

  71. 71.

    OP 1, sub b of Res. 1721 A.

  72. 72.

    See the characterization of the relationship between Arts. I and II OST as such in E. Galloway, supra footnote 267 of Chap. 1, p. 144; D. Goedhuis, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 1, p. 35; C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 201 of Chap. 1, p. 441; A. Górbiel, supra footnote 63 of Chap. 1, p. 46; K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 30 and 32; id., supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 562 and 564; S. Hobe, supra footnote 335 of Chap. 1, p. 123; P. Delville, supra footnote 29, p. 142 and 144; S. Freeland and R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 148 of Chap. 1, no. 12; D. Johnson, supra footnote 64 of Chap. 1, p. 1504. It is accepted practice that the meaning of a provision is established through comparison with other, related and contrasting provisions of the same treaty. See R. Gardiner, supra footnote 144 of Chap. 1, p. 185–186, referring to ICJ , Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1988, p. 69, paras. 42–45. Delville argues that the provisions are not perfect corollaries, in that it is possible to grant certain prerogatives to the exploiting state without affecting the effectivity of the freedom to explore outer space: P. Delville, supra footnote 29, p. 152.

  73. 73.

    P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, supra footnote 46 of Chap. 1, p. 431.

  74. 74.

    See M.S. McDougal, H.D. Lasswell and I.A. Vlasic, Law and public order in space, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964.

  75. 75.

    J.E.S. Fawcett, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 5 and 17; A. Górbiel, supra footnote 63 of Chap. 1, p. 47. The same principle guides the use of resources in other common spaces in international law as well. Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell note that “[t]he principle that common spaces are open for use by all nationals entails an obligation not to abuse this right or to interfere unreasonably with the freedoms of others”: P. Birnie, A. Boyle and C. Redgwell, supra footnote 39 of Chap. 1, p. 201.

  76. 76.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 428; V. Kopal, ‘What is «outer space» in astronautics and space law?’, 10 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1967, p. 277.

  77. 77.

    Items 7 (a) and (b) on the agenda of the Legal Subcommittee: see the 2014 report of the UNCOPUOS.

  78. 78.

    The ITU instruments add a separate subdivision to outer space sensu lato based on physical features by way of the ‘deep space’ notion. This relates to the segment of outer space at distances from the Earth equal to, or greater than, 2 × 10 to the 6th km has no apparent legal relevance: No. 1.177 ITU RR. Butler has noted that the notion of deep space in the ITU is functional rather than strictly locational: R.E. Butler, supra footnote 274 of Chap. 1, p. 98. We will not concern ourselves with this concept, though the legal relevance of separate portions of outer space sensu stricto based solely on their distance from Earth will obliquely re-enter the discussion when addressing the Bogotá Declaration. For a critical analysis of the deep space notion in the ITU instruments, see L. Perek, ‘Deep space at WARC ORB-88’, 32 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1989, p. 255–258.

  79. 79.

    See infra, Sect. 2.3.1.3.

  80. 80.

    Most authors’ writings are reflected in the reports of the Working Group III of the International Institute of Space Law on the legal status of celestial bodies, published in the 1962–1966 IISL Proceedings of the colloquium on the law of outer space, and in the reports of the ILA Space Law Committee. In addition, the need for a definition was raised in International Law Association , Report of the forty-ninth conference, held from 8 through 12 August 1960 in Hamburg, London: International Law Association, 1961, p. 251; B. Cheng, ‘The extra-terrestrial application of international law’, 18 Current Legal Problems 1965, p. 148; C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 200; I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 213. Lachs was one of the few authors to explicitly renounce, before the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, a distinctive approach to outer space sensu stricto and celestial bodies in terms of property rights : M. Lachs, supra footnote 5, p. 51–53.

  81. 81.

    See infra, Sect. 5.1.2.2 .

  82. 82.

    See C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 45 of Chap. 1, p. 110; id., supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 200; J.E.S. Fawcett, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 25; G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 125–126 (“[i]n outer space no state, not even the most advanced one, would be able to preserve its effective domination of a zone or region, or to enforce a blockade of same”); R.K. Woetzel, supra footnote 83 of Chap. 1, p. 60. The argument has resurfaced in more recent writings, as well: see E. Husby, supra footnote 136 of Chap. 1, p. 366; L. Ravillon, ‘Les orbites et les fréquences dans une UIT mutante’, in M. Couston (ed.), supra footnote 324 of Chap. 1, p. 32; Z.A. Paliouras, supra footnote 8 of Chap. 1, p. 42–43. Markoff notes that, “exception faite des engins spatiaux artificiels lancés dans l’espace ou établis en orbites stationnaires, il n’est pas possible d’exercer une autorité souveraine dans l’espace extra-atmosphérique si ce n’est de façon instantanée”: M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 429. But it is this exact exception – whose perfectly practicable nature already disproves the general assertion made by the author himself – that lies at the basis of the entire de facto appropriation discussion of valuable orbital positions. See infra, Sect. 5.2.1. The author further raises the exception of permanently inhabited stations in outer space, which according to him could be considered as ‘artificial celestial bodies’. This example further demonstrates the irrelevance of solid surfaces as a legally distinguishing factor. See infra, Sect. 5.3.2.1.

  83. 83.

    C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 104–105. See also the discussion in M. Menter, ‘Jurisdiction over land masses in space’, 4 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1961, p. 294–310.

  84. 84.

    See R.K. Woetzel, supra footnote 83 of Chap. 1, p. 80; M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 52 of Chap. 1, p. 29; C.Q. Christol (1984), supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 241; S.M. Williams (1987), supra footnote 37 of Chap. 1, p. 146; L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 49; K.N. Metcalf, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 218–220.

  85. 85.

    See supra, Sect. 1.1.2.2.

  86. 86.

    Apart form the authors mentioned throughout the text, the argument is also raised in T.R. Adams, supra footnote 12 of Chap. 1, p. 143; M.A. Ferrer, supra footnote 330 of Chap. 1, p. 217 (calling it a ‘cosmographic absurd’); L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 49–50.

  87. 87.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 67.

  88. 88.

    C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 45 of Chap. 1, p. 103–104. See also C.C. Okolie, ‘International law principle of jurisdiction in regard to settlements of humankind on the Moon and Mars ’, 34 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1991, p. 67.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., p. 104.

  90. 90.

    See supra, footnote 45 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.

  91. 91.

    E. Korovine, ‘The cosmos and international law’, in United States Senate (ed.), supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 1065.

  92. 92.

    F.N. Kovalev and I.I. Cheprov, ‘Artificial satellites and international law’, 1 Soviet Yb. Int’l L. 1958, p. 128–149, cited in C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 139.

  93. 93.

    J.C. Cooper, supra footnote 6 of Chap. 1, p. 58–59.

  94. 94.

    A.D. McNair, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 33.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    M. Lemoine, Traité de droit aérien, Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1947, p. 113–116; J. de Yanguas Messia, Aspectos juridicas y politicas de la utilizacion des espacio ultraterrestre, cited, with translation, in C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 158–159.

  97. 97.

    J.E.S. Fawcett, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 19. Earlier still, Ball had jested that “to assert property in hydrometeors or other atmospheric elements is almost on a par with claiming the planets and galaxies, which as the earth turns, pass into the landowner’s hypothetically infinite […] funnel of dominion”: V.C. Ball, ‘Shaping the law of weather control ’, 58 Yale L.J. 1949, p. 236.

  98. 98.

    Cited in J.C. Cooper, supra footnote 6 of Chap. 1, p. 91. Compare the similar argument developed by Lachs against adopting Roman municipal law terminology in discussions of the status of outer space, supra footnote 79 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.

  99. 99.

    See the excellent article, ibid., p. 55–102.

  100. 100.

    See in particular Von Jhering, whose thoughts on the subject are accurately summarized in the article cited in the previous footnote, at pages 60 and 90–91.

  101. 101.

    M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 101 of Chap. 1, p. 371.

  102. 102.

    See for example D. Goedhuis, supra footnote 34 of Introduction, p. 283–308. For a thorough discussion of early theories on freedom and sovereignty in airspace, see C.N. Shawcross and K.M. Beaumont, Shawcross and Beaumont on air law, London: Butterworth, 1951.

  103. 103.

    P. Fauchille, ‘Le domaine aérien et le régime juridique des aérostats’, 8 Rev. Gén. Dr. Int’l Public 1901, p. 425. The author reasons that dominion over the airspace could only be realized with the help of a mass of guns placed following a chess-board pattern. Since, however, sovereignty cannot rely on guns, as the differences in the ranges of guns would render the exact definition of the territory dominated by a state impossible, the author concludes that this conception does not seem workable (p. 428).

  104. 104.

    See, for example, T.W. Merrill, ‘Property and the right to exclude’, 77 Neb. L. Rev. 1998, p. 732: “there is a consensus that the concept of property includes the rights of persons with respect to both tangible and intangible resources ”. See further infra, section “Resource Exploitation and Sample” in Chap. 5 .

  105. 105.

    K. Gray, ‘Property in thin air’, 50 Cambridge L.J. 1991, p. 259.

  106. 106.

    J.E.S. Fawcett, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 19.

  107. 107.

    Ibid., p. 27.

  108. 108.

    C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 200.

  109. 109.

    I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 213–214.

  110. 110.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 194.

  111. 111.

    Apart from the authors listed earlier, see also T.R. Adams, supra footnote 12 of Chap. 1, p. 143.

  112. 112.

    Markoff appears to raise the issue of physical impossibility to appropriate only with respect to the entirety of outer space: M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 239.

  113. 113.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 51.

  114. 114.

    J.E.S. Fawcett, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 20.

  115. 115.

    J. Zourek, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, cited in C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 144–145.

  116. 116.

    C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 7 of Chap. 1, p. 163–164. Nevertheless, the author appears to call for the absorption of scientific theories in the formulation of the legal rules on outer space when he notes that “[a]n international law which has hardly assimilated Copernicus and Galileo, still less Einstein and Rutherford, cannot cope with the problems of space in an age of atomic energy, electronics, and jet and rocket propulsion, and international lawyers must now show vision and resilience if they are to make a significant contribution to the solution of the problems which the skill of the rocket engineers is about to make imminent”: C.W. Jenks, supra footnote 45 of Chap. 1, p. 118.

  117. 117.

    Compare S.K. Sarkar, ‘Criteria of equitable access to geostationary orbit and frequency spectrum’, 26 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1983, p. 41. The author invokes the principle of entropy as a guide to the equitable use of orbits and frequencies in outer space.

  118. 118.

    Art. 1 (1) MA.

  119. 119.

    In this sense: D. Goedhuis, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 214.

  120. 120.

    D. Goedhuis, ‘An evaluation of the leading principles of the Treaty on Outer Space of 27th January 1967’, 15 Neth. Int’l L. Rev. 1968, p. 30. View reiterated in D. Goedhuis, supra footnote 30 of Chap. 1, p. 41; id., ‘The present state of space law’, in M. Bos (ed.), The present state of international law and other essays: written in honour of the centenary celebration of the International Law Association 1873–1973, Deventer: Kluwer Law International, 1973, p. 208.

  121. 121.

    UNGA Resolution 1721, OP 1 (b); UNGA Resolution 1962, OP 3.

  122. 122.

    See M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 89.

  123. 123.

    E. Fasan, Weltraumrecht, Mainz: Krausskopf-Flugwelt-Verlag, 1965, p. 110; B. Cheng (1997), supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 80–87 (containing a reprint of the original 1965 article).

  124. 124.

    On the significance of this substitution, see B. Cheng, ‘Introducing a new term to outer space law: «outer void space »’, 11 Korean J. Air & Space L. 1999, p. 321–324.

  125. 125.

    Summary record of the sixty-fourth meeting of the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held on 21 July 1966, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.64 of 24 October 1966, p. 10.

  126. 126.

    The 1967 report of the Working Group III reveals a consensus that the OST severely diminishes the need to come up with a definition of what constitutes a celestial body: M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 1, p. 12–18.

  127. 127.

    As is indeed argued in L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 85 and 87.

  128. 128.

    C. Chaumont, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 114. See also R. Quadri, supra footnote 54 of Chap. 1, p. 592–597.

  129. 129.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 187–188. The author alleges that the outer space notion is increasingly being used in official and scientific parlance to refer to the space in between celestial bodies. Similar objections were raised in B. Cheng (1968), supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 558–561. See also I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 214–215.

  130. 130.

    See infra, section “Tangibility and the Moon Agreement” in this chapter .

  131. 131.

    B. Cheng, ‘Outer void space: the reason for this neologism in space law’, 1999 Austl. Int’l L.J. 1999, p. 1–8; id., supra footnote 124. See also B. Cheng, ‘Properly speaking, only celestial bodies have been reserved for use exclusively for peaceful (non-military) purposes, but not outer void space ’, in M.N. Schmitt (ed.), International law across the spectrum of conflict: essays in honour of Professor L.C. Green on the occasion of his eightieth birthday, Newport: Naval War College, 2000, p. 81–117.

  132. 132.

    Compare the term ‘der leere Weltraum’ in German doctrine: A. Bückling, supra footnote 136 of Chap. 1, p. 33; E. Vitt, ‘Begriffsdefinitionen’, in K.-H. Böckstiegel (ed.), supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 51. Lachs apparently uses the term ‘outer space sensu largo’ for this same purpose: M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 44. The notion is clearly misleading, however, and one is left to wonder how the inclusive notion of outer space as used in the UN space treaties would have to be identified if the nomenclature suggested by Lachs were to be accepted.

  133. 133.

    R. Quadri, supra footnote 54 of Chap. 1, p. 529. See also M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 52 of Chap. 1, p. 27:“legal nature is to be deduced essentially not from the characteristics of things but from human behavious [sic] at a given stage of historical development”.

  134. 134.

    Ibid., p. 597.

  135. 135.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 428–429.

  136. 136.

    See M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 11.

  137. 137.

    See infra, section “Tangibility and the Moon Agreement” in this chapter .

  138. 138.

    See, for example, A. Górbiel, supra footnote 63 of Chap. 1, p. 52–53; E. Vitt, supra footnote 132, p. 52; R. Oosterlinck, supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 276; B. Cheng (2000), supra footnote 131; V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 47–58; R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 187. Compare the similar argumentation by Kopal when illustrating the need to define the notion ‘outer space’ in the context of the Outer Space Treaty: V. Kopal, supra footnote 76. See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 257 of Chap. 1, p. 132 (discussing the legal regime for manned and unmanned space stations ).

  139. 139.

    I.H.P. Diederiks-Verschoor, ‘The legal status of artificial space objects ’, 24 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1981, p. 93; A. Górbiel, supra footnote 63 of Chap. 1, no. 16; K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 89–91.

  140. 140.

    Any lawyer does well to take heed of the cautionary wisdom regarding the role of definitions in legal doctrine as issued in K.-H. Böckstiegel, ‘Grundlagen des Weltraumrechts’, in K.-H. Böckstiegel (ed.), supra footnote 27 of Chap. 1, p. 5–7.

  141. 141.

    See, most recently, S. Hobe and F. Tronchetti, ‘[Moon Agreement :] Article 1 (scope of application)’, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), supra footnote 37 of Chap. 1, p. 353, footnote 118.

  142. 142.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 8.

  143. 143.

    A.A. Cocca, ‘Basic statute for the Moon and heavenly bodies’, 5 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1962, p. 5.

  144. 144.

    I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 213.

  145. 145.

    F.G. Rusconi, supra footnote 25 of Chap. 1, p. 63.

  146. 146.

    G.P. Zhukov, ‘The problem of the definition of outer space’, 10 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1967, p. 273. This view is reiterated in G.P. Zhukov, ‘Outer space: legal aspects’, 8 Indian J. Int’l L. 1968, p. 245; id., supra footnote 8 of Chap. 1, p. 168.

  147. 147.

    E. Vitt, supra footnote 132, p. 54.

  148. 148.

    L. Peyrefitte, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 11.

  149. 149.

    C. Chaumont, supra footnote 134 of Chap. 1, p. 95.

  150. 150.

    S.H. Lay and H.J. Taubenfeld, supra footnote 15 of Chap. 1, p. 7–8.

  151. 151.

    S. Hobe and F. Tronchetti, supra footnote 141, no. 50.

  152. 152.

    See supra, footnote 3 of Introduction and infra, footnote 187. See also the text of the US Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, which, though applicable to all space resources in general, specifically singles out asteroid resources as a separate concept, even if the notion is not defined beyond the basic description of ‘a space resource found on or within a single asteroid’.

  153. 153.

    J. Sztucki, ‘Remarks during the discussion on the introductory report [on the Draft resolution on the legal status of celestial bodies]’, 9 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1966, p. 64.

  154. 154.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 68.

  155. 155.

    E. Brooks, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 323.

  156. 156.

    L. Viikari, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 112–113, referring to R. Oosterlinck, supra footnote 30 of Introduction, p. 277.

  157. 157.

    Ibid., p. 114, citing a similar proposal in N.C. Goldman, ‘Space activities: transforming space law’, 28 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1985, p. 230.

  158. 158.

    V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 58.

  159. 159.

    See also J. Machowski, ‘The legal status of meteors and meteorites’, 39 Yearbook A.A.A. 1969, p. 101–108.

  160. 160.

    S.M. Williams, ‘Utilization of meteorites and celestial products’, 12 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1969, p. 179, referring to Planetario de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, El universo y la sociedad. Proceedings from the Primer coloquio sobre los progresos en la exploración cósmica y sus consecuencias para la humanidad, held from 19 through 22 December 1966 in Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires: Secretaría de Cultura y Acción Social, 1966, p. 375, in turn referring to the NASA lexicon.

  161. 161.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 68.

  162. 162.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 38. On the WG III IISL draft resolution, see infra, section “Physical Divisions” in this chapter.

  163. 163.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 8.

  164. 164.

    Planetario de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires, supra footnote 160, p. 374. Nevertheless, private appropriation of these bodies was not considered desirable given their scientific relevance, which far surpasses their economic import. Therefore, the Colloquium defined meteorites as “extratelluric matters that fall on the surface of the Earth , and are of interest to Humanity, the study and analysis of which must not be prevented by any State or private person, alleging that they fell or were found in some territory under their sovereignty or land of their property”: see the citation in S.M. Williams, supra footnote 160, p. 179.

  165. 165.

    S.M. Williams, supra footnote 160, p. 18. Moreover, the author’s definition of what a ‘meteoroid ’ is offers little guidance for determining the application of the Outer Space Treaty. With reference to the scientific understanding of the notion, she defines a meteorite as “a solid object moving in outer space, of considerably smaller proportions than an asteroid but considerably larger than an atom or molecule”: S.M. Williams, supra footnote 160, p. 179. Such vague language offers little helpful footing to the lowly lawyer.

  166. 166.

    M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 1, p. 16.

  167. 167.

    J. Sztucki, supra footnote 153 of Chap. 1, p. 64.

  168. 168.

    E. Brooks, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 322. This view is also shared by a number of contemporaneous authors, such as K.N. Metcalf, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 161.

  169. 169.

    A.A. Cocca, supra footnote 143, p. 4; id., supra footnote 8, p. 145.

  170. 170.

    E.G. Vassilievskaya, ‘Les problèmes juridiques de la mise en valeur de la Lune et des planètes’, in A. Piradov (ed.), Le droit international de l’espace, Moscow: Editions du Progrès, 1976, p. 148. Outlining the role of scientists and lawyers in defining the physical scope of space law, Fasan already noted that “[o]ne should not ask a lawyer for a definition, one should ask a scientist. The scientist, however, should not try to find a legal definition. He should give a scientific definition to the lawyer and then the lawyer should try to find a legal one”: E. Fasan, ‘Mutual clarification of terms’, 11 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1968, p. 382.

  171. 171.

    See infra, section “Tangibility and the Moon Agreement” in this chapter . See also infra, Sect. 2.4.

  172. 172.

    The International Astronomical Union , for example, describes asteroids simply as belonging to the category of small solar system bodies, and has yet to give a more detailed definition of the notion. See IAU General Assembly, Resolutions B5 and B6 on the Definition of a planet in the solar system and Pluto , 24 August 2006, available at https://www.iau.org/static/resolutions/Resolution_GA26-5-6.pdf, retrieved on 18 September 2014.

  173. 173.

    IAU General Assembly, cited in previous footnote. See also L. Perek, ‘The IAU resolutions on planet definition’, 49 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 2006, p. 523–529; L.I. Tennen, ‘Legal implications of the IAU resolutions on planet definition: some preliminary observations’, 49 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 2006, p. 526–529.

  174. 174.

    V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 47.

  175. 175.

    A.A. Cocca, supra footnote 8, p. 146.

  176. 176.

    See infra, Sect. 3.2.1.2.

  177. 177.

    If not entirely devoid of practical relevance: see the plans of Elon Musk, founder of SpaceX, to establish a veritable colony on Mars in the tradition of the American settlers: R. Coppinger, ‘Huge Mars colony eyed by SpaceX founder Elon Musk’, 23 November 2012, available at http://www.space.com/18596-mars-colony-spacex-elon-musk.html?, retrieved on 17 September 2014. See also the official website of the intrepid endeavour: http://www.mars-one.com

  178. 178.

    Compare the connotations of the term ius planetare in E. Fasan, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1.

  179. 179.

    See the discussion of the notion res communis omnium universi, supra, footnote 86 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.

  180. 180.

    The highly conjectural topic of interplanetary relations is the subject of what is commonly labelled metalaw, on which Haley remains the foremost authority: A.G. Haley, ‘Weltraumrecht und Recht außerhalb der Erde: eine Übersicht (Space law and metalaw: a synoptic view)’, 6 Zeit. Luft- & Weltraumr. 1957, p. 59–74; id., ‘Space law and metalaw – Jurisdiction defined’, 24 J. Air L. & Com. 1957, p. 286–303.

  181. 181.

    M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 132 of Chap. 1, p. 15.

  182. 182.

    Ibid.

  183. 183.

    M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 44.

  184. 184.

    E. Fasan, ‘Some legal problems regarding the Moon’, 22 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1980, p. 9; V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 51–53.

  185. 185.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 123, p. 113. See also E. Fasan, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 9; id., supra footnote 38.

  186. 186.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, p. 8.

  187. 187.

    R. Frohn, Internationalisierung von Himmelskörpern, West Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1969, p. 69. See also R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 189. NASA ’s plans to capture a near-Earth asteroid and redirect it to a lunar orbit show that these developments are quickly moving from the realm of possibilities to reality. For more information on the NASA Asteroid Redirect Mission and Grand Challenge, see http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/asteroids/initiative

  188. 188.

    J.H. Glazer, supra footnote 257 of Chap. 1, p. 89.

  189. 189.

    Cited in R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 189. Markoff criticizes the criterion as well, though on the basis of security reasons: M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 52 of Chap. 1, p. 37; id., ‘Problèmes juridiques de l’exploration planétaire’, 8 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1965, p. 202–203

  190. 190.

    Other writers that have adopted the criterion include E. Brooks, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 323; H. Machado (1967), supra footnote 62 of Chap. 1, p. 141.

  191. 191.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 186–187.

  192. 192.

    K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 91.

  193. 193.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 73 of Chap. 1, p. 281–282.

  194. 194.

    See infra, Sect. 2.3.2.

  195. 195.

    Cited as part of the debate of the WG III in M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 101 of Chap. 1, p. 378.

  196. 196.

    Contra: I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 213–214. The authors contend that the Sun and other stars in the universe should be equated with interplanetary space, since their physical characteristics do not make them available for direct exploration.

  197. 197.

    M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 101 of Chap. 1, p. 361–363. While developed before the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, the draft resolution was the basis for the work of the 1966 Buenos Aires Colloquium, which did conclude after the treaty was adopted.

  198. 198.

    See Art. 1 of the IISL Draft resolution concerning the legal status of celestial bodies prepared as result of merging the propositions of Dr. Fasan (Austria), Dr. Csabafi (Hungary), at the semi-annual meeting of the Working Group III of IISL held under the chairmanship of Dr. Michel Smirnoff (Yugoslavia) at Paris on 15 March 1964, published in 7 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1964, p. 351–354. The definition received support in the writings of individual members of the Working Group: see, for example, A.A. Cocca (1964), supra footnote 119 of Chap. 1, p. 16; id., ‘Legal status of celestial bodies and economic status of the celestial products’, in M.D. Schwartz (ed.), Space law perspectives: commentaries based on volumes 1–15 (1957–1972) of the Colloquia on the Law of Outer Space, sponsored by the International Institute of Space Law of the International Astronautical Federation, South Hackensack: Distributed for the University of California, Davis, California by F. B. Rothman, 1976, p. 125; E. Fasan, supra footnote 27 of Introduction, p. 40.

  199. 199.

    M.S. Smirnoff (1964), supra footnote 133 of Chap. 1, p. 356. See also A.G. Haley, Space law and government, New York: Appleton Century Crofts, 1963, p. 283. Fearing that the definition would not stand the test of time, Piradov dismissed the proposal of Working Group III as well: A. Piradov, International space law, Moscow: Editions du Progrès, 1976 (2000 reprint), p. 113–114.

  200. 200.

    M.G. Markoff, ‘A further answer regarding the non-appropriation principle ’, 13 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1970, p. 85. For a more detailed assessment of the definition by this author, see M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 189, p. 201–203.

  201. 201.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 243. This particular critique is shared in O. Dörffer, supra footnote 342 of Chap. 1, p. 26.

  202. 202.

    Ibid., p. 242.

  203. 203.

    See M. Lachs, supra footnote 5, p. 51; M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 189, p. 201–202; F.G. Rusconi, ‘An essay on the lawful concept of heavenly bodies’, 9 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1966, p. 58; J. Kish, The law of international spaces, Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973, p. 47; E. Vitt, supra footnote 132, p. 52; A.D. Roth, La prohibition de l’appropriation et les régimes d’accès aux espaces extra-terrestres, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France , 1992, p. 103; W.N. White, ‘Proposal for a multilateral treaty regarding jurisdiction and real property rights in outer space’, 43 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 2000, p. 245–253, Art. 1, sub a; P. Delville, supra footnote 29, p. 138. Ogunbanwo defines celestial bodies as“all the objects that can be observed in the sky beyond the atmospheric envelope of the Earth ”: O.O. Ogunbanwo, International law and outer space activities, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, p. 60. The same rationale underlies the definitions that distinguish celestial bodies from artificial space objects : J.G. Verplaetse, supra footnote 83 of Chap. 1, p. 318; I.H.P. Diederiks-Verschoor, supra footnote 139, p. 93; O. Dörffer, supra footnote 342 of Chap. 1, p. 26. See also the definition of celestial bodies in non-specialized works, such as P. Daillier, M. Forteau and A. Pellet, Droit international public: formation du droit, sujets, relations diplomatiques et consulaires, responsabilité, règlement des différends, maintien de la paix, espaces internationaux, relations économiques, environnement, Paris: LGDJ, 2009, no. 730. The ordinary meaning of the celestial body notion is also relied upon in K.-U. Schrogl and J. Neumann, ‘[Outer Space Treaty:] Article IV’, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, no. 38.

  204. 204.

    International Institute of Space Law, ‘Summary of colloquium discussions’, 23 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1980, p. 225.

  205. 205.

    M. Lachs, supra footnote 5, p. 51. See also M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 44.

  206. 206.

    P. Delville, supra footnote 29, p. 138.

  207. 207.

    J.G. Verplaetse, supra footnote 83 of Chap. 1, p. 318.

  208. 208.

    G.C. Sgrosso, supra footnote 136 of Chap. 1, p. 155.

  209. 209.

    S. Hobe and F. Tronchetti, supra footnote 141, no. 50.

  210. 210.

    See supra, footnote 131 and accompanying text.

  211. 211.

    B. Cheng (1999), supra footnote 131, p. 8: “[i]t has no pretension to being a description and even less a definition or prescription to be used in space science and technology which proclaims that the space in question […] is absolutely bereft of any form whatsoever of matter or energy, be it dust, gas, or radiation, solid or charged particles; or anything else”. In we accept this clarification, however, we would suggest that the outer void space notion be dismissed due to its confusing nature.

  212. 212.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 234.

  213. 213.

    Ibid., p. 241–245.

  214. 214.

    See the proposals listed in P.G. Dembling, ‘Principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies’, in N. Jasentuliyana and R.S.K. Lee (eds.), Manual on space law. Volume I, Dobbs Ferry: Oceana, 1979, p. 9.

  215. 215.

    Art. 1 (1) MA.

  216. 216.

    Understandably, most of these views were expressed before the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, which explicitly equated the Moon with other celestial bodies. The Moon was excluded from the category of celestial bodies due to the “satellitary condition” of dependence between the Moon and the Earth in A.A. Cocca, supra footnote 8, p. 145. See also A.A. Cocca, ‘Principles for a declaration with reference to the legal nature of the Moon’, 1 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1958, p. 35; G. Rinck, supra footnote 83 of Chap. 1, p. 197; P.B. Yeager, supra footnote 51 of Chap. 1, p. 763; M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 431.

  217. 217.

    See, for example, A.W. Knauth, ‘If we land there soon, who owns the Moon?’, 45 Am. Bar Ass. J. 1959, p. 15; G. Rinck, supra footnote 82 of Chap. 1, p. 196. Compare the debate on the cone of sovereignty argument, supra Sect. 2.3.1.1.

  218. 218.

    See, in particular, the writings of Cocca: A.A. Cocca, supra footnote 216; id., supra footnote 143.

  219. 219.

    Art. 1 (1) MA.

  220. 220.

    Art. 31 (2), sub a and Art. 32 VCLT, respectively.

  221. 221.

    See supra, footnotes 174–177 of Chap. 1 and accompanying text.

  222. 222.

    Compare the minority assessment of the interpretative relevance of a provision in the San Francisco conference committee report on the interpretation to be given to Art. 4 UN Charter: “[w]ithout wishing to embark upon a general examination and assessment of the value of resorting to travaux préparatoires in the interpretation of treaties, it must be admitted that if ever there is a case in which this practice is justified it is when those who negotiated the treaty have embodied in an interpretative resolution or some similar provision their precise intentions regarding the meaning attached by them to a particular article of the treaty”: ICJ , Admission of a State to the United Nations, p. 87. Fitzmaurice rightly points out that in such a case the documents at hand do not rank as preparatory works but as substantive documents: G.G. Fitzmaurice, supra footnote 187 of Chap. 1, p. 13.

  223. 223.

    UNGA , Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UN Doc. A/34/20 of 14 August 1979, para. 62.

  224. 224.

    B. Cheng (1997), supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 363.

  225. 225.

    1979 report of the UNCOPUOS, para. 63.

  226. 226.

    Verbatim record of the two hundred and third meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, held on 3 July 1979, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203 of 16 July 1979, p. 26.

  227. 227.

    See further infra, Sect. 3.1.2 .

  228. 228.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 27 of Introduction, p. 35–36. Others consistently use the notion as a synonym for ‘extraterrestrial resources’, without proper justification for this terminological idiosyncrasy: see V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 136–148.

  229. 229.

    This interpretation is supported in E. Fasan, supra footnote 24 of Introduction, p. 228; G.C.M. Reijnen, The United Nations space treaties analysed, Gif-sur-Yvette: Frontières, 1992, p. 288; O. Dörffer, supra footnote 342 of Chap. 1, p. 25; L. Viikari, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 112; V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 148–149.

  230. 230.

    A.A. Cocca, supra footnote 143, p. 4.

  231. 231.

    Contra: E. Brooks, supra footnote 125 of Chap. 1, p. 245. The author opines that asteroids and comets threatening Earth remain covered by the Moon Agreement .

  232. 232.

    Moreover, it has correctly been noted that orbits are not so much physical phenomena as they are fictions that exist only by virtue of the path created by artificial space objects navigating through void space. From a physical perspective, orbits should thus be considered parts of outer space sensu stricto or as intrinsic components of celestial bodies, while their reliance on artificial Earth satellites should arguably subject them to the legal regime of space objects . See further infra, Sect. 3.1.2 .

  233. 233.

    The inclusion of gaseous coronas in the definition of otherwise material celestial bodies is also supported in O. Fernández-Brital, supra footnote 26 of Introduction, p. 196.

  234. 234.

    V.K. Lall and D. Khemchand, Encyclopaedia of international law, New Delhi: Anmol, 1997, p. 78–79.

  235. 235.

    See the comments of Sztucki in M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 132 of Chap. 1, p. 15. The inclusion was supported, however, by other authors, such as J. Kiss, ‘Moon Charter’, 8 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1965, p. 235.

  236. 236.

    Ibid., p. 15.

  237. 237.

    M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 101 of Chap. 1, p. 381 (emphasis added).

  238. 238.

    The full title of the text proposed by the IISL Working Group III is ‘Draft resolution on the legal status of celestial bodies’. The mandate of the Working Group also involved finding a solution to the question of the legal status of celestial bodies rather than spelling out the limits of the activities on or regarding them.

  239. 239.

    H. Machado, ‘Comments on the introductory report of Dr. Horsford’, 10 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1967, p. 19.

  240. 240.

    UNGA , Letter dated 27 May 1971 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/8391 of 4 June 1971. See S. Hobe and F. Tronchetti, supra footnote 141, no.97. Compare the writings of Kiss, who developed a veritable Moon Charter describing the “Moon and her gravitational zone” as “international spaces”: A. Kiss, supra footnote 235, p. 236.

  241. 241.

    Poulantzas in M.S. Smirnoff, supra footnote 22 of Chap. 1, p. 16.

  242. 242.

    Ibid., p. 12.

  243. 243.

    See the responses of Fasan and Poulantzas, ibid.

  244. 244.

    E. Vitt, supra footnote 132, p. 53.

  245. 245.

    Art. 9 (5) of the Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of member states of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Government of the United States of America concerning cooperation on the civil international space station of 29 January 1998, entered into force 27 March 2001, reprinted in K.-H. Böckstiegel, M. Benkö and S. Hobe, supra footnote 293 of Chap. 1, section D.II.4. On the requirement of reciprocity, see L.J. Smith, ‘[Outer Space Treaty:] Article XII’, in S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd and K.-U. Schrogl (eds.), supra footnote 10 of Chap. 1, nos. 16–17.

  246. 246.

    P.G. Dembling and D.M. Arons, supra footnote 46 of Chap. 1, p. 431. The authors interpret the provision as guaranteeing “free access at all times to all areas of outer space and celestial bodies ”.

  247. 247.

    Compare Art. 3 MA, which adds to the provisions of Art. IV OST the requirement derived from general international law not to use force on the Moon and other celestial bodies.

  248. 248.

    K.U. Pritzsche, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 92. Compare paras. 3 and 4 of Art. 3 MA.

  249. 249.

    Compare Art. 3 (1) MA.

  250. 250.

    See infra, Sect. 2.4.

  251. 251.

    I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 196; G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 186–187; E. Vitt, supra footnote 132, p. 51–54.

  252. 252.

    A. Piradov, supra footnote 199, p. 114.

  253. 253.

    However, the author subsequently forfeits the flexibility inherent to this approach by reintroducing astronomical categories to define the types of natural bodies in space that should legally be considered celestial bodies: G.P. Zhukov, supra footnote 146, p. 273.

  254. 254.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 240.

  255. 255.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 244–245. The same definition is proposed in M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 189, p. 203 and supported in H. Machado (1967), supra footnote 62 of Chap. 1, p. 141.

  256. 256.

    R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 190–191.

  257. 257.

    A. Górbiel, ‘Réflexions sur la notion juridique international du corps céleste’, 22 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1979, p. 146; id., ‘L’étendue du terme «le corps céleste» dans le droit international public’, 34 Rev. Fr. Dr. Aér. & Spatial 1980, p. 246. In his later writings, Fasan literally quotes Górbiel to this effect: E. Fasan, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 72.

  258. 258.

    A. Górbiel (1979), supra footnote 257, p. 147.

  259. 259.

    K.N. Metcalf, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 162.

  260. 260.

    C. Chaumont, supra footnote 134 of Chap. 1, p. 53.

  261. 261.

    Markoff states that celestial bodies constitute “le cadre local des activités planétaires”: M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 91 of Chap. 1, p. 245.

  262. 262.

    See also Art. I, para. 2 OST and the preambles of the OST and the MA.

  263. 263.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 133.

  264. 264.

    See supra, Sect. 2.2.1.

  265. 265.

    M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 46. Also cited in R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 32 of Introduction, p. 347.

  266. 266.

    A. Górbiel (1980), supra footnote 257, p. 245, resp. A. Górbiel, International agreement on the Moon, Lódź: Uniwersytet Lódzki, 1981, p. 136.

  267. 267.

    M.S. McDougal and L. Lipson, supra footnote 1, p. 426.

  268. 268.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 186. For this reason, the author considers asteroids as celestial bodies in the legal sense, though not meteors .

  269. 269.

    A.A. Cocca, ‘Legal status of celestial bodies and economic status of the celestial products’, 5 Proc. Coll. L. Outer Space 1962, p. 4.

  270. 270.

    I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 196.

  271. 271.

    For a more thorough overview of this concept, see infra, Sect. 3.2.1.2. For an overview of legal literature concerning the interpretation of this concept, see S. Freeland and R.S. Jakhu, supra footnote 148 of Chap. 1, p. 44–45.

  272. 272.

    See, for example, E. Fasan, supra footnote 123, p. 112–113; I. Csabafi and S. Rani, supra footnote 102 of Chap. 1, p. 213; G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 201; V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 47–58.

  273. 273.

    V. Pop, supra footnote 24 of Chap. 1, p. 50. See also p. 48. Compare Viikari, who argues that a distinction between small and large asteroids could resolve legal difficulties arising from consumptive use of these bodies: L. Viikari, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 114.

  274. 274.

    E. Fasan, supra footnote 123, p. 133; id., supra footnote 27 of Introduction, p. 37.

  275. 275.

    S.H. Lay and H.J. Taubenfeld, supra footnote 15 of Chap. 1, p. 8.

  276. 276.

    R.J. Lee, supra footnote 2 of Introduction, p. 191.

  277. 277.

    Apparently in the same sense: S.M. Williams, supra footnote 160, p. 180; A. Górbiel (1980), supra footnote 257, p. 248. For this reason, the latter author opposes restrictive interpretations of the celestial body notion.

  278. 278.

    M. Lachs, supra footnote 5, p. 53.

  279. 279.

    E.G. Vassilievskaya, supra footnote 170, p. 149; A. Górbiel (1980), supra footnote 257, p. 248; A.D. Roth, supra footnote 203, p. 102–103. Compare G.P. Zhukov, supra footnote 146, p. 273. When dismissing the celestial body qualification for small meteorites and comets, the former Soviet author notes that “there are more grounds for their referring directly to outer space”.

  280. 280.

    See, for example, the aforementioned definition of celestial bodies in K.N. Metcalf, supra footnote 70 of Chap. 1, p. 162: “the Outer Space treaty applies to all celestial bodies big enough to be of any interest for exploitation of resources”.

  281. 281.

    See also C.Q. Christol, supra footnote 117 of Chap. 1, p. 378.

  282. 282.

    S.E. Doyle (2001), supra footnote 233 of Chap. 1, p. 316–325.

  283. 283.

    See also G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 192.

  284. 284.

    See supra, Sect. 2.3.1.1.

  285. 285.

    M.G. Markoff, supra footnote 1 of Chap. 1, p. 26.

  286. 286.

    See further infra, Sect. 5.3.2.2 .

  287. 287.

    G. Gál, supra footnote 20 of Chap. 1, p. 192; M. Lachs, supra footnote 36 of M. Lachs, The law of outer space: an experience in contemporary law-making, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972 (2012 reprint), p. 44.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Philip De Man

  2. Master of Space Studies, University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium

    Philip De Man

Authors
  1. Philip De Man
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

De Man, P. (2016). Space Law, Scope and Status. In: Exclusive Use in an Inclusive Environment. Space Regulations Library, vol 9. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38752-9_2

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-38752-9_2

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-38751-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-38752-9

  • eBook Packages: Law and CriminologyLaw and Criminology (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation