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Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining

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Part of the Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice book series (PAHSEP, volume 2)

Abstract

Theories of deterrence and compellence incorporate behavioral and political assumptions.

Keywords

Europe Flare Assure Turkey Stein 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of War StudiesKing’s College LondonLondonUK

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