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Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining

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Richard Ned Lebow: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, History, Political Philosophy and Psychology

Part of the book series: Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice ((PAHSEP,volume 2))

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Abstract

Theories of deterrence and compellence incorporate behavioral and political assumptions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This text was first published as: “Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining”, in: European Journal of International Relations (1998), 4 (1): 31–66; doi:10.1177/1354066198004001002. The permission to republish this text was granted on 29 June 2015 by Sage’s permission system to the author.

  2. 2.

    The author would like to thank James Davis, Eric Herring, Richard Herrmann, Friedrich Kratochwil, Janice Gross Stein and the anonymous reviewers of the EJIR for their helpful comments.

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  1. Department of War Studies, King’s College London, London, UK

    Richard Ned Lebow

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  1. King's College London, Department of War Studies King's College London, London, United Kingdom

    Richard Ned Lebow

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Lebow, R.N. (2017). Beyond Parsimony: Rethinking Theories of Coercive Bargaining. In: Lebow, R. (eds) Richard Ned Lebow: A Pioneer in International Relations Theory, History, Political Philosophy and Psychology. Pioneers in Arts, Humanities, Science, Engineering, Practice, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-34150-7_10

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