Abstract
This chapter supports Frederick Schauer’s contention, put forward in the last chapter of The Force of Law, that coercion is one of the differentiating characteristics of law. However, the chapter takes issue with the way in which this contention is defended by Schauer, and it argues that a fully successful case for the differentiating character of coercion ought to focus on the monopolistic character of legal coercion.
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Notes
- 1.
The designation is supposed to emphasize that it is not all that clear, as Schauer points, out, whether Hart would have considered himself to be offering a theory of the nature of law. See Schauer (2015, 3, 40).
- 2.
In which obedience involves doing what the law tells us to do for the reason that the law tells us to do so. See Schauer (2015, 48–52).
References
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Acknowledgments
This chapter was presented at the special workshop on The Force of Law at the IVR World Congress 2015 in Washington. I would like to thank the participants in the workshop, and especially Frederick Schauer, for their generous and helpful comments on the presentation.
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Vinx, L. (2016). Schauer on the Differentiation of Law. In: Bezemek, C., Ladavac, N. (eds) The Force of Law Reaffirmed. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 117. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33987-0_9
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