Objectivity and Normative Discourse

Abstract

We have already discussed a number of arguments for the view that normativity cannot be reduced or otherwise placed in the natural world, as many naturalists would insist it must be to remain legitimate. However, we have also argued that we should not thereby move to a form of non-naturalism that places the sources of authority for our claims outside the natural world. Such a choice was forced upon us by a set of false assumptions, and we can move beyond them with the sort of broadly pragmatist interpretation of normative discourse that we have offered in the last three chapters. On our account, normativity need not be placed as entities and properties in the world, but we also look to the world in which we are embodied in speaking and judging normative matters. We thus made the case that the incorporation of normative discourse with other forms of discourse about the natural world remained a worthwhile goal. This, we have argued, is a sense of naturalism worth embracing.