Interests, Embodiment, and Constraint by the World

  • Michael P. Wolf
  • Jeremy Randel Koons


Thus far, we have made three central claims. First, we have argued that some form of naturalism, or at least allegiance to versions of some tenets associated with it, is a preferred methodological starting point for philosophy. Second, we have argued that efforts to solve the placement problem for normative discourse via reduction or non-reductive supervenience approaches cannot deliver convincing accounts. Third, we have argued that this sort of moderate naturalism should not lead us to abandon an understanding of our own normative discourse that is both truth-apt and constrained by the world in an important sense. Few philosophers have tried to reconcile all three of these themes. Those who say we cannot place the normative in the natural world tend to eviscerate normative discourse, replacing it with some form of projectivism or norm-expressivism (e.g., Blackburn, Gibbard), while others opt to eliminate it altogether or treat it fictionally (e.g., Mackie, Joyce). Those moved to keep a world with robust normativity often find themselves moving explicitly away from naturalism (e.g., McDowell, Wiggins), or toward supernaturalism (e.g., Adams, Craig). To many, there will be at least a whiff of an inconsistent triad in these three claims.


Higgs Boson Large Hadron Collider Social Practice Normative Practice Normative Concept 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael P. Wolf
    • 1
  • Jeremy Randel Koons
    • 2
  1. 1.Washington, PAUSA
  2. 2.DohaQatar

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