Truth and Pluralism

  • Michael P. Wolf
  • Jeremy Randel Koons


A major feature of our account can now return to the fore again. Part of our strategy in reconciling normativity with the naturalist themes described in our first two chapters will be to follow philosophers, such as Brandom and Price, in rejecting what we have called representationalism about meaning and content. On such a view, thoughts and descriptive parts of a language (paradigmatically, declarative sentences) are fundamentally representations of the extra-linguistic world, and truth and designation are the fundamental elements of analysis. If the objections we discussed in Chap.  3 to placing normativity in the natural world have bite, then representationalist accounts of normativity give rise to real problems: if there is nothing to place, then there is nothing to designate, no facts to state, and either all of what we say in normative discourse is false or it is so laden with empty, non-referring terms as to become vacuous.


Natural World Ontological Commitment Normative Claim Declarative Sentence Doxastic Condition 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael P. Wolf
    • 1
  • Jeremy Randel Koons
    • 2
  1. 1.Washington, PAUSA
  2. 2.DohaQatar

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