Advertisement

Naturalist Themes

  • Michael P. Wolf
  • Jeremy Randel Koons
Chapter
  • 191 Downloads

Abstract

One of the great difficulties in deciding how to reconcile our fairly robust views on normativity with naturalism is that there are about as many forms of naturalism as there are naturalists. The label has been adopted by or ascribed to philosophers as disparate in their views as John Dewey, Frank Ramsey, Roy Wood Sellars, Wilfrid Sellars, Ernest Nagel, David Armstrong, W.V.O. Quine, Thomas Kuhn, Philip Kitcher, both Paul and Patricia Churchland, J.L. Mackie, Philippa Foot, Aristotle, David Hume, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Richard Rorty, Friedrich Nietzsche (Leiter 2002), and Jacques Derrida (Staten 2008); to ordinary language philosophers, to experimental philosophers, and to the entire pragmatist tradition. We do not confront a single doctrine in naturalism, but rather numerous methodologies, motivations, and projects; which of these to address and which to dismiss will be substantial philosophical questions in their own rights.

Keywords

Scientific Practice Scientific Discourse Ontological Commitment Abstract Property Philosophical Inquiry 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

References

  1. Armstrong, David. 1978. Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Balaguer, Mark. 1996. A Fictionalist Account of the Indispensible Applications of Mathematics. Philosophical Studies 83: 291–314.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Bedke, Matthew. 2012. Against Normative Naturalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(1): 111–129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Bernstein, Richard J. 2010. The Pragmatic Turn. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
  5. Churchland, Paul. 1981. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. Journal of Philosophy 78(2): 67–90.Google Scholar
  6. Churchland, Paul. 1996. The Engine of Reason, The Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey Into the Brain. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  7. Dretske, Fred. 1977. Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 44(2): 248–268.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Field, Hartry. 1980. Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Field, Hartry. 1989. Realism, Mathematics and Modality. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar
  10. Foucault, Michel. 1977. Discipline and Punish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books.Google Scholar
  11. Goldman, Alvin I. 1992. Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology. In Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, ed. Alvin I. Goldman, 155–175. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  12. Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  13. Haugeland, John. 1982. Heidegger on Being a Person. Noûs 16(1): 15–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Heidegger, Martin. 1927/1962. Being and Time. Trans. John Macquarrie, and Edward Robinson. London: SCM Press.Google Scholar
  15. Joyce, Richard. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. Knobe, Joshua, and Shaun Nichols. (Eds.). 2007. An experimental philosophy manifsto. In Experimental Philosophy, 3–14. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  17. Kornblith, Hilary. 2002. Knowledge and Its Place in Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Korsgaard, Christine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  19. Kraut, Richard. 2011. Against Absolute Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  20. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1970. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
  21. Kuhn, Thomas S. 1977. Objectivity, Value Judgement and Theory Choice. In The Essential Tension, 320–329.Google Scholar
  22. Lewis, David. 1983. New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61: 343–377.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Lewis, David. 1986. Against Structural Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64: 25–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. Loux, Michael. 2001. Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  25. Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York, NY: Penguin Press.Google Scholar
  26. Margolis, Joseph. 2003. The Unraveling of Scientism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
  27. McDowell, John. 1988. Projection and Truth in Ethics (Lindsey Lectures). Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press.Google Scholar
  28. Melnyk, Andrew. 2003. Some Evidence for Physicalism. In Physicalism and Mental Causation, ed. Sven Walter and Heinz-Dieter Heckmann, 155–172. Exeter: Imprint Academic.Google Scholar
  29. Mill, John Stuart. 1869/1978. On Liberty, ed. Elizabeth Rapaport. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.Google Scholar
  30. Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1984. Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations for Realism. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  31. Papineau, David. 2001. The Rise of Physicalism. In Physicalism and Its Discontents, ed. Carl Gillett and Barry M. Loewer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  32. Papineau, David. 2009. The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, 53–65. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  33. Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Parfit, Derek. 2006. Normativity. Vol. 1, in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 325–380. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  35. Putnam, Hilary. 1994. Words and Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  36. Quine, W.V.O. 1969. Epistemology Naturalized. In Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 69–90. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  37. Quine, W.V.O. 1995. Naturalism; or, Living Within One’s Means. Dialectica 49(2–4): 251–261.Google Scholar
  38. Rorty, Richard. 1972. The World Well Lost. The Journal of Philosophy 69(19): 649–665.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  40. Rorty, Richard. 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  41. Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Rosenberg, Alexander. 1999. Naturalistic Epistemology for Eliminativist Materialists. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59(2): 335–358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Rosenberg, Alexander. 2014. Disenchanted Naturalism. In Contemporary Philosophical Naturalism and Its Implications, ed. B. Bashour and H. Muller, 17–36. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  44. Rovelli, Carlo. 2014. Science Is Not About Certainty. The New Republic. July 11. https://newrepublic.com/article/118655/theoretical-phyisicist-explains-why-science-not-about-certainty. Accessed 17 June 2015.Google Scholar
  45. Scanlon, Thomas M. 2000. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
  46. Sellars, Wilfrid. 1956/1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  47. Sellars, Wilfrid. 1962. Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man. In Frontiers of Science and Philosophy, ed. Robert Colodny, 35–78. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted in Science, Perception, and Reality, pp. 1–40.Google Scholar
  48. Staten, Henry. 2008. Derrida, Dennett, and the Ethico-Political Project of Naturalism. Derrida Today 5(1): 19–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  49. Stich, Stephen. 1983. From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
  50. Tooley, Michael. 1977. The Nature of Laws. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7(4): 667–698.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  51. Vicente, Augustin. 2005. On the Causal Completeness of Physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20(2): 149–171.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  52. Warman, Matt. 2011. Stephen Hawking Tells Google ‘Philosophy is Dead’. The Telegraph, May 17.Google Scholar
  53. Wolf, Michael P. 2002. The Curious Role of Natural Kind Terms. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83: 81–101.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  54. Wolf, Michael P. 2008. Language, Mind and World: Can’t We All Just Get Along? Metaphilosophy 39(3): 363–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Wolf, Michael P. 2012. Boundaries, Reasons and Relativism. Journal of Philosophical Research 37: 205–220.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Yablo, Stephen. 2001. Go Figure: A Path Through Fictionalism. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume XXV: Figurative Language), eds. Peter French and Howard Wettstein, 25: 72–102.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael P. Wolf
    • 1
  • Jeremy Randel Koons
    • 2
  1. 1.Washington, PAUSA
  2. 2.DohaQatar

Personalised recommendations