Abstract
While there are several moments throughout his career when Ricoeur devotes attention to the problem of truth—for example, in History and Truth, his conception of manifestation in his biblical hermeneutics, and when discussing convictions and non-epistemological beliefs in Oneself as Another—a more unified theory is never formulated. This can be seen as a somewhat odd omission given the emphasis he places on a hermeneutical form of reasoning. What is a theory of reasoning without a theory of truth? The aim of this chapter is to construct a theory of truth from various texts that span Ricoeur’s career. I begin by situating Ricoeur between Heidegger’s notion of truth as disclosure and MacIntyre’s view that truth is monolithic. I examine how fragility acts as the founding concept for a Ricoeurian theory of truth, which I describe as a kind of “holistic fallibilism.” The core of his theory is ethically grounded as opposed to emphasizing ontological disclosure, consistency of beliefs with a metaphysical principle, or the analysis of the reasonableness of statements/propositions.
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Notes
- 1.
I should note that I take some liberty in ascribing the term “hermeneutical” to Ricoeur’s theory of truth. In drawing on earlier texts I am assuming that his discussion is consistent with his pre-hermeneutical thought (eg, History and Truth), aspects of his biblical hermeneutics, and his ethical thought in Oneself as Another. This unified reading of Ricoeur may irritate the more historically-minded scholar, but it is a necessary interpretive gambit if one is going to attempt to elaborate a topic Ricoeur only infrequently discusses.
- 2.
This comes out particularly in Heidegger’s “Origin of the Work of Art” when he identifies earth as primordial source, or phusis, and world as the human poietic activity set in strife against it. On this reading, the so-called Kehre in Heidegger’s thought does not refer to a shift of his thought in a non-anthropological direction but a turning within his thought that discloses features that were earlier concealed.
- 3.
Purcell (2013: 146) reads Ricoeur’s criticism quite strongly as expressing a logical failure in Heidegger’s thought. Purcell thus sees the appeal to primordial ontology as having a logical obligation to discuss how this ontology “explains the posterior level” (146) of derivative practices. I do not see this type of accusation in Ricoeur’s criticism. Rather, it seems to me Ricoeur cites Heidegger’s failure or refusal to let ontology be translated, correlated, interpreted in the direction of specific practices and methods (cf. Ricoeur 2013: 70–71). Hence, Heidegger dissolves historical knowledge by his ontology. It is not that Heidegger failed to address a question of logical consistency, but that on his account this demand is a wrong one. Ricoeur (1986: 47–48) appears to offer a similar criticism of transcendental reflection.
- 4.
For a discussion of listening and conscience in relation to social conflict, see Mei (2016).
- 5.
I leave untreated how this ethical dimension relates to truth disclosed by the world of the text; cf. Ricoeur (1977).
- 6.
I assume Ricoeur (2004: 336) is speaking favourably of Henri Marrou’s philosophy of history. I describe friendship as a regulative ideal because the realization that one’s own existence can only occur in “living together” is a reflexive one confronted by several obstacles, not least of which are the ways in which friendship reduces to utility and pleasure; Ricoeur (1992: 186–187). Compare Ricoeur’s (2004: 384) intention to remain with the subject of the practice of the historian when thinking Heidegger’s notion of historicity.
- 7.
Another way of seeing this difference between Heidegger and Ricoeur is in the latter’s development of the concept of attestation as a response to the former’s concept of anticipation. See Jean Greisch (2001: 379–385).
- 8.
More recent revisions of Kant fall prey to this as well. See Mei (2014: 253 n. 48).
- 9.
There is also a holistic theory of justification accounting for the criteria according to which one can say one is justified in believing a proposition to be true. In speaking about Ricoeur’s conception of truth, as we shall see, it is more accurate to describe him as a fallibilist since he does require the criteria of consistency and connection within a set of beliefs. Indeed, for him to do so would mean contradicting his view that discourse is polyvalent and situational. Holistic justification, in attempting to strive for overall consistency, has to fix the meaning of beliefs in order to maintain epistemic equilibrium. If one belief in the set has multiple meanings or is situation-dependent, its cohesion would break down.
- 10.
Or what is a common criticism of coherentism; Almeder (1986: 213).
- 11.
I therefore do not attempt to account for how we can determine beliefs to be true, which involves a theory of justification. Rather, I will explain what it means for a belief to be true according to Ricoeur’s theory. The difference in tasks can be seen in how the correspondence theory of truth holds that for a belief to be true a statement must correspond to a state of affairs. Yet, to talk about how one determines whether a statement does indeed correspond involves a distinct process of justification. See note 14 below.
- 12.
He also mentions the power-in-common of historical communities.
- 13.
Perhaps a distinction needs to be raised between what I have offered as Ricoeur’s theory of truth and pragmatic accounts since both focus on how an agent achieves an end by way of beliefs. I omit discussion of this due to the scope of this chapter. However, generally it can be remarked that Ricoeur places greater weight on the ethical nature of ends and beliefs and as well the substantive (as opposed to pragmatic) nature of discourse.
- 14.
I deal with this analysis in terms of the justification of convictions (Mei 2014; 2016). My sincere thanks to the editors for their suggestions and comments in view of making this chapter more cohesive. I would also like to thank Maureen Junker-Kenny and Pamela Sue Anderson for their comments on a version of this chapter which was presented on November 19, 2013 at the Ricoeur Centenary Congress (1913–2013) hosted by the Fonds Ricoeur in Paris, France.
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Mei, T.S. (2016). Constructing Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Theory of Truth. In: Davidson, S., Vallée, MA. (eds) Hermeneutics and Phenomenology in Paul Ricoeur. Contributions to Hermeneutics, vol 2. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33426-4_14
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