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Evidence

  • Kevin McCain
Chapter
  • 166k Downloads
Part of the Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SUTP)

Abstract

This chapter explores two central issues when it comes to the concept of evidence. The first issue concerns the nature of evidence itself as it pertains to justification and knowledge. There are two primary theories of the nature of evidence. The first claims that evidence consists of non-factive mental states, and the second claims that evidence consists of propositions. This chapter explains both of these theories and considers some of the major challenges facing each. The second issue this chapter explores is that of what it takes for someone to have an item of information as evidence. After all, one cannot have knowledge on the basis of evidence that one does not possess. The extreme views of evidence possession each have serious problems, however, moderate views face challenges too. After elucidating some of the challenges facing the various views, this chapter demonstrates that there are some promising ways of providing a moderate account of what it takes to have evidence.

Keywords

Visual Experience Moderate Account Phenomenal Conception Total Evidence Doxastic Attitude 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin McCain
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Alabama at BirminghamBirminghamUSA

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