Advertisement

Justification

  • Kevin McCain
Chapter
First Online:
  • 166k Downloads
Part of the Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SUTP)

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the final component of the traditional account of knowledge: justification. Traditionally, justification has been understood as having good reasons for believing that a particular claim is true. The nature of these good reasons is examined in this chapter. In particular, practical reasons for accepting a particular claim are distinguished from epistemic reasons for accepting a particular claim. It is the epistemic reasons that are necessary for knowledge. Additionally, a major contemporary debate in epistemology concerning whether one always needs good reasons in order to be justified is explored in this chapter. Internalists say “yes”, but externalists say “no”. Some of the major moves in this debate are explained in this chapter. However, it becomes clear by the chapter’s end that whether internalists or externalists are correct in general, the sort of justification required for scientific knowledge does require good reasons, which are best understood as evidence.

Keywords

Good Reason True Belief Visual Experience Justify Belief Basic Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in to check access.

References

  1. Alston, W. P. (1985). Concepts of epistemic justification. The Monist, 68, 57–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Alston, W. P. (1988). The deontological conception of epistemic justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 257–299.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Angere, S. (2007). The defeasible nature of coherentist justification. Synthese, 157, 321–335.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Angere, S. (2008). Coherence as a heuristic. Mind, 117, 1–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Armstrong, D. M. (1973). Belief, truth and knowledge. London: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. Audi, R. (1988). Belief, justification, and knowledge. Belmont: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
  7. Audi, R. (1993). Contemporary foundationalism. In L. Pojman (Ed.), The theory of knowledge: Classic and contemporary readings (pp. 206–213). Belmont: Wadsworth.Google Scholar
  8. Audi, R. (2011). Epistemology: A contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  9. Baehr, J. (2011). The inquiring mind: On intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Bergmann, M. (2006). Justification without awareness: A defense of epistemic externalism. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Bishop, M. (2010). Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem. Philosophical Studies, 151, 285–298.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. BonJour, L. (1978). Can empirical knowledge have a foundation? American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 1–13.Google Scholar
  13. BonJour, L. (1980). Externalist theories of empirical knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 53–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. BonJour, L. (1985). The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  15. BonJour, L. (2000). Toward a defense of empirical foundationalism. In M. DePaul (Ed.), Resurrecting old-fashioned foundationalism (pp. 21–40). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  16. BonJour, L. (2006). Replies. Philosophical Studies, 131, 743–759.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. BonJour, L. (2010). Epistemology: Classic problems and contemporary responses (2nd ed.). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  18. Bosanquet, B. (1920). Implication and linear inference. London: Macmillan.Google Scholar
  19. Bovens, L., & Hartmann, S. (2003). Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  20. Brewer, B. (1997). Foundations of perceptual knowledge. American Philosophical Quarterly, 34, 41–55.Google Scholar
  21. Burge, T. (1986). Individualism and psychology. Philosophical Review, 95, 3–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. Chisholm, R. M. (1956). Epistemic statements and the ethics of belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 16, 447–460.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Chisholm, R. M. (1966). Theory of knowledge. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  24. Chisholm, R. M. (1977). Theory of knowledge (2nd ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  25. Chisholm, R. M. (1982). The foundations of knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.Google Scholar
  26. Chisholm, R. M. (1989). Theory of knowledge (3rd ed.). Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  27. Cohen, G. (1996). Memory in the real world (2nd ed.). East Sussex: Psychology Press.Google Scholar
  28. Cohen, S. (1984). Justification and truth. Philosophical Studies, 46, 279–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Cohen, S. (2002). Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 309–329.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Comesaña, J. (2006). A well-founded solution to the generality problem. Philosophical Studies, 129, 27–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Comesaña, J. (2010). Evidentialist reliabilism. Nous, 44, 571–600.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Conee, E. (1988). The basic nature of epistemic justification. Monist, 71, 389–404.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  33. Conee, E. (2013). The specificity of the generality problem. Philosophical Studies, 163, 751–762.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  34. Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (1998). The generality problem for reliabilism. Philosophical Studies, 89, 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2004). Making sense of skepticism. In E. Conee & R. Feldman (Eds.), Evidentialism (pp. 277–306). New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Conee, E., & Feldman, R. (2011). Replies. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents (pp. 428–501). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  37. Dancy, J. (1985). Introduction to contemporary epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  38. Davidson, D. (1986). A coherence theory of knowledge and truth. In E. Lepore (Ed.), Truth and interpretation (pp. 307–319). Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  39. DePaul, M. (2014). Foundationalism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 235–244). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  40. Descartes, R. (1641/1988). Meditations on first philosophy. In J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, & D. Murdoch (Trans.), Descartes: Selected philosophical writings (pp. 73–123). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  41. Dietrich, F., & Moretti, L. (2005). On coherent sets and the transmission of confirmation. Philosophy of Science, 72, 403–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Douven, I., & Meijs, W. (2007). Measuring coherence. Synthese, 156, 405–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Engel, M. (1992). Personal and doxastic justification. Philosophical Studies, 67, 133–151.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Ewing, A. C. (1934). Idealism: A critical survey. London: Methuen.Google Scholar
  45. Feldman, R. (1985). Reliability and justification. Monist, 68, 159–174.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  46. Feldman, R. (1988). Epistemic obligations. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 235–256.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Feldman, R. (2003). Epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  48. Feldman, R. (2005). Justification is internal. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 270–284). Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  49. Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 45, 15–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  50. Feldman, R., & Conee, E. (2001). Internalism defended. American Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 1–18.Google Scholar
  51. Fumerton, R. (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  52. Fumerton, R. (2000). Classical foundationalism. In M. DePaul (Ed.), Resurrecting old-fashioned foundationalism (pp. 3–20). Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  53. Fumerton, R. & Hasan, A. (2010). Foundationalist theories of epistemic justification. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/justep-foundational/
  54. Gertler, B. (2012). Understanding the internalism-externalism debate: What is the boundary of the thinker? Philosophical Perspectives, 26, 51–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  55. Ginet, C. (1975). Knowledge, perception, and memory. Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  56. Ginet, C. (2005a). Infinitism is not the solution to the regress problem. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 140–148). Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  57. Ginet, C. (2005b). Reply to Klein. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 153–155). Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  58. Glass, D. H. (2007). Coherence measures and inference to the best explanation. Synthese, 157, 257–296.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  59. Goldberg, S. (Ed.). (2007). Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  60. Goldman, A. I. (1979). What is justified belief? In G. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1–23). Dordrecht: Reidel.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  61. Goldman, A. I. (1986). Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  62. Goldman, A. I. (1988). Strong and weak justification. Philosophical Perspectives, 2, 51–69.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  63. Goldman, A. I. (1992). Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology. In A. I. Goldman (Ed.), Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences (pp. 155–175). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  64. Goldman, A. I. (1999). Internalism exposed. Journal of Philosophy, 96, 271–293.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  65. Goldman, A. I. (2008). Immediate justification and process reliabilism. In Q. Smith (Ed.), Epistemology: New essays (pp. 63–82). New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  66. Goldman, A. I. (2009). Internalism, externalism, and the architecture of justification. Journal of Philosophy, 106, 309–338.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  67. Goldman, A. I. (2011a). Reliabilism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/reliabilism/
  68. Goldman, A. I. (2011b). Toward a synthesis of reliabilism and evidentialism? or: Evidentialism’s troubles, reliabilism’s rescue package. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents (pp. 393–426). New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  69. Greco, J. (2000). Putting skeptics in their place: The nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  70. Greco, J. (2005). Justification is not internal. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 257–270). Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  71. Greco, J. (2010). Achieving knowledge. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  72. Greco, J. (2011). Evidentialism about knowledge. In T. Dougherty (Ed.), Evidentialism and its discontents (pp. 167–178). New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  73. Haack, S. (1993). Evidence and inquiry. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  74. Harman, G. (1973). Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  75. Henderson, D. K., & Horgan, T. (2011). The epistemological spectrum: At the interface of cognitive science and conceptual analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  76. Huemer, M. (2007). Weak Bayesian coherentism. Synthese, 157, 337–346.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  77. Huemer, M. (2011). Does probability theory refute coherentism? Journal of Philosophy, 108, 35–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  78. Klein, P. (1999). Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons. Philosophical Perspectives, 13, 297–325.Google Scholar
  79. Klein, P. (2005). Infinitism is the solution to the epistemic regress problem. In M. Steup & E. Sosa (Eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (pp. 131–140). Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
  80. Klein, P. (2007). Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 134, 1–17.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  81. Klein, P. (2014a). Infinitism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 245–256). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  82. Klein, P. (2014b). No end in sight. In R. Neta (Ed.), Current controversies in epistemology (pp. 95–115). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  83. Kornblith, H. (1989). The unattainability of coherence. In J. W. Bender (Ed.), The current state of the coherence theory: Critical essays on the epistemic theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, with replies (pp. 207–214). Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  84. Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  85. Kvanvig, J. (1992). The intellectual virtues and the life of the mind: On the place of the virtues in contemporary epistemology. Savage: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  86. Kvanvig, J. (2012). Coherentism and justified inconsistent beliefs: A solution. Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50, 21–41.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  87. Kvanvig, J. (2014). Epistemic justification. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 25–36). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  88. Lau, J. & Deutsch, M. (2014). Externalism about mental content. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/content-externalism/
  89. Lehrer, K. (1974). Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  90. Lehrer, K. (2000). Theory of knowledge (2nd ed.). Boulder: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  91. Lehrer, K., & Cohen, S. (1983). Justification, truth, and coherence. Synthese, 55, 191–207.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  92. Lewis, C. I. (1946). An analysis of knowledge and valuation. LaSalle: Open Court.Google Scholar
  93. Littlejohn, C. (2009). The new evil demon problem. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-new/#SH2a
  94. Locke, J. (1690/1975). An essay concerning human understanding. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  95. Lycan, W. G. (1988). Judgement and justification. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  96. Lycan, W. G. (2012). Explanationist rebuttals (coherentism defended again). Southern Journal of Philosophy, 50, 5–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  97. Lyons, J. (2009). Perception and basic beliefs: Zombies, modules, and the problem of the external world. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  98. Maffie, J. (1990). Recent work on naturalizing epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly, 27, 281–293.Google Scholar
  99. Matheson, J. (2015). Is there a well-founded solution to the generality problem? Philosophical Studies, 172, 459–468.Google Scholar
  100. McCain, K. (2014). Evidentialism and epistemic justification. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  101. McCain, K. (2015a). A new evil demon? No problem for moderate internalists. Acta Analytica, 30, 97–105.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  102. McCain, K. (2015b). Is forgotten evidence a problem for evidentialism? Southern Journal of Philosophy, 53, 471–480.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  103. McCain, K. (2015c). No knowledge without evidence. Journal of Philosophical Research, 40, 369–376.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  104. McGrew, T. (1995). The foundations of knowledge. Lanham: Littlefield Adams Books.Google Scholar
  105. Montmarquet, J. (1993). Epistemic virtue and doxastic responsibility. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  106. Moon, A. (2012a). Knowing without evidence. Mind, 121, 309–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  107. Moon, A. (2012b). Three forms of internalism and the new evil demon problem. Episteme, 9, 345–360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  108. Moser, P. K. (1989). Knowledge and evidence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  109. Neurath, O. (1932). Protokollsätze. Erkenntnis, 3, 204–214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  110. Nozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
  111. Olsson, E. (2005). Against coherence: Truth, probability, and justification. Oxford: Clarendon Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  112. Olsson, E. (2014a). Coherentism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 257–267). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  113. Olsson, E. (2014b). Coherentist theories of epistemic justification. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition). http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justep-coherence/
  114. Olsson, E., & Schubert, S. (2007). Reliability conducive measures of coherence. Synthese, 157, 297–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  115. Plantinga, A. (1993a). Warrant and proper function. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  116. Plantinga, A. (1993b). Warrant: The current debate. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  117. Pollock, J. (1984). Reliability and justified belief. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14, 103–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  118. Pollock, J. (1986). Contemporary theories of knowledge. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
  119. Post, J. (1980). Infinite regress of justification and of explanation. Philosophical Studies, 38, 32–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  120. Poston, T. (2008). Internalism and externalism in epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/
  121. Poston, T. (2014). Reason & explanation: A defense of explanatory coherentism. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  122. Pritchard, D. (2005). Epistemic luck. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  123. Pritchard, D. (2010). Knowledge and understanding. In D. Pritchard, A. Millar, & A. Haddock (Eds.), The nature and value of knowledge: Three investigations (pp. 5–88). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  124. Pryor, J. (2001). Highlights of recent epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 52, 95–124.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  125. Putnam, H. (1975). Philosophical papers, vol. 2: Mind, language, and reality. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  126. Quine, W. V. O., & Ullian, J. S. (1970). The web of belief. New York: Random House.Google Scholar
  127. Rescher, N. (1973). The coherence theory of truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  128. Roush, S. (2005). Tracking truth: Knowledge, evidence, and science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  129. Russell, B. (1912a). The problems of philosophy. London: Williams and Norgate.Google Scholar
  130. Russell, B. (1912b/2001). Truth and falsehood. In M. P. Lynch (Ed.), The nature of truth: Classic and contemporary perspectives (pp. 17–24). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  131. Schupbach, J. N. (2008). On the alleged impossibility of Bayesian coherentism. Philosophical Studies, 141, 323–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  132. Sellars, W. (1956). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 1, 239–252.Google Scholar
  133. Smithies, D. (2014). Can foundationalism solve the regress problem? In R. Neta (Ed.), Current controversies in epistemology (pp. 73–94). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  134. Sosa, E. (1980). The raft and the pyramid. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 3–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  135. Sosa, E. (1991). Knowledge in perspective. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  136. Sosa, E. (2007). A virtue epistemology: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. I). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  137. Sosa, E. (2009). Reflective knowledge: Apt belief and reflective knowledge (Vol. I). Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  138. Sosa, E. (2011). Knowing full well. Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  139. Steup, M. (1996). An introduction to contemporary epistemology. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
  140. Thagard, P. (2000). Coherence in thought and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  141. Thagard, P. (2005). Testimony, credibility, and explanatory coherence. Erkenntnis, 63, 295–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  142. Toulmin, S. E. (2003). The uses of argument. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  143. Turri, J. (2014). Epistemology: A guide. Malden: Wiley Blackwell.Google Scholar
  144. Vahid, H. (2014). Externalism/internalism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 144–155). New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
  145. Vogel, J. (2000). Reliabilism leveled. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 602–623.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  146. Wedgwood, R. (2002). Internalism explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65, 349–369.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  147. Williamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  148. Zagzebski, L. (1996). Virtues of the mind: An inquiry into the nature of virtue and the ethical foundations of knowledge. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin McCain
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Alabama at BirminghamBirminghamUSA

Personalised recommendations

Cite chapter

Buy options