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Truth

  • Kevin McCain
Chapter
  • 166k Downloads
Part of the Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SUTP)

Abstract

This chapter explores another component of the traditional account of knowledge in detail. Although it is often taken as clear, the nature of truth is a complex philosophical issue and worth careful consideration. This chapter examines both traditional and contemporary theories of truth as well as realist and anti-realist conceptions of truth. Further, it briefly looks at some of the major challenges for a successful theory of truth. Ultimately, this chapter puts forward an argument for a commonsensical, realist conception of truth. This conception of truth is supported by both philosophical argument as well as recognition of its presupposition in science. While neither of these considerations is decisive, together they do provide a strong case for accepting this realist conception of truth. At the very least these considerations make it is clear that working with this realist conception of truth to further understand the traditional account of knowledge is perfectly acceptable.

Keywords

Correspondence Theory Traditional Account Realist Conception Pragmatic Theory Teddy Bear 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin McCain
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Alabama at BirminghamBirminghamUSA

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