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From Explanation to Knowledge

  • Kevin McCain
Chapter
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Part of the Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy book series (SUTP)

Abstract

Building upon the insights of the previous chapter concerning the nature of explanation and its relation to understanding this chapter argues for a close connection between explanation and evidential support. That is to say, this chapter argues that the degree to which a given body of evidence supports believing that a particular proposition is true depends upon how well that proposition explains the evidence or is explained by the best explanation of that evidence. The upshot of this explanationist view of evidential support is that explanation is an integral component of epistemic justification. As a result of detailing this explanationist view of evidential support, this chapter offers a clear conception of when we should accept claims in science as well as an account of epistemic justification more generally. Thus, the chapter establishes a very close connection between scientific inference and the justification we might have for any of our beliefs.

Keywords

Scientific Knowledge Evidential Support Good Explanation Explanatory Reasoning Previous Chapter 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin McCain
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Alabama at BirminghamBirminghamUSA

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