Abstract
This chapter provides a historical examination of the special relationship between Britain and South Africa. It briefly defines the meaning of technology denial as an instrument for combating nuclear proliferation and describes diplomatic incidents and political environments that suggest that Britain adopted complacent approaches which ultimately negated the effectiveness of “technology denial” in the South African nuclear proliferation case. It traces the development of their unique, historically grounded significance and ties, in the context of interactions around nuclear weapons. If the general assumption is that technological capability is a prerequisite for a state to go nuclear, how is Britain implicated in the provision of such and how did this motivate South Africa to develop its indigenous nuclear weapons? Specifically, this chapter responds to the question: to what extent did British nuclear technology collaboration led to the development of South Africa’s technological capability?
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Notes
- 1.
The majority of the archival documents used for the analysis in this chapter were obtained from the Anna-Mart Van-Wyk, British Archive Collections.
- 2.
A 2008 Congressional Research Service report lists 17 states with an active or defunct nuclear weapons program.
- 3.
Ibid.
- 4.
South Africa is not included since it has dismantled its six-and-a-half nuclear bomb stockpile.
- 5.
According to Alexander Reed, for example, “the Security Council imposed sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) following the state’s nuclear test in 2006. Resolution 1718 bans transfers of “all items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology…which could contribute to DPRK’s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs.”
- 6.
Problems at the war’s end over dominion representation in international deliberations seemed a clear demonstration of this.
- 7.
On December 2, 1968, the UN General Assembly requested all states and organizations “to suspend cultural, educational, sporting, and other exchanges with the racist regime and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid.”
- 8.
It is widely believed that the uranium was used to manufacture nuclear weapons. The history of nuclear energy in South Africa dates back to 1959, when the country’s first large-scale nuclear research and development project was initiated under the auspices of the AEB. The AEB was later replaced by the Uranium Enrichment Corporation of South Africa Limited (UCOR) to enrich uranium, develop the process further, and to complete the construction of the pilot plant and put it into operation.
- 9.
Letter from British embassy in Pretoria to the Joint Nuclear Section, Energy Department, Whitehall, London. “South African Uranium Enrichment,”’ FCO45-1809. 17th November 1975 (Van-Vyk, Anna-Mart Archival Collections).
- 10.
The General Electric Company (GEC) was a major British-based industrial conglomerate, involved in consumer and defense electronics, communications, and engineering.
- 11.
Minutes of meeting held at the British Department of Energy office, between Brown, F. (British department of Energy), Fakley, D. (British Ministry of Defence, hereafter cited as MOD), Hughes (British Nuclear Fuels Limited, hereafter cited as BNFL), and Mr. Lorin Stieff of ACDA United States. South Africa, The NPT, and Enrichment Safeguards. FCO45-1809. 4th December 1975 (Van-Vyk, Anna-Mart Archival Collections).
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Asuelime, L.E., Adekoye, R.A. (2016). An Analysis of the Failed Technology Denial Strategy of Britain Towards South Africa. In: Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33373-1_9
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