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A Historical Analysis of “Emerging Powers” Nuclear Proliferation: Israel and South Africa

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Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa

Abstract

This chapter explores the nuclear proliferation cases of “emerging powers” of Israel and South Africa. This chapter presents case studies of two developing countries noted to have had some form of nuclear collaborations in the past, particularly in the 1970s. The Vela incident is instructive here. The principal question that this chapter seeks to answer is: what is the level of technological capability and the motivation behind these states’ decision to develop nuclear weapons in Israel and South Africa? The argument made here is that many factors impacted upon Israel and South Africa’s nuclear weapons decisions. Overall, the two countries show international dimensions and collaboration with one or more of the established five nuclear states—both in the development of their nuclear complex and in the development of its motivations.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Nuclear proliferation refers to the spread of nuclear weapons, fissile material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as “nuclear weapon states” by the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. These states are not allowed to possess nuclear weapons.

  2. 2.

    See Report by the Board of Governors and the Director General to the General Conference, South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities, GC (XXVIII)/724, September 24, 1984, Annex 1, Attachment 3, p. 2.

  3. 3.

    At the end of the 1980s, however, there were dramatic political changes in South Africa. In 1990, new President Fredrik W. De Klerk made a firm commitment to remove a number of apartheid measures. The new administration undertook to release political prisoners, assist with the return of exiles, indemnify political activists for past crimes, and review security legislation. There was growing optimism that sanctions against the country would soon begin to be lifted. de Klerk’s initiatives to remove the remaining apartheid measures—dictating where black people were allowed to live, restricting black ownership of land and classifying citizens by race—encouraged the European Community, the USA, and the IMF to consider easing economic and financial sanctions. These political developments considerably reduced South Africa’s isolation.

  4. 4.

    To combat the “total onslaught,” a “total strategy” was devised that might include nuclear weapons.

  5. 5.

    Some, for example, Flournoy and Campbell, have emphasized the military intention of South Africa’s nuclear option, but many have suggested that South African attempts to possess nuclear weapons was for nonmilitary purposes such as enhancing the country’s status or increasing its diplomatic leverage.

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Asuelime, L.E., Adekoye, R.A. (2016). A Historical Analysis of “Emerging Powers” Nuclear Proliferation: Israel and South Africa. In: Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33373-1_7

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