Abstract
This chapter is devoted to the analysis and constructs of nuclear proliferation in South Africa. The analysis highlights the rationale for nuclear proliferation. It provides model explanations for South Africa’s nuclear weapons development and determines the nature of the political environment that conditioned decisions and outcomes. This chapter seeks to determine whether or not certain patterns of similarity or difference exist among the nations and to identify the significant factors influencing a nation’s nuclear options. Based on this comparison, this chapter also provides an overall evaluation of nuclear weapons programs in the case study countries.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
By 1981, South Africa had formal diplomatic relations with only 15 states.
- 2.
The term “laager” means a defensive formation of wagons and comes from the Afrikaners’ treks into South Africa. It is used to describe a defensive attitude towards the world.
- 3.
Some suggest that US intervention in the 1973 Yom Kippur war on Israel’s side encouraged South Africans to believe in catalytic deterrence.
- 4.
Interestingly, Pik Botha, the South African Prime Minister, described the nuclear weapon as a diplomatic weapon to defend South Africa. Other possible uses of the weapon listed by Betts were dissuading neighboring African states from harboring insurgents and compelling them to engage in greater economic and diplomatic interaction with South Africa, thus reducing its isolation. These seem even more implausible.
- 5.
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe have borders with South Africa. These “frontline states” were accused of providing shelter to antiapartheid fighters and to Communists.
- 6.
But failed to mention Britain as a collaborator in its advancement in nuclear strategy and capability.
- 7.
South African engineers had extensive experience with deep-level mining, so it is unclear why they would make the preparations above ground, permitting detection by satellites. It is also suggested that the country had not produced enough HEU for a test in 1977.
- 8.
“Rogue states” is a term usually attributed to states other than the five recognized nuclear states (the USA, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China) that chose to build nuclear weapons against the dictates of international treaties banning such. In the 1990s, Iraq was regarded as one. South Africa was fairly quietly regarded as rogue state in the 1980s.
References
Albright, D., & Hibbs, M. (1993). South Africa: The ANC and the atom bomb. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 49(3), 32–38.
Asuelime, L. (2012). Perche il Sudafrica si e Fatto la Bomba (E Pol L’ha Smantellata) (pp. 237–244). Limes: Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica.
Asuelime, L. (2013). Drivers of nuclear proliferation in the global south: A historical analysis of South Africa. A PhD thesis international relations, submitted to the College of Humanities, University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa (Unpublished).
Betts, R. (1977). Paranoids, pygmies, pariahs and nonproliferation. Foreign Policy, No. 26 (Spring), 162–164.
Betts, R. (1979). A diplomatic bomb for South Africa? International Security, 4(2), 91–115.
de Villiers, J. W., Jardine, R., & Reiss, M. (1993). Why South Africa gave up the bomb. Foreign Affairs, 72(6), 98–109.
Department of Foreign Affairs. (2001, April 7). Statement regarding the visit of the Director-General of the IAEA. Department of Foreign Affairs, South Africa. http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/010409945a1001.htm. Accessed 11 Jan 2006.
Dunn, L. A. (1991). Containing nuclear proliferation. Adelphi Paper, No. 263, 12.
Fig, D. (1999). Sanctions and the nuclear industry. In N. Crawford & A. Klotz (Eds.), How sanctions work. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Fischer, D. (1993). Reversing nuclear proliferation: South Africa. Security Dialogue, 24(3), 273–286.
Forge, J., & Myhra, S. (1995). The utility of ambiguity: Towards a theory of horizontal proliferation in the ‘New World Order’. Canberra: Peace Research Centre, Australian National University.
Frankel, B. (1993). The brooding shadow: Systemic incentives and nuclear weapons proliferation. In Z. Davis & B. Frankel (Eds.), The proliferation puzzle: Why nuclear weapons spread. Portland, OR: Frank Cass.
Garrity, P. J. (1980). South African strategy: The strategy of an international pariah. Naval War College Review, 33, 23–30.
Harkavy, R. E. (1981). Pariah states and nuclear proliferation. International Organization, 35(1), 135–163.
Hibbs, M. (1993). South Africa’s secret nuclear program: The dismantling. Nuclear Fuel, 18(11), 9.
Howlett, D., & Simpson, J. (1993). Nuclearization and denuclearization in South Africa. Survival, 35(3), 154–173.
Klotz, A. (1995). Norms in international relations: The struggle against apartheid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Liberman, P. (2001). The rise and fall of the South African bomb. International Security, 26, No. 2 (Fall), 45–86.
Masiza, Z., & Landsberg, C. (1996). Fission for compliments? South Africa and the 1995 extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Johannesburg: Centre for Policy Studies.
Minty, A. S. (1994). South Africa’s military and nuclear build-up. In E. S. Reddy (Ed.), Anti-apartheid movement and the United Nations: Statements, papers and letters of Abdul S. Minty. New Delhi: Sanchar Publishing House.
National Security Archive. (1985, April 17). Memo from Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State, to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs—Item SA01795.
National Security Archive. (1987, July 29). Nuclear news from South Africa—Item SA02378. Secret Cable 11288.
Pabian, F. (1995). South Africa’s nuclear weapons programme: Lessons for US nonproliferation policy. Nonproliferation Review, 3, 1–19.
Patnaik, A. V. (1993). South Africa’s nuclear bomb: A Western responsibility. Strategic Analysis, 26(3), 297–310.
Purkitt, H. E., & Burgess, S. F. (2005). South Africa’s weapons of mass destruction. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Rajamohan, C. (1980). Atomic teeth to apartheid: South Africa and nuclear weapons. IDSA Journal, 12.
Reiss, M. (1995). Bridled ambition: Why countries constrain their nuclear capabilities. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
Scheinman, L. (1987). The IAEA and world nuclear order. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future.
Stumpf, W. (1996). South Africa’s nuclear weapons program: From deterrence to dismantlement. Arms Control Today, 25(10), 6.
Thayer, B. A. (1998). The causes of nuclear proliferation and the utility of the nonproliferation regime. In R. G. C. Thomas (Ed.), The nuclear nonproliferation regime. Houndmills: Macmillan.
Walters, R. W. (1987). South Africa and the bomb: Responsibility and deterrence. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Asuelime, L.E., Adekoye, R.A. (2016). Model Explanations of a Nuclear Powered South Africa. In: Nuclear Proliferation in South Africa. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33373-1_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33373-1_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-33372-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-33373-1
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)