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Rational Lawmaking under Review pp 155–188Cite as

The Obligation of Consistency in Lawmaking

Using the Example of the Ban on the Private Sale of Public Lottery Tickets and Its Review by the Federal Constitutional Court

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Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 3))

Abstract

Using the example of the ban on the private sale of public lottery tickets and its review by the Federal Constitutional Court the study examines the question whether the German Constitution comprises a duty of consistent legislature and, if so, what its contents might be. The starting point is the realignment of the Federal Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction that has occurred in the past few years regarding constitutional requirements of rationality in law. This development has led to both more concrete and broader requirements. The realignment shows particularly in the Court’s ruling on the smoking ban in restaurants where the Court made an important step towards establishing a general requirement of consistency. The main challenge when establishing such a requirement is to integrate the demands of rationality and of the rule of law into the overall conception of a democratic, constitutional state. This is because this conception is based on the realization of limited rationality and of the necessity of political compromise.

The article was originally published in: Der Staat 49 (2010): 77–105.

I was inspired to write this piece by a legal opinion I prepared on behalf of the Tipp 24 AG, which deals with the Federal Constitutional Court’s dismissal decision, BVerfG, Order of 14 October 2008, 1 BvR 928/08 – Interstate-Treaty on Gambling, (fully published at juris; partially published at 14 BVerfGK 328). Many thanks go to my academic assistant Johannes Gerberding for his support, especially for working through the factual aspects and the legal questions related to the private resale of lotteries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Scheuner (1978: 532, 537, 539); Siehr (2005: 541 et seqq.); Grawert (1975: 864 et seqq.); Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 458): “Since the enlightenment, rational legislation has been a pleonasm and a standard that cannot be deserted at will but that is unavoidable for all contemporary forms of lawmaking.” (Translation by the author.)

    On the search for expectations of rationality towards legislation, one finds a variety of ideas. Some conceptualize the law so that it by definition has to fulfill specific requirements of rationality. Others understand the law in an instrumental sense. Among the latter approaches, some formulate demands of rationality towards the content of the law (as for example the normative economic analysis of law does) and others concentrate on the procedure of lawmaking.

  2. 2.

    BVerfG, Order of 11 June 1958, 1 BvR 596/56, 7 BVerfGE 377 at 409 et seqq. – Pharmacy-Judgment.

  3. 3.

    Bumke (1998: 144 et seq.).

  4. 4.

    Scheuner (1958), 849. See also the considerations of Forsthoff (1955: 233, 235). Lerche (1961: 98 et seqq.) suggests that the requirement to choose the least invasive amongst several equally effective options (Gebot der Erforderlichkeit) may vary in scope depending on context, and regarding the Pharmacy-Judgment , Lerche (1958: 232 et seq.).

  5. 5.

    See Bumke (2008: 228 et seq. in a general sense and 232 et seq. with regard to the capital markets).

  6. 6.

    Idea of output legitimacy, seminal work by Scharpf (1970: 21 et seqq.), summarizing presentations by Rumler-Korinek (2003: 328 et seqq.).

  7. 7.

    Regarding legislation in the international sphere, this is one of the major approaches for the compensation of seemingly or actually existing democratic deficits, see Scharpf (2005: 705 et seqq.; and 1999: 20 et seqq.); Slaughter (2004: 108 et seqq., 193 et seqq.). Regarding the state of the debate, see Kirsch (2008: 87 et seqq.).

  8. 8.

    Dreier (2004: Vorb. marginal no. 144 et seqq.); Grzeszick (2006: Art. 20 marginal no. 107); Kraft (2007: 578 et seq.); Bumke (1998: 40 et seq., 124 et seqq., 144 et seqq.).

  9. 9.

    These inherent limitations are less about the correct definition of rationality (cf. side remarks on various conceptions of rationality regarding the rationality of lawmaking as a research interest by Meßerschmidt 2000: 795 including footnote 85; and Schulze-Fielitz 1988: 454 et seq., both with further references), but more about the fact that any conception regardless of its design quickly reaches the limits of what it can achieve.

  10. 10.

    Of course, the legal system can chose not recognize this insight and grant another government body, such as a constitutional court, the competence to replace the legislator’s judgments with its own.

  11. 11.

    This requires viewing the institution of the democratic constitutional state not solely as a question of the form of government, but as an independent construct of political community, see Möllers (2008: 80 et seqq.).

  12. 12.

    Regarding the functions of the market, cf. Homann and Suchanek (2005: 213 et seqq.). Conceptually prior to the market mechanism is the question of how the resources and goods present within a society can be organized and distributed fairly. The market is an important instrument, but not the only one, for answering the distributive question.

  13. 13.

    The thoughts of Isensee (2003: marginal no. 109 et seqq.) point in a different direction.

  14. 14.

    This is not to deny the possibility of frictions between rational order and democratic lawmaking. But the fact that what is rational tends to be determined by reference to discourse and proceduralization (see Scheit 1987) shows how closely together both modes of generating order lie, see Homann (1988: 266 et seqq.); Karpen (1989: 43); Noll (1973: 70); Meßerschmidt (2000: 811 et seqq.).

  15. 15.

    A more detailed account can be found below, Sect. 7.3.2.

  16. 16.

    BVerfG, Order of 30 July 2008, 1 BvR 3262/07, 1 BvR 402/08, and 1 BvR 906/08, 121 BVerfGE 317 et seqq. – Smoking Ban, analyzed among others by Michael (2008); Bäcker (2008); Gröschner (2008).

  17. 17.

    BVerfG, 121 BVerfGE 317 at 359 et seqq. (Footnote 16).

  18. 18.

    Ibid., 365 et seqq.

  19. 19.

    Drüen (2009); Meyer (2009). For a closer look, see below, section “Re-orientation of Established Obligations of Rational Lawmaking”.

  20. 20.

    In effect since January 1, 2008. Discussions of the technical terms by Korte (2008: § 18 marginal no. 7 et seq.); Dietlein and Hüsken (2008: § 2 GlüStV marginal no. 4 et seqq.).

  21. 21.

    Cf. § 3 Section 3 Sentence 1, § 2 Sentence 2 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. For reasons of legislative competence the Treaty does not cover the law on gambling machines (covered in § 33c of the Commercial Act [Gewerbeordnung, GewO]) or betting on horse races (which is covered by the Race-Bet and Lottery Act [Rennwett- und Lotteriegesetz, RennwLottG]), see Dietlein (2008b: Vorbemerkung GlüStV marginal no. 3). Further, it does not cover the law on amusement arcades due to a dispute about the content and scope of the constitutional provision regulating legislative competence in this respect (Art. 74 Section 1 No. 11 of the Basic Law), see Dietlein (2008a: Grundgesetz, Art. 70 ff., 123 ff. GG marginal no. 14).

  22. 22.

    § 10 Sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. For details, see Ruttig (2008), § 12 GlüStV marginal no. 5.

  23. 23.

    Schlund (1972: chapters 5 and 6; 29 et seqq.); Diegmann, Hoffmann and Ohlmann (2008: Appendix 9 no. 6; 197 et seqq.).

  24. 24.

    In effect as of July 1, 2004 pursuant to § 18 Sentence 1 of the Treaty. Repealed effective from January 1, 2008 by § 29 Section 2 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  25. 25.

    § 14 Section 2 Nos. 1–5 of the Interstate Treaty on Lotteries.

  26. 26.

    § 4 Section 1 and Section 2 Sentence 3 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. The previous requirements of § 14 Section 2 Nos. 1–5 of the Interstate Treaty on Lotteries remain effective with hardly any changes according to § 4 Sections 2 and 3, § 19 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. In greater detail Postel (2008: § 4 GlüStV marginal no. 64 et seqq.).

  27. 27.

    § 4 Section 4 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  28. 28.

    § 25 Section 6 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  29. 29.

    § 4 Section 2, § 26 Section 6 Nos. 1–5 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  30. 30.

    Postel (2008: § 25 GlüStV marginal no. 40), provides an overview of the provisions of States’ Executionary Statutes.

  31. 31.

    BVerfG, 14 BVerfGK 328 (see footnote in the chapter opening page). Another dismissal decision of similar content followed, BVerfG, Order of 17 December 2008, 1 BvR 3409/08, juris.

  32. 32.

    BVerfG, 14 BVerfGK 328 at 330 et seq. (see footnote in the chapter opening page). The pursuit of such a “preeminently important goal” is a necessary condition for the justification of grave interferences with the Freedom of Profession (Berufsfreiheit), such as the interference at hand.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., 331.

  34. 34.

    Ibid., 331. In this quite relevant point, the Court errs. Since the possibility of private resale through the internet had existed for years and during this period the number of players had shrunken slightly, the game relocated but did not expand.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., 333.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., 333, 335.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., 335. Considering the transitionary provision of § 25 Section 6 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling and the lack of any indication of its inadequacy, this statement seems strange. This is especially true since the Court had pointed out earlier that a law contravenes the requirement to chose the least invasive of several equally effective options (Grundsatz der Erforderlichkeit) only “if according to the facts available to the legislator and considering previous experiences it can be determined that restrictions suitable as possible alternatives promise the same effectiveness but afflict aggrieved individuals less” (ibid., 334. Translation by the author.). The Court’s self-restraint seems comprehensible only against the background of its flawed assumption that the legislative measures serve the purpose of preventing an expansion of gambling and subsequently of gambling addiction.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., 335 et seqq.

  39. 39.

    See the criticism by Korte (2009) as well as the objections pointed out in footnotes 34 and 37.

  40. 40.

    After decades of lotto playing by millions of participants, existing studies (cf. the compilation by the Administrative Court of Berlin, VG Berlin, Order of 22 December 2008, 35 A 15/08, juris) conclude that the addictive potential of lotteries “is to be estimated as low” and “of marginal significance” (translations by the author), as Hayer and Meyer (2005: 52) point out with references also to contradicting observations. The authors summarize their findings as follows (ibid., 54): “The proportion of problematic players amongst all players, who in terms of the frequency of their playing favor the lottery, is 0.4 % (4 out of 1,067 people)” – relativized because of the small sample size. Also Hayer and Meyer (2004: 296); Stöver (2007: 50) characterize “lottery addiction” as a clearly lower-ranking gambling addiction problem. Becker (2008: 93), estimates that there are between 500–1,500 individuals in Germany whose primary gambling addiction is to the lottery. Especially incorrect is putting lotteries and sports betting on the same level in terms of their addictive potential, see Hayer and Meyer (2003: 214).

  41. 41.

    Stöver (2007: 45 et seqq.), with regard to the diagnostic schemes “SOGS – The South Oaks Gambling Screen” and “DSM-IV – Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders”.

  42. 42.

    One reason for the legislative proposal was the “Sports Betting Decision” by the Federal Constitutional Court, which stated that a public monopoly on betting could not be justified by fiscal interests. Of course, the public monopoly on lotteries has a clear tradition of fiscal justification (see Klenk 1976: 363 et seq.; Rüpig 2005: 234 et seq.). The second reason was that a few months after the Sports Betting Decision the Federal Competition Office (Bundeskartellamt) decided (see BKartA [2006], essentially upheld by the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, [OLG Düsseldorf, Order of 8 June 2007, VI-Kart 15/06, Zeitschrift für Wett- und Glücksspielrecht (ZfWG) 2007: 277], and the Federal Supreme Court [BGH, Order of 14 August 2008, KVR 54/07, Zeitschrift für Wett- und Glücksspielrecht (ZfWG) 2008: 359]) among other things that the mutually-consensual division of the market by public lottery companies violated §§ 1, 21 of the Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, GWB) as well as Art. 81 of the Treaty of Rome and repudiated the argument of preventing addiction as a justification for the territorial cartel (BKartA 2006: marginal no. 295 et seqq.). The preservation of traditional gambling businesses, which had been forced into a defensive position by these decisions, was at least the factual consequence of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling (regarding the preservation of the monopoly structure see § 10 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling and Dietlein/Postel 2008: § 10 GlüStV marginal no. 1 et seq.; Ruttig 2008: § 12 GlüStV marginal no. 5 et seqq.; regarding the regionalization, see Schmitt 2008: § 19 GlüStV marginal no. 38 et seqq.; Ristelhuber/Schmitt 2008: marginal no. 22 et seqq.).

  43. 43.

    It is conspicuous that the statement of grounds in the proposal lists the “opinions of addiction experts ” (see for example in Baden-Wuerttemberg, Reports of the State Parliament [LT-Drs.] 14/1493, 34, 37) in a strongly abbreviated, if not distorted, table form. In the case of some States, it is not apparent that the table was even available to the representatives in the forming of their opinion (see for example the structure of the Reports of the Hamburg State Parliament [Bü.-Drs. 7229]).

  44. 44.

    For most of the areas at hand, state and federal legislators have concurrent legislative powers according to Art. 72 of the Basic Law, which means that the States can regulate a subject matter only insofar as federal law does not govern it. Since the federal legislator has not created rules for all the areas, though, action on the state level remains possible in some. Whether the states have any legislative authority is doubted by Pieroth (2007: 18 et seq.); Horn (2006: 792).

  45. 45.

    In many statements made during legislative procedures in the states, financial interests have played a prominent role (see for the example of the State of Berlin the remarks made by the Administrative Court of Berlin, VG Berlin, Order of 2 April 2008, 35 A 52/08, juris). It fits together with this observation that mainly the finance, budget and sports committees have been concerned with the Ratification and Executionary Acts. In Thuringia, a motion to move the proposal for the Interstate Treaty on Gambling to the Committee for Social Affairs and Health was dismissed and the issue transferred to the Budget and Finance Committee (Record of the State Parliament of Thuringia [Plenarprotokoll], 4/67 from September 20, 2007, 6779).

  46. 46.

    More about this below, Sect. 7.4.2.

  47. 47.

    More about this below, Sect. 7.4.3.

  48. 48.

    When assessing violations of the General Principle of Equality in cases of a grave interference with individual liberty, like the one at hand, the Court does not simply ask whether the measure is arbitrary, but “whether reasons of such kind and weight exist for the intended differentiation that they can justify the unequal legal consequences” (BVerfG, Order of 26 January 1993, 1 BvL 38/92, 1 BvL 40/92, and 1 BvL 43/92, 88 BVerfGE 87 at 97 – Transgender, continuous jurisprudence. Translation by the author; for a more detailed account see Bumke and Voßkuhle (2008: 96 et seqq.). Hence, at this point there would have been cause for critical questions of constitutional law by the Federal Constitutional Court (cf. below, Sect. 7.4.2.). Still, it is not unusual for the Court to focus its examination on certain central points.

  49. 49.

    For now, see the references made by Meßerschmidt (2000: 781 et seqq., 843 et seqq., 930 et seqq., 969 et seqq.); as well as Heckmann (1997: 265 et seqq.).

  50. 50.

    This is the title of Burghart’s (1996) dissertation (translation by the author).

  51. 51.

    Degenhart (1976); Haack (2002: 75 et seqq.). Differentiated representation of this approach by Bumke (2004: 83 et seq.). However, postulates of legislative self-fixation do not necessarily aim at guaranteeing rationality; another influential idea lies in the protection of legitimate expectations and the provision of continuity, see Leisner-Egensperger (2004: 31 et seqq.), who introduces numerous further approaches for explaining legislative self-fixation.

  52. 52.

    Despite having mentioned the idea of system-coherency since its early days, the Federal Constitutional Court usually denied to meet system-incoherencies alone with consequences (see the references in footnote 56). Summaries of this judicature can be found in Peine (1985: 53 et seqq.), Pöschl (2008: 296); Hanebeck (2002: 432 et seqq.), who sees a trend of increasing judicial self-restraint ; Prokisch (2000: 293 et seq., 296), who identifies several points in the later judicature, to which the legislator may be bound.

    An exception is the Court’s review of laws for the territorial restructuring of local communities, where it recognized “the obligations of adequacy towards the subject matter and system-coherency” (translation by the author) and also obliged the legislator to correctly and completely gather all relevant facts and base his decision on them (BVerfG, Order of 27 November 1978, 2 BvR 165/75, 50 BVerfGE 50 at 51 – Local Self-Government). With regard to this decision, see Peine (1985: 63).

  53. 53.

    Peine (1985: 54).

  54. 54.

    See BVerfG, Order of 9 March 1994, 2 BvL 43/92 et. al., 90 BVerfGE 145 at 195 et seqq. – Use of cannabis.

  55. 55.

    Canaris (1983: 121 et seqq.), who also mentions the term “contradiction of principles” (Prinzipienwiderspruch); Kirchhof (2000: marginal no. 231 et seqq.); Smeddinck (2006: 126); Jarass (2007: 112); Merten (1994: § 20 marginal no. 71–72); Becker (2004: 86 et seqq.).

  56. 56.

    See BVerfG, Order of 10 November 1981, 1 BvL 18/77 and 1 BvL 19/77, 59 BVerfGE 36 at 49 – Service Group; Order of 9. February 1982, 2 BvL 6/78 and 2 BvL 8/79, 60 BVerfGE 16 at 43; Order of 19 October 1982, 1 BvL 39/80, 61 BVerfGE 138 at 149; Order of 6 November 1984, 2 BvL 16/83, 68 BVerfGE 237 at 253; Order of 16 June 1987, 1 BvL 4/84 and 1 BvL 6/84, 75 BVerfGE 382 at 395 et seq. – Unemployment Aid; Order of 1 July 1987, 1 BvL 21/82, 76 BVerfGE 130 at 139 et seq. – Flat Charging Scheme of Social Lawsuits; Order of 26 April 1988, 1 BvL 84/86, 78 BVerfGE 104 at 122 et seq. – Legal Aid; Order of 23 January 1990, 1 BvL 44/86 and 1 BvL 48/87, 81 BVerfGE 156 at 207 – Employment Promotion Act; Order of 11 February 1992, 1 BvL 29/87, 85 BVerfGE 238 at 246 et seq.

  57. 57.

    Heun (2004: Art. 3 marginal no. 19, as well as the references to the judicature there in footnote 131); Kalina (2001: 73 et seqq.).

  58. 58.

    Especially clear BVerfG, 88 BVerfGE 87 at 96 (footnote 48); see also BVerfG, Order of 7 October 1980, 1 BvL 50/79, 1 BvL 89/79, and 1 BvR 240/79, 55 BVerfGE 72 at 88 – Preclusion in Civil Procedure; Gubelt (2000: Art. 3 marginal no. 14); Schoch (1988: 875 et seqq.). Summarizing the discussion and differentiating between different streams within the judicature Kischel (2009: Art. 3 marginal no. 38 et seqq.).

  59. 59.

    Still reluctant BVerfG, Order of 3 November 1982, 1 BvR 620/78, 1 BvR 1335/78, 1 BvR 1104/79 and 1 BvR 363/80, 61 BVerfGE 319 at 343 et seq. – Tax Splitting for Married Couples; Order of 22 February 1984, 1 BvL 10/80, 66 BVerfGE 214 at 223 – Necessary Maintenance Costs; more explicit then BVerfG, Order of 23 January 1990, 1 BvL 4/87, 1 BvL 5/87, 1 BvL 6/87 and 1 BvL 7/87, 81 BVerfGE 228 at 236; Order of 29 May 1990, 1 BvL 20/84, 1 BvL 26/84 and 1 BvL 4/86, 82 BVerfGE 60 at 86 – Child Benefit Judgment; Order of 26 January 1994, 1 BvL 12/86, 89 BVerfGE 346 at 352 – Tax Exemption for Education; Order of 10 November 1998, 2 BvL 42/93, 99 BVerfGE 246 at 260 – Subsistence Minimum for Children I; Order of 6 March 2002, 2 BvL 17/99, 105 BVerfGE 73 at 125 et seq. – Taxation on Pensions; Order of 16 March 2005, 2 BvL 7/00, 112 BVerfGE 268 at 279 – Childcare Costs; from the literature, see Birk (1983: 259 et seqq.); Lang (1988: 97 et seqq. with comprehensive references there in footnote 315). Summary by Wernsmann (2005: 267 et seqq.).

  60. 60.

    See in this regard from the judicature BVerfG, Order of 13 February 2008, 2 BvL 1/06, 120 BVerfGE 125 at 164 et seqq. – Health Insurance Contributions as Exceptional Expenses; and from the literature Kirchhof (2007: marginal no. 95, 178 et seqq.; and 2006: 14 et seq.). Summary at Schwarz (2007: 957 et seqq.). Even further-reaching restraints for the legislator are suggested by Tipke (2008: 19 et seqq.; and 2007: 207 et seqq.), whose concept of consistency extends across different taxes.

  61. 61.

    BVerfG, Order of 9 December 2008, 2 BvL 1/07 et al., 122 BVerfGE 210 at 230 et seqq., 235 et seqq. – Commuter Allowance.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., 241 et seqq.

  63. 63.

    BVerfG, Order of 9 May 1998, 2 BvR 1876/91 et. al., 98 BVerfGE 83 at 97 et seq. – Eco-Tax; Order of 9 May 1998, 2 BvR 1991/95, and 2 BvR 2004/95, 98 BVerfGE 106 at 118 et seq. – Packaging-Tax. Regarding this decision, Bumke (1999); Jarass (2001); Haack (2002: 210 et seqq.).

  64. 64.

    BVerfG, Order of 14 May 2007, 1 BvR 2036/05, 11 BVerfGK 189 at 193 et seq. – Emissions Trading.

  65. 65.

    BVerfG, Order of 15 July 2003, 2 BvF 6/98, 108 BVerfGE 169 at 181 et seq. – Telecommunication Access Rights.

  66. 66.

    Only very rarely does the Court separate the principle of a contradiction-free legal order from its context in the federal state. In that case, it has no independent normative content, though. See BVerfG, Order of 9 April 2003, 1 BvL 1/01, and 1 BvR 1749/01, 108 BVerfGE 52 at 75 – Subsistence Minimum for Children IV.

  67. 67.

    BVerfG, Order of 17 June 2004, 2 BvR 383/03, 111 BVerfGE 10 at 45 et seqq. – Party Financing X.

  68. 68.

    BVerfG, 121 BVerfGE 317 at 357 et seqq. (footnote 16). Perhaps, the Court’s notion developed in the decision on sports betting fits in the thematic context of this decision that an interference with individual rights can become unproportional, if a sufficiently important public interest is pursued as a legislative goal, but the rule under review is not sufficiently “consequently” tailored to this goal and it even serves contravening purposes (BVerfG, Order of 28 March 2006, 1 BvR 1054/01, 115 BVerfGE 276, key statement and at 310 et seq. – Sports Betting Monopoly). Lindner (2007: 188), builds on this point and develops it further based on his own conception.

  69. 69.

    At the same time, the Smoking Ban Judgment shows very clearly how it is possible to end up on shaky ground when creating new obligations of rationality. In his dissenting opinion Judge Masing developed a legislative concept of the smoking ban that diverged from the opinion of the majority (BVerfG, 121 BVerfGE 317, 381 et seqq. [Footnote 16]; the dissenting opinion of Judge Bryde [Ibid., 378 et seqq.] stresses that the law under review is the result of a compromise). If the legislator had been obliged to realize this concept coherently, the smoking ban for small venues would have turned out to be constitutional. Which concept was the right one, though, and how is this determined? A legislative concept is a construct that is significantly harder to encompass than the purpose of an individual legislative directive. It requires a dogmatic analysis of the legal framework and can often be developed alongside several differentiations. This in mind, one will even have to ask whether the legislator is obliged to develop concepts at all. Outside of legal doctrine, the legislator uses the notion of a concept to ensure rational planning by the public administration and private entities. Regarding this, see Hoffmann-Riem (2006), marginal no. 115; Eifert (2006), marginal no. 101.

  70. 70.

    The obligation to decide in a separate act of parliament the criteria according to which finances are redistributed among the States pursuant to Art. 107 of the Basic Law also counts as one of the new standards that increases rationality. See BVerfG, Order of 11 November 1999, 2 BvF 2/98, 2 BvF 3/98, 2 BvF 1/99 and 2 BvF 2/99, 101 BVerfGE 158 at 215 et seqq. – German Interstate Fiscal Equalization Scheme III; as well from the predominantly critical literature Schmalenbach (2001: 256 et seqq.); Waldhoff (2000: 208 et seqq.); Linck (2000: 326 et seqq.).

  71. 71.

    The Federal Constitutional Court often mentions the intelligibility and unambiguity of laws together, see BVerfG, Order of 3 March 2004, 1 BvF 3/92, 110 BVerfGE 33 at 52 – Federal Act on Foreign Trade; used as one also by Di Fabio (2001: Art. 2 Abs. 1 marginal no. 41). For a unitary approach also Reimer (2006: marginal no. 62). Critical towards mixing both criteria Lücke (2001: 9 et seq.).

  72. 72.

    BVerfG, Order of 17 November 1992, 1 BvL 8/87, 87 BVerfGE 234 at 263 et seqq.; Order of11 January 1994, 1 BvR 434/87, 90 BVerfGE 1 at 16 et seq. – Publications Harmful to Young Persons; order of 9 August 1995, 1 BvR 2263/94, 1 BvR 229/95 and 1 BvR 534/95, 93 BVerfGE 213 at 238 – GDR-Lawyers; Order of 12 December 2000, 1 BvR 1762/95, 1 BvR 1787/95, 102 BVerfGE 347 at 361 – Benetton Avertising; Order of 18 May 2004, 2 BvR 2374/99, 110 BVerfGE 370 at 396 et seq – Sludge Compensation Fund.

  73. 73.

    BVerfG, Order of 16 March 1994, 2 BvL 3/90 et. al., 92 BVerfGE 1 at 16 et seqq. – Forensic Commitment.

  74. 74.

    BVerfG, Order of 11 March 2008, 1 BvR 2074/05 and 1 BvR 1254/07, 120 BVerfGE 378 at 407 et seq. – Recording of Motor Vehicle License Plates; Order of 27 February 2008, 1 BvR 370/07 and 1 BvR 595/07, 120 BVerfGE 274 at 315 et seqq. – Online Search; Order of 20 December 2007, 2 BvR 2433/04 and 2 BvR 2434/04, 119 BVerfGE 331 at 366 et seqq. – Joint Working Partnerships by Federation and Local Communities According to § 44b of Book II. of the Social Code; Order of 13 June 2007, 1 BvR 1550/03, 1 BvR 2357/04 and 1 BvR 603/05, 118 BVerfGE 168 at 188 et seqq. – Account Checks According to § 93 Section 8 of the Tax Code; Order of 27 July 2005, 1 BvR 668/04, 113 BVerfGE 348 at 378 et seqq. – Telecommunication Surveillance; Order of 26 July 2005, 1 BvR 80/95, 114 BVerfGE 73 at 92 et seqq. – Capital Building Life Insurances: Participation in Profits; Order of 26 July 2005, 1 BvR 782/94 and 1 BvR 757/96, 114 BVerfGE 1 at 53 et seqq. – Capital Building Life Insurances: Transfer of Existing Stock. Also see the dissenting opinion in BVerfG, Order of 24 May 2006, 2 BvR 669/04, 116 BVerfGE 24 at 65 et seqq. – Revoking of Citizenship. Before, similar decisions took place far less often, see BVerfG, Order of 3 March 2004, 1 BvF 3/92, 110 BVerfGE 33 at 57 et seqq. – Act on Foreign Trade/Customs Criminal Office; Order of 20 March 2002, 2 BvR 794/95, 105 BVerfGE 135 at 163 et seqq. – Confiscation of Property as a Criminal Punishment against the Background of Art. 103 Section 2 of the Basic Law; and from volumes 90-99 of the court reports only BVerfG, Order of 11 November 1988, 2 BvL 10/95, 99 BVerfGE 280 at 298 – Expense Allowance East.

  75. 75.

    In my opinion, the key fault of this re-orientation is that without practical necessity it sacrifices the well-tried and very successful practice of concretizing what is legally required by means of dividing labor between the legislator and courts. Not only are the advantages of a decentralized generation of knowledge through expert courts for specific fields of the law sacrificed, but the legislator is also quickly overburdened. For a critical view of the notion that the obligation of intelligibility of norms serves the purpose of increasing predictability for citizens, see Towfigh (2009), with a summary at 71–73.

  76. 76.

    BVerfG, Order of 12 February 2003, 2 BvL 3/00, 107 BVerfGE 218 at 256 – Civil Service Salary East I: a provision denominated as provisional may not be a permanent rule; Order of 19 March 2003, 2 BvL 9/98, 2 BvL 10/98, 2 BvL 11/98 and 2 BvL 12/98, 108 BVerfGE 1 at 20 – Re-Registration-Fee Baden-Würtemberg: purposes of fees must be disclosed; Order of 13 September 2005, 2 BvF 2/03, 114 BVerfGE 196 at 236 – Discount for Pharmacies and Order of 27 September 2005, 2 BvL 11/02, 2 BvL 12/03 and 2 BvL 13/02, 114 BVerfGE 303 at 312 – Second-Home-Tax: within the text of an executive rule there may be no ambiguity with regard to the rank of any provision as executive or formal legislative law; see, however, the dissenting opinion, Order of 13 September 2005, 2 BvF 2/03, 114 BVerfGE 196 at 253. From the literature see fundamentally Mellinghoff (2003), 15; id. (2004), 36 et seq.; summarizing Drüen (2009), 60 et seqq.

  77. 77.

    BVerfG, Order of 2 June 2008, 1 BvR 349/04, and 1 BvR 378/04, Neue Zeitschrift für Verwaltungsrecht (NVwZ) 2008: 1229 at 1230. Translation by the author.

  78. 78.

    Drüen (2009: 60 et seqq.) sees the core subject of the obligation in divergences between what citizens can legitimately expect a provision’s meaning to be and the rule’s actual effects. Presently, the principle switches back and forth between a non-enforceable expectation and a real constitutional duty (ibid., 71 et seq.). Meyer (2009: 278 et seqq.) sees the significance of the principle as very low.

  79. 79.

    Schmidt-Aßmann (2004a: chapter 2 marginal no. 75 et seqq.); Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 454 et seqq., especially 554 et seqq.); Meßerschmidt (2000: 777 et seqq.). The difficulties Meßerschmidt sees find their reason in the fact that the idea of rationality itself is not constitutionally recognized but surfaces in a multitude of different principles, the most comprehensive of which is the principle of the Legal State .

  80. 80.

    Bumke (2004: 7, 249 et seqq.; and 1998: 26 et seqq.).

  81. 81.

    This perhaps forms the core of the demand for freedom from value judgments and self-restraint to descriptive statements that has to be followed in legal science.

  82. 82.

    Occasionally, the Court also bases the principle of intelligibility and the closely connected obligation that laws must be unambiguous on the principle of democracy (Demokratieprinzip) and the responsibility of parliament to shape society through law emphasized there (BVerfG, Order of 27 February 2008, 1 BvR 370/07, and 1 BvR 595/07, 120 BVerfGE 274 at 317 – Online Search).

  83. 83.

    Hesse (1962: 560 et seqq.); Schmidt-Aßmann (2004b: marginal nos. 1 and 21 et seq.).

  84. 84.

    See the differentiated summary by Sobota (1997: 472 et seqq.). Critical remarks by Kunig (1988: 326).

  85. 85.

    Schmidt-Aßmann (2004b: marginal no. 22).

  86. 86.

    In greater detail Voßkuhle (2008: 640 et seq.); Meßerschmidt (2000: 780). As Meßerschmidt points out, it is a circular argument to deduct the idea of rationality from the Legal State and at the same time base the Legal State on the idea of rationality (781 et seqq.). This is unavoidable but also harmless, because both principles are situated on different normative levels. While the Legal State is part of positive constitutional law, the idea of rationality is the model of modern statehood that receives another peculiar twist in the ideal of the democratic constitutional state .

  87. 87.

    Schmitt (1928: 200 et seqq.; and 1926: 13 et seqq. and throughout).

  88. 88.

    Achterberg (1969: 159); Kunig (1988: 283); see also Unger (2008: 231 et seqq.).

  89. 89.

    The foundations of an interpretation of principles as “obligations to optimize” (Optimierungsgebote) are laid by Alexy (1979: 80; and 1985: 75 et seqq.). On the other hand, regarding an understanding of optimization-obligations as rules Sieckmann (1990: 64 et seq.; and 2009: 21 et seqq.); Borowski (2007: 76 et seq.). Modification of the theory by Alexy (2000: 38 et seqq.); Borowski (2000: 77).

  90. 90.

    This involves more than the question whether the constitution as a “fundamental order” (Grundordnung) provides the value basis for the entire legal system or merely contains a fractional system of restraints (Rahmenordnung), within which the democratic legislature is completely free to shape the law on its own (see in this regard Böckenförde 1990: 1; and 1999: 13; Alexy 2002: 14–15; relativizing the dichotomy is Lerche 1997: 203 et seq.). Both constitutional conceptions are compatible with the Basic Law’s version of a democratic constitutional state . What counts is the notion that individual and democratic liberty originate in the same point and that the political community is constituted with the help of a constitution binding for all branches of government and a constitutional judiciary.

  91. 91.

    On this starting point, also the notion of the “unity of the constitution” (Einheit der Verfassung) builds. Closer Hesse (1995: marginal nos. 20, 70 et seq.); Roellecke (1976: 32 et seq.); Stern (1984: 131 et seq., there with footnote 148); Herzog (1980: Art. 20 GG marginal no. 36 et seqq., especially 44).

  92. 92.

    In greater detail Schuppert and Bumke (2000: 10 et seqq.); Wahl (2006: 35 et seqq.).

  93. 93.

    In greater detail Bumke (2009: 49 et seqq.).

  94. 94.

    The procedural requirements also generally remain the same, so that the room for the legislature to make decisions is also not limited in this regard.

  95. 95.

    In greater detail Bumke (2004: 51 et seqq., 95 et seqq.). A very strict principle of a contradiction-free legal order is suggested by Sodan (1999: 868 et seqq.).

  96. 96.

    See Bumke (2004: 60 et seqq., 77 et seqq.).

  97. 97.

    Bumke (1999: 381 et seqq.; Hanebeck 2002: 439 et seqq.).

  98. 98.

    The standard to assess compliance with the obligation of consistency should be identical with the review standard of the General Principle of Equality in its most intense “person-related” form. See in this regard BVerfG, Order of 2 March 1999, 1 BvL 2/91, 99 BVerfGE 367 at 388 et seqq. – Coal and Steel Co-Determination System ; and from the literature Kischel (2009: Art. 3 marginal no. 38 et seqq.).

  99. 99.

    Same categorization – with further sub-differentiations – by Meßerschmidt (2000: 911 et seqq.; 930; 932 et seqq.; 964 et seqq.).

  100. 100.

    In Meßerschmidt’s opinion ([2000], 908 et seq.), how legislative leeway is to be measured depends on the question whether the targets (or purposes) are determined subjectively – according to the legislator’s will – or objectively – according to the purpose of the law, which he wants to ascertain among other things based on the law’s effects (its actual consequences). However, for assessing whether and to what extent deciding the content of the law lies within the legislator’s discretion, it is irrelevant whether the purpose is determined subjectively or objectively. In any case, the law has to follow the substantive requirements of the constitution.

  101. 101.

    In greater detail Meßerschmidt (2000: 881 et seqq.), where he apostrophizes it as an “essential aspect of legislation” (translation by the author).

  102. 102.

    In greater detail regarding this point Schulze-Fielitz (2004: Art. 5 I, II marginal no. 161 et seqq.).

  103. 103.

    For a strong account see Wieland (2004: Art. 12 marginal nos. 117 et seqq., 135).

  104. 104.

    In greater detail Bumke (2009: 50 et seqq.).

  105. 105.

    Legislative leeway in this context includes not only individual facts, but also complex situations and causal dynamics.

  106. 106.

    BVerfG, Order of 1 March 1979, 1 BvR 532/77 et. al., 50 BVerfGE 290 at 332 et seq. – Employee Participation; Meßerschmidt (2000: 990 et seqq.), with further references.

  107. 107.

    BVerfG, 50 BVerfGE 290 at 332 et seq. (Footnote 106); more recently BVerfG, Order of 10 June 2009, 1 BvR 706/08 et. al., 123 BVerfGE 186 at 241 – Private Health Insurance Base-Rate. Sometimes the Court requires the legislative judgment to be “reliable” (BVerfG, Order of 28 May 1993, 2 BvF 2/90, 2 BvF 4/92, and 2 BvF 5/92, 88 BVerfGE 203 at 262 – Abortion II. Translation by the author.). This, however, is not a new standard of review. The reliability of a judgment can be larger or smaller, depending on requirements that have to be followed. The judgment of reliability therefore has to be defined more closely, for example, with the three levels of scrutiny postulated by the Court. Schlaich and Korioth (2007: marginal no. 538) overlook this circumstance in their critique.

  108. 108.

    In the case of a prognosis , that the situation developed differently than expected is not enough to constitute an error. A prognosis is a judgment of probability (Poscher 1999: 83 et seqq., on the judgment of dangers in public security law), which – unless the probability very exceptionally is a hundred percent – can also turn out differently. Errors are possible, though, with regard to the value of the probability and especially the assumed causal relationship.

  109. 109.

    BVerfG, Order of 31 May 2006, 2 BvR 1673/04 and 2 BvR 2402/04, 116 BVerfGE 69 at 91 – Displaced Persons Pension Act; Order of 16 March 2004, 1 BvR 1778/01, 110 BVerfGE 141 at 158, 166 – Fighting Dogs; Order of 11 March 2003, 2 BvK 1/02, 107 BVerfGE 286 at 296 – Municipal-Election-Threshold Schleswig-Holstein, in procedures according to Art. 99 of the Basic Law; further references by Bumke (2004: 168). Critical remarks by Meyer (2009: 292 et seq.).

  110. 110.

    BVerfG, Order of 26 February 2008, 2 BvR 392/07, 120 BVerfGE 224 at 240 – Incest between Siblings, with reference to 90 BVerfGE 145 at 172 et seq. (Footnote 54); Order of 3 March 2004, 1 BvR 2378/98 and 1 BvR 1084/99, 109 BVerfGE 279 at 336 – “Big Eavesdropping”; 110 BVerfGE 141 at 157 et seq. (Footnote 109).

  111. 111.

    The Court speaks of them being “so erroneous that reasonably they cannot form a base for measures as such” (BVerfG, 110 BVerfGE 141 at 158 [Footnote 109]; see also Order of 10 February 2004, 2 BvR 834/02 and 2 BvR 1588/02, 109 BVerfGE 133 at 158 – Supplementary Preventative Detention. Translation by the author.). However, this broad leeway does not prevent the Court, for example, from very intensely including the factual consequences of measures when assessing proportionality (Order of 3 July 2007, 1 BvR 2186/06, 119 BVerfGE 59 at 84 et seqq. – Horse-Shoeing-Act) or from analyzing individual legislative considerations and asking for their persuasiveness (110 BVerfGE 141 at 164 et seqq [Footnote 109]).

    When assessing whether the necessity of a uniform nationwide rule justifies action by the federal legislator according to Art. 72 Section 2 of the Basic Law, the Court occasionally even makes far greater demands. For example, it has pointed out that the factual basis for a prognosis is “not sufficiently documented” (Order of 26 January 2005, 2 BvF 1/03, 112 BVerfGE 226 at 247 – Tuition Fees).

  112. 112.

    BVerfG, 115 BVerfGE 276 at 309 (Footnote 68).

  113. 113.

    BVerfG, Order of 24 October 2002, 2 BvF 1/01, 106 BVerfGE 62 at 144 – Geriatric Care Act, even though this very far-reaching demand can be found only once in volumes 100–120 of the official reports of the Federal Constitutional Court.

  114. 114.

    § 1 Nos. 1–3 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. The fourth goal (§ 1 No. 4 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling), fighting crime as an after- or side effect of gambling, is irrelevant for the matter at hand and is not considered here.

  115. 115.

    § 10 Sections 1, 2 and 5 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. Strict requirements (§§ 4, 12 et seqq. of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling; see § 18 though) also apply to the offering of “lotteries with a low danger potential” (translation by the author), which are governed by the third part of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling (§§ 12 et seqq.). There is no entitlement to a license (§ 4 Section 2 Sentence 3 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling).

  116. 116.

    § 4 Section 3 Sentence 2 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  117. 117.

    §§ 8, 23 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. Finally, the States have committed themselves to pursue research on addiction (§ 11 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling).

  118. 118.

    In contrast fiscal interests cannot, according to the Federal Constitutional Court, justify the state’s privileges in the gambling sector (BVerfG, 115 BVerfGE 276 at 307 [Footnote 68]).

  119. 119.

    § 10 Sections 1 and 3 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  120. 120.

    § 4 Section 4 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  121. 121.

    § 5 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  122. 122.

    Regarding the number of lottery retail points (about 26,000), see the findings of the Federal Competition Office (Resolution of 23 August 2006, B 10-92713-Kc-148/05 [Footnote 42]), marginal no. 328. Regarding the number of pharmacies (19,892 as of December 31, 2005), see Federal Office of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008), 409; the Federal Association of German Organizations of Pharmacists (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Apothekerverbände) indicates a slightly higher number of 21,476 as of the year 2005, see ABDA (2015). Regarding the required number of post offices (at least 12,000), see § 2 No. 1 of the Postal Universal Service Directive (Post-Universaldienstverordnung), with further requirements regarding the supply in the following numbers.

  123. 123.

    § 22 Section 2 Sentence 1 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling. With this rule, the legislator shows that he himself does not take lottery addiction very serious. Apparently, he believes that participating in the number lottery does not lead to any significant addiction damage, so that the lack practicability of a stricter approach and the greater burdens following from it for the retail points weigh heavier.

  124. 124.

    The overall revenue for lotteries, special lotteries and other number lotteries decreased during this time period with only slight variations, see the “Notice by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Commission of the European Communities in the Infringement Procedures No. 2007/4866 from May 20, 2008” (translation by the author), there Appendix 4, 21 et seqq.

  125. 125.

    § 25 Section 6 Nos. 1 and 2. Also the further requirements named in Nos. 3–5 serve the purpose of fighting addiction: No. 3 limits the organizing and resale largely to the classic offerings of the lottery, No. 4 establishes an obligation to localize, Nr. 5 obliges the private entity to develop a social concept tailored to the internet. In greater detail Postel (2008: § 25 GlüStV marginal no. 42 et seqq.).

  126. 126.

    Nor can this inconsistency be justified by pointing to the task of ensuring a sufficient supply of games, since the exclusion of one or two retail channels in no way furthers the supply of games.

  127. 127.

    BVerfG, Order of 14 October, 1 BvR 928/08, juris marginal no. 58 et seq. (see footnote in the chapter opening page). It is not the case, though, that – as claimed in the grounds of the proposal for the Interstate Treaty on Gambling (Reports of the State Parliament of Baden Wurttemberg [LT-Drs.] 14/1493) – ‘addiction experts ’ advocate a ban on internet resale. Rather, their criticism aims at games, which can be expected to lead to a significantly increased potential of addiction, and Meyer and Hayer (2005: 165) even advocate, as mentioned above, a publicly licensed online supply of games (165); as well as Meyer and Hayer (2006: 5).

  128. 128.

    A higher frequency is already impossible because of § 25 Section 6 No. 3 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  129. 129.

    See Sedatis (1988: marginal no. 326).

  130. 130.

    § 22 Section 2 Sentence 2 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling.

  131. 131.

    Technologically, this is possible, for example, with the method offered by the German General Credit Protection Association SCHUFA under the brand name “SCHUFA-Q-Bit”, see SCHUFA (2015).

  132. 132.

    This may be different when comparing online resale with casinos, but a casino is fundamentally different from online resale, since it is not a kind of resale, but of product. Only the organization of games online can be compared to the casino.

  133. 133.

    According to § 25 Section 6 No. 2 of the Interstate Treaty on Gambling, it must be ensured for the case of online resale that the stakes do not exceed €1,000 per month.

  134. 134.

    It fits with this observation that several lottery companies (Westdeutsche Lotterie GmbH & Co. OHG, Sächsische Lotto-GmbH, Lotto Hamburg GmbH) have by now established electronic self-service terminals (in Hamburg under the brand of “JackPoint”), which allow the public to participate in games. This fact emphasizes once more that when banning private internet sales, the legislator does not have the fight against the dangers of addiction in mind.

  135. 135.

    At first, one might think that the requirements of a proportionality review must always be the same. However, considering that the proportionality of a measure depends on the size of the legislative leeway, it becomes understandable why, if the review’s standard and intensity become stricter, the outcomes of the proportionality review are influenced. The Federal Constitutional Court also knows different degrees of intensity in the assessment of proportionality (see BVerfG, 115 BVerfGE 276 at 308 [Footnote 68]; as well as Raabe 1998: 332 et seqq., regarding the interconnection between prognostic leeway and the assessment of proportionality).

    With regard to the earlier discussion concerning the possibility and necessity of a graded proportionality review exemplarily Grabitz (1976: 94 et seqq.); as well as the considerations by Lerche (2000: marginal no. 16 et seqq.).

  136. 136.

    Against this judgment one can argue with the legislator’s prerogative to assess the situation at hand. But this prerogative also has to build on some factual basis and the only known facts indicate that online resale has not led to an increase in players (see footnote 124), so that no sensible reason is apparent why the ban should lead to a decrease.

    A measure, for which an equally effective but less invasive alternative exists, is also always unproportional or unacceptable for those negatively affected by it. Since the weight of the public interests, which justifies the restriction, depends fundamentally on the effectiveness of the ban and the possibility of a less invasive alternative, the third step of the proportionality review leads to no change in the constitutional assessment. If one reaches a different judgment on the first two steps, one would on the third step not arrive at the conclusion that the measure is unproportional. See in this regard the considerations of the Federal Constitutional Court, BVerfG, Order of 14 October 2008, 1 BvR 928/08 (see footnote in the chapter opening page).

  137. 137.

    One could try to manage with the idea that a more intense rationality review would be reserved to decisions by the Senates of the Federal Constitutional Court, while in the daily mass business of Chamber-decisions the traditional standards would have to be used. Since the standard one chooses can affect the result, though, such an approach would be arbitrary.

  138. 138.

    In greater detail Bumke (2004: 147 et seqq.).

  139. 139.

    See above, Sect. 7.3.1.

  140. 140.

    Individual parts of the judgment of rationality, as for example the prerogative of the legislator to assess the situation at hand, vary according to subject matter, constitutional provision affected and legislative goal. This, however, does not affect the required level of rationality itself.

  141. 141.

    Consequently, the Federal Constitutional Court should also revise its constitutional assessment of the ban on the private resale of lotteries.

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Bumke, C. (2016). The Obligation of Consistency in Lawmaking. In: Meßerschmidt , K., Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) Rational Lawmaking under Review. Legisprudence Library, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33217-8_7

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