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Symbolic Legislation Under Judicial Control

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Rational Lawmaking under Review

Part of the book series: Legisprudence Library ((LEGIS,volume 3))

Abstract

Since the Enlightenment the claim of law to rationality has become an indispensable standard for all current forms of law-making. However, the well-known tension between certain standards of rationality and legislation on the basis of democratic majority rule – that legitimizes law-making in view of voluntas not ratio and that takes place in the realm of politics – is tested to its limits by symbolic laws. Those laws, by definition, are characterized by an element of deception, a discrepancy between their manifest purposes that cannot be achieved and latent purposes that remain hidden. This paper examines the different notions of ‘symbol’ as well as the different conceptions and standards of rationality under the German Basic Law and asks whether judicial review is able to tackle the problem of (deceptive) symbolic laws. It will show that the requirement of Normenwahrheit (truthfulness of legal norms) is specifically tailored to capture this problem. Nonetheless, Normenwahrheit as well as other internal standards of legislation are only enforceable to some extent by the German Federal Constitutional Court. This leads to the question of how to deal with the legal grey area between justiciable constitutional principles and internal standards of legislation that do not determine the constitutionality of a law but that are relevant for the law’s quality, and to the question of whether legislative jurisprudence (‘legisprudence’) can provide an answer.

This paper partly draws on Siehr (2008) and Siehr (2005); citations of German publications have been translated by the author. Many thanks to my dear colleague Gertrude Lübbe-Wolff for valuable hints and to my team, especially to Tatjana Chionos and Liesa Reffert for their assistance!

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For Cicero this term meant that the Roman law expressed and realized the eternal and unalterable law of nature and the reason governing it. Later Francisco Suárez systematically incorporated the notion of reason into the notion of law. See Suárez (1613/2002: 19, 44–45, 95 et seq, 171, 185–186, 192; on Cicero: 96, 172, passim).

  2. 2.

    In great detail: Bastit (1990). See also Grawert (1975: 864 et seq).

  3. 3.

    As Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 458) correctly points out: “Rational law making is, since the Enlightenment, a pleonasm; it is not a standard we are free to abolish but an indispensable standard for all current forms of law-making.” Grzeszick (2012: 51) describes rationality as “the universal promise of salvation of the modern age”.

  4. 4.

    Blankenburg (1977: 43–44). See also Blankenburg (1986: 118–119).

  5. 5.

    Noll (1981: 353, 355–356).

  6. 6.

    See Voß (1989: 25).

  7. 7.

    Amendatory Act, 24.3.2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I (Federal Law Gazette of Germany), 969.

  8. 8.

    See Enders and Lange (2006: 105 et seq).

  9. 9.

    See Gusy (2004: 159 et seq), Kötter (2004: 371–373 et seq), both with further references.

  10. 10.

    The German Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) seems to approve this development. In a decision of 5 February 2004, 2 BvR 2029/01, 109 BVerfGE 133 at 157–158 the Court states: “Whether the tightening of the law of preventive detention was triggered by an actual increase of violent crime or simply by an enhanced feeling of threat among the population is not for this Court to decide.” A similar development could be observed in the United States in the 1990s during which time crime rates decreased but rates of imprisonment continued to soar. As Zimring (2001: 163, 165) points out, for “most members of the public the symbolic functions of penal legislation are the most important aspect of new legislation” which causes the “incarceration boom.”

  11. 11.

    See on this and the following Kant (1797/1983, vol 7, “Einleitung in die Rechtslehre”, § B, § E: 337, 339–340, “Einleitung in die Metaphysik der Sitten”: 331 et seq), and Kant (1793/1983, vol 9, II. Vom Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Staatsrecht [Gegen Hobbes]: 144–148).

  12. 12.

    Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 378).

  13. 13.

    See Siehr (2008: 271–271).

  14. 14.

    These four approaches, of course, are also relevant outside the context of legislative theory; many scholars would not even bring the commonly accepted ‘constitutional law approach’ into line with ‘legislative theory’.

  15. 15.

    Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 457–458). See for a specification which kind of ‘distance’ is meant below n 66.

  16. 16.

    Blum (2004: 22, 29 et seq). For further references on the procedural approach see Emmenegger (2006: 300, n 9).

  17. 17.

    For a detailed analysis and the relation between these two approaches see Meßerschmidt in this volume.

  18. 18.

    However, different countries with a continental law tradition put emphasis on different aspects of legislative theory. For instance, Austrian legal scholars seem to be considerably more open to the sociological approach (see Winkler and Schilcher [1981] and Schäffer and Triffterer [1984]) than German legal scholars. Yet, the substantial constitutional law approach is less powerful in Austria than in Germany, also because the Austrian Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) uses the instrument of abrogation of laws in accordance with Art. 140(3) Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz more restrictively. The Swiss Federal Court (Bundesgericht) – although it de facto reviews federal laws for their constitutionality – has to apply laws even if it finds them to be unconstitutional, cf Art. 190 of the Bundesverfassung (Federal Constitution).

  19. 19.

    As Blum (2004: 9) stated at the German Lawyers’ Conference: “Not every botched law is necessarily unconstitutional.”

  20. 20.

    Wintgens (2006: 1).

  21. 21.

    This distinction between the external legislative process , i.e. the proceedings as set out in the Constitution (for Germany see Art. 76–78 and 82 of the Basic Law), and the internal legislative process which encompasses the preparation of bills as well as the method and certain standards of decision-making, was first made by Schwerdtfeger (1977: 173 et seq). See also Hölscheidt and Menzenbach (2008: 139–140). Schwerdtfeger (1977: 173 et seq) also postulated a constitutional duty for optimal legislation. See for the opposing view Gusy (1985: 298). Schlaich and Korioth (2007: margin note 529–530) put it bluntly: “The legislator does not owe anything but the law”.

  22. 22.

    See for a subtle analysis of the question of coherence Wintgens (2006: 15 et seq); Bumke (2010); id in this volume. The addressees of internal standards of legislation are mainly the bureaucracies that entrust their lawyers with the preparation of bills. Though, if the application of particular internal standards of legislation does not presuppose specific legal knowledge – as is the case with symbolic laws – the respective standards also aim to enhance the sensitivity of the representatives and of the Federal Council of Germany (Bundesrat).

  23. 23.

    See Hofmann (1995: 264–265) who refers to Ulrich Scheuner.

  24. 24.

    Voß (1989: 2, 40 et passim); regarding the Constitution also Lübbe-Wolff (2000b: 224–225). On Blankenburg and Noll see above, n 4 and 5.

  25. 25.

    Cf Gusfield and Michalowics (1984: 419 et seq). Alexander Blankenagel cites language as an example, see Blankenagel (1987: 358). From the point of view of the social working approach see also Griffiths (2004: 151). For a profound elaboration on language as a symbolic form see Cassirer (1923: 12–13, 18–25, 44 et passim); Cassirer (1925/1959: 71–79).

  26. 26.

    Blankenagel (1987: 360; see also 361 et seq, with further references).

  27. 27.

    The distinction between “referential symbolism” and “condensation symbolism” was first made by Sapir (1934: 493), and was taken up esp by Edelmann (1964: 5 et seq, 119, 175 et passim). On the symbolic dimension of politics see also Gusfield (1963); Gusfield and Michalowics (1984: 423–424 et passim). On other forms of symbolism see Voß (1989: 41–42).

  28. 28.

    See Blankenagel (1987: 350 et seq) who cites Erikson’s definition of collective identity, for further details Blankenagel (1987: 345, 348 et seq, 361); Voß (1989: 40–41).

  29. 29.

    For the idea of a Staatsbürgernation see Siehr (2001: 237–238, 240 et seq).

  30. 30.

    Hassemer (1989: 555–556); Lübbe-Wolff (2000a: 27). On the symbolic working of law as well as of legislation see also van Klink (2005: 113, 128 et seq) and other contributions in this book.

  31. 31.

    Cassirer (1923: 5 et seq, esp 9, 19 et seq, 47, 50 and passim).

  32. 32.

    Cassirer (1923: 9, 12–13, 22, 24 et seq, 31, 41–42, 48, 50–50). See also Vandenberghe (2001: 484 et seq).

  33. 33.

    Cassirer (1923: 47). See also Cassirer (1923: 23): “an original and autonomous achievement”.

  34. 34.

    Cassirer (1923: 6 et seq, 10–11 and passim).

  35. 35.

    Cassirer (1923: 6): “All objectivation […] is in reality mediation and [must] remain mediation.”

  36. 36.

    On these different categories of symbolic statutes see Voß (1989: 26–34). Cf for different aspects of symbolic laws also Griffiths (2004: 150 et seq).

  37. 37.

    See for a closer examination Lübbe-Wolff (2000a: 28 et seq).

  38. 38.

    See Hassemer (1989: 556); Lübbe-Wolff (2000a: esp 25, 28; 2000b: 218); Führ (2003: 6–7, 9 et seq, 19–20); Voß (1989: 72 et seq, 75–76); Newig (2003: 26; on ‘societal self-deception’: 276).

  39. 39.

    Concerning the issue of Normenwahrheit see S. Meyer (2009: 294–303); Drüen (2009) and below in this text under Sect. 13.4.

  40. 40.

    Cf Hassemer (1989: esp 556); Voß (1989: 6, 63 et seq). See also Führ (2003: 5–6); Schmehl (1991: 253) points out that the achieved sedative effect might even block the mobilization of potential for social action. Newig (2003: 277) argues in the same direction.

  41. 41.

    „Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes“ of 31 July 2011, Bundesgesetzblatt I (Federal Law Gazette of Germany), 1704. See for further details Reyes y Ráfales (2013: 599–600).

  42. 42.

    Noll (1981: 361). The rapidly adopted German Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 is a perfect example, see Rublack (2002: 202). Dwyer (1990: 233) gives another example: legislation addressed to exotic and particularly dreaded health threats.

  43. 43.

    Tushnet and Yackle (1997: 1–86, conclusion: 85–86). As they point out the Supreme Court saw the problem of randomness, too, and held that the freakish imposition of the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, cf McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 US 433, 454 (1990).

  44. 44.

    Hassemer (1989: 557 et seq); Seelmann (1992: 456 et seq); Lübbe-Wolff (2000a: 28 et seq); Newig (2003: 40 et seq).

  45. 45.

    Cf Tushnet and Yackle (1997: 4); Dwyer (1990: 316).

  46. 46.

    Subsequently, the term “symbolic laws ” is always meant in the narrower sense.

  47. 47.

    Spinner (1986: 924).

  48. 48.

    Weber (1921–1922/19725: 397, passim); Weber (1915/1946: 293 et seq, 299, passim, see other essays in this volume, too). There is a perceived difference between modern and primitive societies: modern life is viewed as being dominated by a secular, matter-of-fact as well as rational culture. Max Weber’s view of a disenchanted, non-magical, rationalized world has been very influential, see Gusfield and Michalowics (1984: 418). For a detailed account of Max Weber’s occidental rationalism see Schluchter (1998: 181 et seq, 205 et seq with further references).

  49. 49.

    Spinner (1986: 923, esp 925 et seq).

  50. 50.

    Spinner (1986: 923–924, esp 925 et seq).

  51. 51.

    See on the relationship between law and truth Decker (1992: 43); Patterson (1996); Poscher (2003: 200); Moore (2004).

  52. 52.

    See for a profound analysis Daston (1992: on the following esp. 597–98) and Daston and Galison (1992).

  53. 53.

    From a history of science perspective see Daston (1992: 597–98) who points out that for a long time it has been assumed that objectivity is and has been a monolithic and immutable concept.

  54. 54.

    See with respect to rationality Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 454 et seq, 459 et seq); Meßerschmidt (2000: 777 et seq); Engel (2001b: 28); Grzeszick (2012: 51 et seq, 76). See from a philosophical perspective also Putnam (1981).

  55. 55.

    Daston (1992: 599).

  56. 56.

    Daston and Galison (1992: 82).

  57. 57.

    Daston and Galison (1992: 84–117). Accordingly, scientists had searched for the underlying ‘type’ (or even ‘archetype’) of a genus, an example which possesses all the leading characters of that genus and represents a ‘true to nature’ abstraction from coincidental individual deviations – as Goethe did when he drafted his ur-plant. See for references and for other exemplary illustrations Daston and Galison (1992: 84–117).

  58. 58.

    Daston (1992: 597, 599, 607; see on the following, including the citation: 600).

  59. 59.

    Daston (1992: 600; see on the following 599). On the relation of objectivity to inter-subjectivity see also Nagel (1986: 63 and passim).

  60. 60.

    Nagel (1986: esp. 5 et seq, 60 et seq: “centerless view”, passim). See on Nagel also Daston (1992: 599).

  61. 61.

    Rawls (1971: 29, 36–37, 159 et seq, 228–229, 284, passim).

  62. 62.

    Of course, today we know that – contrary to the ideal of mechanical objectivity – value-judgements necessarily form part of the application of law. See on ethical/moral judgements Sieckmann (2005: 284 et seq).

  63. 63.

    Hofmann (1986: 101–102); see also Siehr (2001: 80–81, 188–189, 262).

  64. 64.

    See Grawert (1975: 894–899); Hofmann (1995: 9, 23–24 with n 88).

  65. 65.

    See Alexy (1983).

  66. 66.

    Grzeszick (2012: 51–52) rightly points out that the expectation of rationality is mainly attributed to the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Kloepfer (1982: 65) describes the state governed by the rule of law as a form of government that is characterized by the keeping of “distance”. For example, it ensures distance between private interest and public decision, between the creation of law and its application, and between political will and the binding law.

  67. 67.

    Grimm (2001: 491) stresses that the law has a rationalizing power merely because of its generality, independent of its content.

  68. 68.

    On the significance of objectivity as publicity, see Postema (2001: 125 et seq).

  69. 69.

    BVerfG, Order of 12 February 2003, 2 BvL 3/00, 107 BVerfGE 218 at 256 – Different Salary in East and West Germany; BVerfG, Judgement of 19 March 2003, 2 BvL 9/98, 2 BvL 10/98, 2 BvL 11/98, 2 BvL 12/98, 108 BVerfGE 1 at 20 – Fees for Re-registrations of Students; BVerfG, Order of 13 September 2005, 2 BvF 2/03, 114 BVerfGE 196 at 236–237 – Contribution Rate Safeguarding Act; BVerfG, Judgement of 4 July 2007, 2 BvE 1-4/06, 118 BVerfGE, 277 at 366–367 – Legal status of MP (German Bundestag). See also Lübbe-Wolff (2000b: 231–232); S. Meyer (2009: 294 et seq); Drüen (2009: 60 et seq); Cornils (2011: 1055).

  70. 70.

    See Degenhart (1981: 479); Kloepfer (1982: 65); Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 378, 459 et seq).

  71. 71.

    Degenhart (1981: 479); Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 457–458); Dann (2010: 645); Reyes y Ráfales (2013: 604–605). However, according to Lienbacher (2012: 32–34), with regard to Austria the internal controls within the law-making process are rather blunt weapons.

  72. 72.

    Grigoleit (2004: 20). On the function of members of parliament as representatives see H. Meyer (1989: 117 et seq, margin note 9 et seq).

  73. 73.

    Grimm (2001: 491).

  74. 74.

    Spinner (1986: 925).

  75. 75.

    Spinner (1986: 933).

  76. 76.

    Kant (1795/1983, vol 9, Appendix II: “Of the Harmony which the Transcendental Idea of Public Law Established between Morality and Politics”, 244–245).

  77. 77.

    See supra n 69.

  78. 78.

    Drüen (2009, see for a summary: 74); Bumke (2010: 91); Merten (2015: 351).

  79. 79.

    See Cornils (2011: 1055). However, Drüen (2009: 64 et seq, 74) defines the difference clearly. The position of S. Meyer (2009: 294 et seq, esp 298/302) is ambiguous: on the one hand, he does not see a doctrinal innovation in relation to Normenklarheit, on the other hand, he explains why this requirement may lead to a different result.

  80. 80.

    This poses a problem for the legal culture as Enders and Lange (2006: 112) correctly point out. On the specific value of normativity as a counterbalance to political and social power, see Engel (2001b: 39). In more detail Engel (2001a: 23 et seq).

  81. 81.

    See on this issue above in the text near n 38.

  82. 82.

    In addition, the generality of law in the sense of its impersonal abstractness, an idea that was elaborated by Rousseau for the first time, is lost: according to Rousseau a law is not general if a single voter is excluded, irrespective of its content. However, deception is a form of exclusion; see for details Siehr (2008: 286 et seq).

  83. 83.

    Kant (1797/1983, vol 7, Rechtslehre, Allgemeine Anmerkung C: 448). Cf also Kant (1797/1983, vol 9, II. Vom Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Staatsrecht [Gegen Hobbes]: 150).

  84. 84.

    See H. Meyer (1989: margin note 7). On the following see H. Meyer (1989: margin note 8).

  85. 85.

    Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 24).

  86. 86.

    Dreier (1988: 457). On the majority rule Dreier (1986: 94); Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 443 et seq).

  87. 87.

    For Rousseau the law is the expression of the general will (volonté générale) as a substantial figure which focuses on the common good , and is different form the will of all (volonté de tous) as a sheer numeric figure. According to his “contrat social” the general will is determined in an assembly of free and equal men and is equally binding for all.

  88. 88.

    Strongly opposing H. Meyer (1975: 93); Dreier (1988: 464 et seq); Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 27). The position of Schneider (1989: margin note 4 and 18) appears ambiguous and unclear.

  89. 89.

    See Hamilton, Madison and Jay (1787–1788/1961).

  90. 90.

    See Dreier (1988); Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 12).

  91. 91.

    See Dreier (1988: 462); Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 12).

  92. 92.

    See for example Lehner (1985: 95 et seq).

  93. 93.

    Cf BVerfG, Order of 10 May 1977, 2 BvR 705/75, 44 BVerfGE 308 at 316 – decision-making capacity of the German Bundestag –; Schneider (1989: margin note 18); Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 27).

  94. 94.

    In a democracy the common good is not pre-determined but its definition is subject to an open pluralistic process which follows strict procedural rules, see Münkler and Fischer (2002: 9–11, passim).

  95. 95.

    In detail on Sieyès see Herbst (2003: 66–78).

  96. 96.

    Schmitt (1983: 204 et seq, 218). Cf Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 10); Hofmann (2002: 148 et seq).

  97. 97.

    Schmitt (1983: 210). On the elitist-aristocratic character, ibid, 219.

  98. 98.

    Schmitt even concludes that, actually, a “powerful representation” is only conceivable against the Parliament, (1983: 315). Cf Hofmann and Dreier (1989: margin note 10, 31); for a thorough analysis of Schmitt’s criticism of parliamentarism see Hofmann (2002: 96 et seq).

  99. 99.

    See on this H. Meyer (1989: margin notes 9–11), also on the following.

  100. 100.

    Cf Dreier (1988: 483 with n 91, including further references).

  101. 101.

    The German Basic Law clearly dismisses both: conceptions of democracy that are based on the identity of rulers and ruled as well as mystifying notions of representation, see Schneider (1989: before article 38, margin note 2–3), and Dreier (1988: 482–483).

  102. 102.

    Evidently the representative does not hold an office within public service but a state office (oberstes Staatsamt) that, in fact, is incompatible with a public service position, see Schneider (1989: margin note 20).

  103. 103.

    Affirmatively, Kötter (2004: 378); disapproving Gusy (2004: 174 et seq, 181–182), who correctly points out that at any rate protecting the feeling of security cannot be the basis for infringing the rights of others.

  104. 104.

    In fact, this is exactly the result already achieved on the basis of Kant’s notion of law (see Sect. 13.1.1) since Kant also called for the necessity of a coercive law in order to justify it. Somehow, the principle of proportionality is a transfer and further elaboration of this idea in terms of legal dogmatics.

  105. 105.

    See supra in the text near n 9.

  106. 106.

    At least, relating to the aforementioned example of a prolongation of preventive detention as means to strengthen the feeling of security (see supra, near n 10), there are certain limits set by the Constitution. These limits follow from the principles that the punishment given to the offender should be limited on the basis of his guilt, and that the danger posed by him (which has to be determined on the basis of a prognosis ) limits the duration of preventive detention.

  107. 107.

    Lübbe-Wolff (2000b: 232): “[…] den Verzicht der Instrumentalisierung des Rechts für falsche Suggestionen und, allgemeiner, die Abwesenheit falscher Suggestionsgehalte des Rechts als ein Gebot des Rechtsstaatsprinzips anzusehen.”

  108. 108.

    BVerfG, Judgement of 19 March 2003, 2 BvL 9/98, 2 BvL 10/98, 2 BvL 11/98, 2 BvL 12/98, 108 BVerfGE 1 at 20 – Fees for Re-registrations of Students; BVerfG, Order of 12 February 2003, 2 BvL 3/00, 107 BVerfGE 218 at 256 – Different Salary in East and West Germany; BVerfG, Order of 13 September 2005, 2 BvF 2/03, 114 BVerfGE 196 at 236–237 – Contribution Rate Safeguarding Act –; BVerfG, Judgement of 4 July 2007, 2 BvE 1-4/06, 118 BVerfGE, 277 at 366–367 – Legal Status of MP (German Bundestag). See for literature supra n 69.

  109. 109.

    BVerfG, Judgement of 19 March 2003, 2 BvL 9/98, 2 BvL 10/98, 2 BvL 11/98, 2 BvL 12/98, 108 BVerfGE 1 at 20 – Fees for Re-registrations of Students. See for further details also S. Meyer (2009: 294–303).

  110. 110.

    See Lücke (1987: 11–13, 33–34, 138), who considers this to be unconstitutional (1987: 216–218, 225). See for the opposing opinion Waldhoff (2007: 325 et seq, 333, 341); Grzeszick (2012: 54, 61, n 57); Reyes y Ráfales (2013: 612 et seq, 614); see also Merten (2015: 360).

  111. 111.

    Since BVerfG, Judgement of 21 May 1952, 2 BvH 2/52, 1 BVerfGE 299 at 312 – Housing Promotion –, the Court has consistently ruled in favor of an objective interpretation. See in detail S. Meyer (2009: 281 et seq).

  112. 112.

    108 BVerfGE 1 at 20 – Fees for Re-registrations of Students – refers explicitly to 105 BVerfG 73 at 112–113 – Taxation of Pensions –, stating that otherwise legitimate incitation effects or other non-fiscal aims of taxation must be based on a transparent and clear decision of the legislator in order to justify new tax burdens.

  113. 113.

    Führ (2003: 10 et seq); Lübbe-Wolff (2000b: 226–228); Merten (2015: 351–352).

  114. 114.

    BVerfG, Judgement of 27 June 1991, 2 BvR 1493/89, 84 BVerfGE 239 at 269 et seq – Taxation of interest income. The Federal Constitutional Court argued that this is not a question of the general principle of equality but only of the sub-principle which refers to equal taxation, ibid, at 268. But as Bryde (1993: 6 et seq, especially 20) shows, this decision is generalizable (if we adhere to the lowest level of scrutiny in respect of the broad discretion of the legislator): Symbolic laws that only target the honest or unlucky citizen are unconstitutional.

  115. 115.

    The wording “Schein-Gesetzgebung” is used by Führ (2003: 5–6, passim).

  116. 116.

    See in detail Meßerschmidt (2000).

  117. 117.

    For instance, in order to evaluate the likely effects of a law, all available sources of skills and knowledge should be fully exploited, so that the legislator has a reliable basis for such a prognosis , cf BVerfG, Judgement of 1 March 1979, 1 BvR 532, 533/77, 419/78 and BvL 21/78, 50 BVerfGE 290 at 333–334 – Employee Participation; BVerfG, Judgement of 15 December 1983, 1 BvR 209, 269, 362, 420, 440, 484/83, 65 BVerfGE 1 at 55–56 – National Census; BVerfG, Judgement of 14 July 1986, 2 BvE 2/84, 2 BvR 442/84, 73 BVerfGE 40 at 91–92 – 3rd Decision on Party Donation; BVerfG, Order of 19 September 1996, 1 BvR 1767/92, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1997, 247 – Remuneration for Operators of Photocopiers. Generally on this topic Burghart (1996: 201 et seq, 206, et passim); Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 490 et seq); Kloepfer (1982: 90–91).

  118. 118.

    However, the functioning and inner logic of the political process do set some limits, cf Schulze-Fielitz (1988: 375 et seq, 553–554); Schuppert (2003: 12 et seq); Dann (2010: 640, 645 [necessity of compromise]).

  119. 119.

    Gusy (1985: 298–299), who rightly points out that there is no causal link between the ‘right’ law-making process and the ‘right’ outcome of this process. – However, it has to be conceded that the chances to get ‘good laws’ are certainly higher if the quality of the legislative process is improved, see supra in the text near n 15 and n 16.

  120. 120.

    On this development of legal science see Voßkuhle (2002: 180) and Voßkuhle (2004: 5).

  121. 121.

    Voßkuhle (2002: 178).

  122. 122.

    Hoffmann-Riem (2005: 5, esp 11 et seq); Siehr (2007: 129, 135 et seq, 143 et seq).

  123. 123.

    On legisprudence as a new theory of legislation see Wintgens (2006).

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  1. Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft, Universität Bielefeld, Postfach 10 01 31, D-33501, Bielefeld, Germany

    Angelika Siehr

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    Klaus Meßerschmidt

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    A. Daniel Oliver-Lalana

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Siehr, A. (2016). Symbolic Legislation Under Judicial Control. In: Meßerschmidt , K., Oliver-Lalana, A. (eds) Rational Lawmaking under Review. Legisprudence Library, vol 3. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33217-8_13

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