Abstract
On the following pages, I present a programmatic proposal for an ethical model that sets out by analysing norms—that is, it does not start with a certain idea of what human beings ‘are’ or ‘must be’ in order to ground normativity . That means to presuppose no kind of reasoning grounded in any so-called autonomous subject, nor in any other kind of prescribed determinations of, or properties belonging to, human lives. Starting with a formal analysis of norms and with their categorization rather than with grounding norms at first might provide an answer to severe objections against the basis of European enlightened ethics.
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Notes
- 1.
There are different possibilities to distinguish ethical models: One contemporary pattern is to draw a distinction between normative, descriptive, and meta-ethics, or between applied and grounding ethics. A third could be to distinguish ethics from theories concerning the social which have a strong ethical impetus, but refuse to provide an explicit ethical model, at least a model which has systematic features—let’s call them ethical non-ethics or positively: deconstructive ethics. Calling them non-ethics indicates the prevailing refusal of their representatives to theorize systematically their mostly extensive ethical considerations. Thus their theoretical status is a bit strange, insofar as they describe in a critical way how ethics and norms work—this is the deconstructive side—but without stating explicitly what theoretical basis legitimates such a critique. Therefore they are subject to a lot of accusations from theorists who find themselves very well legitimated due to their last foundation in e.g. Aristotle, Kant or God, to name but a few. This is true for Habermas’ discourse ethics which is based on a very strict (western) idea of reason and the ability to take part in rational negotiations. It is also true for Martha Nussbaum’s enabling ethics grounded above all in Aristotle. Although the traditions that I refer to as deconstructive ethics see themselves in the tradition of European Enlightenment, they try to avoid some of the aporias introduced by the dialectics of Enlightenment: moral rationality in its modern formation and hence modern morality was not able to avert ‘Auschwitz’ and other genocides during the 20th century. More than that, it was neither able to avert a lot of other iniquities such as colonization or two world wars. Furthermore, there are a lot of voices which do not only wonder about its power to avert horrible developments, but ask to what extent this concept of rationality is also the ultimate cause of such developments. Although the following theorists argue from very different standpoints—though they are all but one voice—see e.g. Spivak (1988), Spivak (2004), Žižek (1994). See also Adorno and Horkheimer (1943/1996), Sartre (1983/1992), Luhmann (1990), Butler (2003/2005), etc.
- 2.
Kant, Sartre, Levinas, or Jean-Luc Nancy, to name but a few, presuppose plurality without giving a reason for its provenance. Hegel prominently answered this question by stating a consciousness which differentiates (and connects at once) by negating (and synthesizing). He is followed by a wide range of theorists which could be subsumed under the label: philosophers of difference. My suggestion here is not to take one of these alternatives but to claim that norms are the differentiating power.
- 3.
The double effect of distinguishing and connecting at once refers, of course, to Hegel and also to G. Spencer Brown’s Laws of Form. The first chapter starts with the definition: “Distinction is perfect continence”. LoF:1.
- 4.
The difference between necessary and sufficient conditions is a very crucial point which will come up again in different contexts: a necessary condition designates what is necessary in order to make something happen; it determines the event in no way; a sufficient condition determines what happens in any case—therefore the difference should not be ignored.
- 5.
Judith Butler distinguishes “necessary and variable norms”. I think this naming is misleading, because it could imply that necessary norms are not variable, which is not the case. See Butler (2002, here: 205–207).
- 6.
The philosophical discourse which is relevant here refers to Lacan and his difference between the ‘symbolic real’ and ‘reality’. Whereas the latter never pervades perfectly in the formatting normative ‘symbolic real’, the ‘symbolic real’ always refers to something more, superfluous, excluded, which becomes visible only with regard to the symbolic and which is therefore somehow produced, or at least defined by it. Thus the ‘symbolic real’ would stand for the normalized which is shaped out of ‘reality’ and which can be thought and seen only through the symbolic. See Lacan (1955/1973).
- 7.
It is crucial to distinguish between prohibitions and commandments: While the first just describe one action which is not allowed and thus leave all the remaining possible actions untouched, the latter describe an action positively. A prohibition is therefore just a negative determination which excludes just one concrete action but does not determine any other action. A commandment, on the other hand, determines the action positively. It is interesting to see that the Bible offers in the Decalogue—after the first three commandments which refer directly to interactions with God—only one further commandment: the fourth, which is about honoring father and mother in order to allow you to live longer (!) on the arable soil given to you by Him (after the translation of Buber/Rosenberg). So it is a kind of conjunction between the first three and the rest. The other six only formulate prohibitions—so that the social is far away from being positively determined by the Decalogue. It is just limited insofar as some actions are excluded—to make social life possible. Of course, they refer to the very condition of life—not to be killed—and to property. But this is another topic.
- 8.
See Butler (2005, especially 65–81). In her description, she refers to Emmanuel Levinas and to psychoanalysis.
- 9.
- 10.
This formulation is reminiscent of Kant’s and Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between positive and negative freedom: the latter means to be free of pain, determinations etc.; the former means to be free to live one’s life as one wants to. See Kant (1795).
- 11.
I would suggest to interpret the Kantian categorical imperative as two-tiered as well: The ‘subjective maxims’ are the rules orienting singular actions and behaviors on the level of singularities. The test if these ‘subjective maxims’ can serve as an ‘objective right’ should be taken literally: check whether your personal rules could be formulated as a right, one might say as a condition, which does not limit the possibilities of others—in the sense of the basic Right.
We can find this idea of a necessary two-tier model also in Dewey (1915, 1935/1999).
- 12.
Most norms receive their legitimization ex post as well, as they only become explicit in the moment of severe social transformations, and thus in times of uncertainty and angst. See Brandom (1998).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Hans G. Ulrich and Stephan Packard for their critical comments, helping to clear up this paper; and especially Stephan Packard for his judicious re-reading of my English. The work on this paper was possible due to a generous Heisenberg-grant sponsored by the German Research Foundation (SCHO 1077/3-1).
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Schönwälder-Kuntze, T. (2016). Deconstructive Ethics—Handling Human Plurality (Shaped) by Normative (Enabling) Conditions. In: Luetge, C., Mukerji, N. (eds) Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_12
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