Abstract
Something is going on in the state of justice theory. Slowly but surely, a novel paradigm emerges. When elaborated further, this paradigm—elsewhere I call it the pragmatist paradigm (Festl in Gerechtigkeit als historischer Experimentalismus. Gerechtigkeitstheorie nach der pragmatistischen Wende der Erkenntnistheorie. Konstanz University Press, Konstanz, 2015)—could, before long, challenge the approaches to justice that are derived from the epochal work of Rawls (A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1971/1999).
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Notes
- 1.
For an extensive elaboration on both of these approaches to justice theory, see Festl (2015, 43–159).
- 2.
I will reference all three in the following.
- 3.
The difference principle states that inequalities between individuals are only legitimate if they work to the advantage of the least well-off members of society (Rawls 1971/1999, 131). For a detailed discussion of the difference principle, see the contribution of Ludwig Heider and Nikil Mukerji (in this volume).
- 4.
Sen even invokes his plea for flexibility against Anderson and Nussbaum, who try, in different ways, to build upon his theory (2009, 232f.).
- 5.
Consequently, to say that order ethics goes back to contract theories is merely a half-truth. It is true when we understand contract theories—with Buchanan and also partly with Hobbes—as modelling the idea that moral action is prone to exploitation when it is not protected by rules ensuring that the moral actor is also remunerated for her behaviour in terms of an increase of her individual utility. In that sense, one could say that the main achievement of contract theory is its awareness of what is now called the prisoner’s dilemma. On the other hand, contract theory cannot be called a predecessor of order ethics if it is understood—with Rawls and Nozick, and also partly with Kant and Locke—as a thought experiment in order to deduce the principles a society in search of perfect justice would adopt if it could start anew (cf. for Buchanan’s explicit rejection of such a use of contract theory his 1975/2000, 98 and 210).
- 6.
Luetge explicitly states that order ethics needs to be assessed based on its capacity to solve normative problems (2004, 118).
- 7.
Homann and Suchanek emphasise that they regard the prisoner’s dilemma as a heuristic (2005, 383f.).
- 8.
As opposed to the prisoner’s dilemma, the capability approach is not derived from game theory, to name just one distinction.
- 9.
It is needless to say that this call for deliberation has little in common with the Habermasian idea that discussions free from coercion could lead to morally indubitable outcomes (for a good discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of such an idea, see Habermas 1990). It is exactly the point of Sen and order ethics that such security in the realm of ethics is unattainable.
- 10.
As space considerations prevent a more thorough juxtaposition of Sen and order ethics, I can merely mention that there is also an aspect in which Sen and order ethics differ, at least a little: compared to Sen, order ethics puts a heavier emphasis on the role of institutions when it comes to promoting justice. This is due to the fact that order ethics builds on Buchanan’s public-choice theory (PCT), whereas Sen relies on his own work in social-choice theory (SCT) and calls PCT his more conservative rival (2009, 291). Both PCT and SCT indeed share, as the names betray, a choice-oriented approach—that is, an approach that aims at the ranking of options for action— but, in simplified terms, whereas PCT is mainly about methodically reconstructing social outcomes via the aggregation of individual choices in order to influence those choices, SCT intends to uncover contradictions between social decisions resulting from individual choices and axioms of rationality (e.g., Condorcet’s paradox). However, when the concepts of both of these economic theories are transferred to justice theory, the commonalities outweigh the differences, especially when compared to other conceptions in justice theory.
- 11.
The common forebear of Honneth and Homann is, obviously, to be found in the practical philosophy of Hegel, especially Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (1821/1986). This issue would justify a thorough investigation.
- 12.
For extensive elaborations see Festl (2015, 377–474).
- 13.
I am very explicit on this in Festl (2015, 380–402).
- 14.
As already mentioned, I outline the current status of my approach in Festl (2015, 377–474).
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Festl, M.G. (2016). Boost up and Merge with. Order Ethics in the Light of Recent Developments in Justice Theory. In: Luetge, C., Mukerji, N. (eds) Order Ethics: An Ethical Framework for the Social Market Economy . Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33151-5_11
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