Abstract
The correct functioning of a smart grid stands on consistent and secure execution of tasks in time. The safe security configuration depends not only on the local device parameters but also on the secure interactions and flows of these parameters across the network. There is a significant number of logical constraints on configuration parameters of many smart grid devices, which need to be satisfied to ensure safe and secure communications among smart grid components. NIST has developed security guidelines (e.g., NISTIR 7628 and NIST SP 800-82 [4, 10]) consisting of hundreds of security controls for ensuring trusted path, resource availability, boundary security protection, etc., toward controlling different security threats on smart grids. Implementing these security controls in a scalable manner is one of the major challenges for analyzing smart grid security and resiliency.
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Al-Shaer, E., Rahman, M.A. (2016). Security Analytics for AMI and SCADA. In: Security and Resiliency Analytics for Smart Grids. Advances in Information Security, vol 67. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32871-3_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32871-3_3
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