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Russian Operations: Continuity, Novelties and Adaptation

  • Palle Ydstebø
Chapter

Abstract

The military element in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, most notably the rapid “non-war” that led to the takeover of Crimea and the sudden eruption of an armed conflict in the Ukrainian oblasts (counties) Donetsk and Luhansk, has generated a lot of speculation regarding new and unknown capacities in the Russian Armed Forces. The more than ten-years-old term “hybrid war” was revitalized and given a new meaning (or a number of new meanings), and mushroomed to explain everything known and unknown about events that seemed to be a mixture of novel enigmas and brute force. What were the Russians actually doing? Will they do it again—against a NATO-country?1

Keywords

Military Force Military Strategy Land Force Military Doctrine Tactical Success 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Palle Ydstebø
    • 1
  1. 1.Norwegian Defence Command and Staff CollegeNorwegian Defence University CollegeOsloNorway

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