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Supply Disruptions and Procurement Contracting

  • Volodymyr BabichEmail author
  • Zhibin (Ben) Yang
Chapter
Part of the Springer Series in Supply Chain Management book series (SSSCM, volume 5)

Abstract

We discuss challenges that arise in practice of procurement contracting from supply disruptions and suggest how the theory should be adjusted to address these challenges. The challenges range from the loss of contract power when unexpected shocks occur to the need for contracts to govern joint risk management efforts of buyers and sellers. We highlight which traditional contracting modeling assumptions need to be reexamined and how our intuition based on the classical results might change. We point out a new direction of impactful research—coordination of supply risk management efforts among firms.

Keywords

Supply Chain Asymmetric Information Optimal Contract Supply Disruption Supply Risk 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.McDonough School of BusinessGeorgetown UniversityWashington, DCUSA
  2. 2.Lundquist College of BusinessUniversity of OregonEugeneUSA

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