Abstract
This chapter combines the conflict success function discussed in Chaps. 3 and 4 with the battle objective described in Chap. 5 into a unified framework. The two adversaries seek to optimize an intertemporal payoff function, subject to the army accumulation process that take into account battle losses and new recruits. The system is found to have unique saddle-path equilibrium and the effects of transient and permanent shocks are examined.
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Notes
- 1.
The coefficient is found to be very robust even if estimated from a sample including only European or non-European civil wars, before or after 1950 or any other time reference.
- 2.
The above finding evokes the discussion on the so-called Gibrat’s Law in industrial economics, which employs log-series to test whether the growth rate of firms’ activity in an industry is independent of the initial size of the firms. Empirical evidence is controversial; see, for example Sutton (1997).
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Christodoulakis, N. (2016). A Model of Intertemporal Conflict. In: An Economic Analysis of Conflicts. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32261-2_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32261-2_7
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