Abstract
The Introduction examines the main channels that interconnect economics and civil wars, both in influencing the causes of conflict and affecting its outcome. It also examines how economic theory and econometric analysis can help model the dynamics of conflict and thus estimate its patterns and consequences.
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Notes
- 1.
Instructing modern revolutionaries, Che Guevara (1961, Ch. 3) advocated that “it is absolutely correct and advisable to carry out sabotage against a power plant. … [T]his is entirely justified by the paralysis of the life of the region.”
- 2.
This kind of risk applies in conflicts where the opponents truly seek for a face-saving compromise. In cases where an aggressive ideology is dominant, compromising signals are likely to be ignored deliberately.
- 3.
The remark was made by R. L. Helmbold in Munich and quoted by Wallis (1968).
- 4.
Recorded in http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/629753.stm, Feb, 4, 2000.
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Christodoulakis, N. (2016). Introduction: Economic Analysis and Civil Wars. In: An Economic Analysis of Conflicts. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32261-2_1
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