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The European Securities and Markets Authority and Its Regulatory Mission: A Plea for Steering a Middle Course

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Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets

Abstract

The European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) has played a pivotal role in shaping the operation of the European supervisory structure since its establishment in January 2011. The overall objective of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) is to safeguard the stability and orderly functioning of the European financial system. ESMA shall achieve this objective in the realm of European capital markets (securities trading). Against the backdrop of ESMA’s operation so far, this chapter will revisit from a scholarly perspective the organisational and operational design, tasks, powers and governance of ESMA. Focus is on ESMA’s regulatory role, not its supervisory mission. ESMA’s regulatory tasks are likely to keep it on top of the watch-list of the European Commission (Commission). In context with the Commission’s work on establishing a Capital Markets Union (CMU) the Commission has emphasized particularly the importance of well-regulated capital markets. Main areas for action in this context are linked to ESMA’s remit. Have ESMA’s design and powers allowed it to contribute adequately to the development of a high-quality single rulebook as an essential element of an enhanced regulatory harmonisation and coherence? Has ESMA’s institutional profile fostered or hindered it to become an efficient and effective ‘rule-maker’? What features of ESMA’s current design have proved themselves to be appropriate? Which of ESMA’s institutional characteristics remain areas of improvement with a view to ESMA’s regulatory mission?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    The Holy See, Visit of His Holiness Pope Francis to the European Parliament and to the Council of Europe, Address of Pope Francis to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, on 25 November 2014.

  2. 2.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014.

  3. 3.

    European Parliament Resolution of 11 March 2014 with recommendations to the Commission on the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) Review, 2013/2166 (INL).

  4. 4.

    The term capital markets law or capital markets regulation and securities regulation shall mean the same. Despite being used for ESMA’s name, the latter term is generally more often employed in English and US-American law. See e.g. Moloney (2014).

  5. 5.

    For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013a), p. 27.

  6. 6.

    For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013a), p. 27.

  7. 7.

    In Germany more than 80 % of the national capital markets law is based on European Union law. For more information on this with further references, see e.g. Buck-Heeb (2014), p. 10.

  8. 8.

    See e.g. the European regulations on credit rating agencies. For more information on the regulatory and supervisory regime for credit rating agencies with further references, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2014a) and Deipenbrock (2014b).

  9. 9.

    See e.g. Veil (2013b), p. 71; see also e.g. Buck-Heeb (2014), p. 10.

  10. 10.

    For more information on the extent to which the CMU has already been completed, see e.g. Veil (2014).

  11. 11.

    For more information on this and its constitutional implications, see Lenaerts (2014).

  12. 12.

    For more information on e.g. the Financial Terminology Study of the Commission, see http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/terminology/index_en.htm, accessed 31 July 2015.

  13. 13.

    See also e.g. Siekmann (2010a), p. 107.

  14. 14.

    For more information on the Union’s objective of sustainable development in context with corporate sustainability, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2011b) and Deipenbrock (2012). See also Deipenbrock (2013b).

  15. 15.

    Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), OJ L 331/84 (2010), as amended by Directive (EU) No 2011/61, OJ L 174/1 (2011) and Directive (EU) No 2014/51, OJ L 153/1 (2014).

  16. 16.

    For more information on the various phases of legislative activities at Union level in the realm of European capital markets law with further references, see Veil (2013a), pp. 2 et seq.

  17. 17.

    For more information on this with further references, see Gruber (2011), pp. 4 et seq.

  18. 18.

    See e.g. also Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Central Bank—Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth, COM (2010) 301 final of 2 June 2010, p. 6, where the Commission refers to consumer protection in one of the headlines but to both consumers and investors in the text.

  19. 19.

    See Sect. 3.1.

  20. 20.

    For more information on this, see e.g. Buck-Heeb (2014), p. 4. See e.g. Mülbert (2013), p. 162.

  21. 21.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, p. 3.

  22. 22.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, p. 3.

  23. 23.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, p. 1.

  24. 24.

    Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU of 25 February 2009.

  25. 25.

    For more information on this with further references, see Granner (2011), pp. 34 et seq. For more information on the developing lines of European capital markets law, see e.g. Wilhelmi (2014), in particular pp. 700 et seq.

  26. 26.

    For more on this with further references, see Granner (2011), p. 35.

  27. 27.

    For more information on ESMA’s supervisory mission, see e.g. Moloney (2011b).

  28. 28.

    For more information on the developments and multiple aspects of the regulation and supervision of credit rating agencies in the Union, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2009); Deipenbrock (2011a); Deipenbrock (2013a) and Deipenbrock (2014a).

  29. 29.

    For more information on the preceding institutional design with further references, see Andenas and Deipenbrock (2011), pp. 10 et seq.

  30. 30.

    For a concise overview on this, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2014b).

  31. 31.

    Parmentier (2014), p. 50.

  32. 32.

    For more information on this, see Walla (2012), pp. 28 et seq.

  33. 33.

    For concise information on this with further references, see Walla (2012), pp. 27 et seq.

  34. 34.

    For more information on this with further references, see Rötting and Lang (2012).

  35. 35.

    The term ‘Lamfalussy II Process’ might not be considered as the generally employed term. For more information on this with further references, see Weber-Rey and Horak (2013), p. 721.

  36. 36.

    In addition, Regulation (EU) No 182/2011, OJ L 55/13 (2011), known as Comitology Regulation, provides important procedural requirements. For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013a), pp. 28 et seq. and 33.

  37. 37.

    For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013a), p. 33.

  38. 38.

    See Rötting and Lang (2012), p. 8.

  39. 39.

    For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013a), p. 34.

  40. 40.

    For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013a), p. 34.

  41. 41.

    For more information on this, see Walla (2014), p. 45.

  42. 42.

    See further below in this Sect. 3.1.

  43. 43.

    For more information on this, see Walla (2014), pp. 44 et seq. For more information on the CoJ’s approach on this, see e.g. Ritleng (2015).

  44. 44.

    See with a view to the ESAs e.g. Moloney (2011a), pp. 43 et seq.

  45. 45.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, Annex 1.

  46. 46.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, Annex 1.

  47. 47.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, Annex 1.

  48. 48.

    Raschauer (2011), p. 21.

  49. 49.

    The Securities and Markets Stakeholder Group is provided in Article 37 of the ESMA Regulation. It comprises of 30 members, representing in balanced proportions financial markets participants operating in the Union, their employees’ representatives as well as consumers, users of financial services and representatives of small and medium-sized enterprises. At least five of its members shall be independent top-ranking academics and ten of its members shall represent financial markets participants.

  50. 50.

    For more information on the ‘legal nature’ of recommendations of ESMA’s predecessor CESR, see e.g. Hupka (2009). For more information on the legal effects of guidelines and recommendations of ESMA, see e.g. Veil (2014), pp. 592 et seq.

  51. 51.

    See e.g. Sonder (2012), p. 9.

  52. 52.

    For more information on this with further references, see Sonder (2012), p. 9.

  53. 53.

    For more information on this with further references, see Rötting and Lang (2012), p. 10.

  54. 54.

    For more information on this, see Walla (2014), p. 47.

  55. 55.

    See Moloney (2011a), p. 64.

  56. 56.

    For more on this with reference to the Joint Statement of the European Parliament, Council and Commission on decentralized agencies of 12 June 2012, see Di Noia and Gargantini (2013), p. 11. The ESAs feature, however, on the Union’s list of decentralized agencies.

  57. 57.

    See CoJ, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 133 (Meroni I), and CoJ, Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 157 (Meroni II).

  58. 58.

    For more information on this with further references, see Moloney (2011a), pp. 73 et seq.

  59. 59.

    See Rötting and Lang (2012), p. 12.

  60. 60.

    See CoJ, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 150 (Meroni I); CoJ, Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 171 (Meroni II).

  61. 61.

    See CoJ, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 152 (Meroni I) and CoJ, Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 173 (Meroni II). For more information on this with further references, see Moloney (2011a), pp. 73 et seq.

  62. 62.

    See CoJ, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 152 (Meroni I) and CoJ, Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 173 (Meroni II).

  63. 63.

    For more information on this with further references, see Moloney (2011a), pp. 73 et seq.

  64. 64.

    CoJ, Case 98/80 Romano v INAMI, ECR 1981, p. 1241 (Romano), para 20.

  65. 65.

    For more information on the agency model at Union level, see e.g. Majone and Everson (2001).

  66. 66.

    For more information on this with further references, see Moloney (2011a), pp. 73 et seq.

  67. 67.

    For more information on this with further references, see Moloney (2011a), p. 66.

  68. 68.

    See also Rötting and Lang (2012), p. 12.

  69. 69.

    See further above in this Sect. 3.1.

  70. 70.

    See further above in this Sect. 3.1.

  71. 71.

    For more information on this regarding the ESAs in general with further references, see Rötting and Lang (2012), pp. 12 et seq.

  72. 72.

    Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, OJ L 86/1 (2012).

  73. 73.

    CoJ, Case 270/12 UK v European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 22 January 2014, paras 53 et seq. and 117. For more information on the relevant opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, see e.g. Orator (2013). See also the case comment by Marjosola (2014).

  74. 74.

    The controversies surrounding such constitutional questions mark also their political importance.

  75. 75.

    For more information on this with further references, see Granner (2011), pp. 47 et seq.

  76. 76.

    See Sect. 3.1.

  77. 77.

    See e.g. Moloney (2011a), p. 73.

  78. 78.

    See Sect. 3 before Sect. 3.1.

  79. 79.

    See Sect. 3.1.

  80. 80.

    For an earlier view on this in context with ESMA’s supervisory role, see also Deipenbrock and Andenas (2012), pp. 12 et seq.

  81. 81.

    For more information on an assessment of the ESAs’ accountability and independence, see Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 18 et seq.

  82. 82.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, p. 3.

  83. 83.

    See CoJ, Case 9/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 133 (Meroni I), and CoJ, Case 10/56 Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 157 (Meroni II).

  84. 84.

    Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU of 25 February 2009.

  85. 85.

    For more information on earlier contributions on accountability in the European context, see Chalmers and Tomkins (2007), p. 312.

  86. 86.

    For more information on this with further references in context with the accountability within the Single Supervisory Mechanism, see e.g. Ter Kuile et al. (2015), pp. 157 et seq.

  87. 87.

    See e.g. Amtenbrink (1999).

  88. 88.

    For more information on the German Federal Constitutional Court and European integration, see Huber (2015), pp. 94 et seq.

  89. 89.

    See partly also e.g. Chalmers and Tomkins (2007), p. 314.

  90. 90.

    See Sect. 3.2.2.

  91. 91.

    For more information on this requirement for the ESFS and its bodies in general, see Report of the High-Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU of 25 February 2009, p. 47. See also with a view to ESMA’s supervisory role as regards credit rating agencies, Deipenbrock and Andenas (2012), pp. 12 et seq.

  92. 92.

    See Articles 42, 46, 49 and 52 of the ESMA Regulation.

  93. 93.

    See e.g. Deipenbrock (2011a), p. 1833.

  94. 94.

    See e.g. Deipenbrock (2011a), p. 1833.

  95. 95.

    This criticism was voiced in a public consultation conducted by the Commission in 2013. For more information on this, see Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 2 and 19.

  96. 96.

    For more information on this with further references, see Walla (2013b), p. 113.

  97. 97.

    For more information on this with further references, see e.g. Veil (2014), pp. 561 et seq.

  98. 98.

    This criticism was voiced in a public consultation conducted by the Commission in 2013. For more information on this, see Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 2 and 19.

  99. 99.

    This criticism was voiced in a public consultation conducted by the Commission in 2013. For more information on this, see Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 2 and 19.

  100. 100.

    See Sect. 4.

  101. 101.

    See Sect. 3.1.

  102. 102.

    See Sect. 3.1.

  103. 103.

    For more information on this, see Walla (2014), p. 45.

  104. 104.

    For a concise overview on the European supervision of the credit rating sector, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2014b).

  105. 105.

    For more information on the Final Annual Accounts of ESMA, see e.g. Final Annual Accounts of the European Securities and Markets Authority, financial year 2013, ESMA/2014/1089 of 15 June 2014 and ESMA’s Report on Budgetary and Financial Management, financial year 2013, ESMA/2014/1090 of 15 June 2014.

  106. 106.

    This criticism was voiced in a public consultation conducted by the Commission in 2013. For more information on this, see Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 2 and 19 et seq.

  107. 107.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, p. 2. See also the letter of the three ESAs to the President ECOFIN, ESAs 2014-41 of 5 November 2014.

  108. 108.

    Deipenbrock (2014b), p. 10. See also Deipenbrock (2014a), p. 213.

  109. 109.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, pp. 7 et seq.

  110. 110.

    For more information on this from the German constitutional perspective on European integration, see Huber (2015), pp. 88 et seq.

  111. 111.

    These annual reports are available at www.esma.europa.eu.

  112. 112.

    See also Siekmann (2010b), p. 39.

  113. 113.

    For more information on this, see e.g. Chalmers and Tomkins (2007), pp. 317 et seq.

  114. 114.

    Details are available at www.esma.europa.eu.

  115. 115.

    ESMA’s interaction e.g. with its stakeholders and the other ESAs might also be viewed through the accountability lens.

  116. 116.

    For more information on the concept of accountability, see e.g. Chalmers and Tomkins (2007), p. 313.

  117. 117.

    For more information on this, see Häde (2011), p. 665.

  118. 118.

    For more information on the liability of the German competent authority, the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), see e.g. Walla (2012), pp. 117 et seq.

  119. 119.

    For more information on this, see Hitzer and Hauser (2015), p. 59.

  120. 120.

    For more information on this with further references, see Moloney (2010), p. 1345.

  121. 121.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, p. 2.

  122. 122.

    For more information on this, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2014a).

  123. 123.

    ESMA became also responsible for supervising Trade Repositories active in the Union. Trade Repositories collect and store post-trade information on derivative transactions aiming at providing transparency and at enabling regulators to better identify possible risks stemming from derivative trading. For more information on this, see e.g. Annual Report of ESMA 2013, p. 31.

  124. 124.

    See Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, p. 5.

  125. 125.

    See Commission Staff Working Document, accompanying the Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), SWD (2014) 261 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 6 et seq.

  126. 126.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, p. 5.

  127. 127.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, Annex 1, p. 1.

  128. 128.

    Such information is available at www.esma.europa.eu.

  129. 129.

    In the Commission’s view, guidelines and recommendations should be subject to review under Article 263 (1) of the TFEU to the extent they are intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties. See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, pp. 5 et seq.

  130. 130.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the operation of the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) and the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS), COM (2014) 509 final of 8 August 2014, p. 5.

  131. 131.

    See Sect. 3.2.1.

  132. 132.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, pp. 7 et seq.

  133. 133.

    For more information on this, see e.g. Deipenbrock (2014a).

  134. 134.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, p. 17.

  135. 135.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, pp. 7 et seq.

  136. 136.

    See ESMA’s 2015 Work Programme, ESMA/2014/1200 rev of 18 February 2015, p. 7.

  137. 137.

    For more information on the pillars of a legal framework of the CMU already shaped by European capital markets law, see e.g. Veil (2014), pp. 546 et seq. and 576.

  138. 138.

    See also e.g. Veil (2014), p. 600.

  139. 139.

    For more information on the developing lines of European capital markets law in general, see e.g. Wilhelmi (2014), in particular pp. 700 et seq. For ESMA’s view, see e.g. a speech of Steven Maijoor on regulatory measures to prevent another crisis, ESMA/2014/1382 of 19 November 2014, pp. 3 et seq.

  140. 140.

    See e.g. Veil (2014), p. 547. See e.g. Wilhelmi (2014), p. 702.

  141. 141.

    See e.g. the European regulations on credit rating agencies.

  142. 142.

    See e.g. Veil (2013b), p. 71; Buck-Heeb (2014), p. 10.

  143. 143.

    See e.g. Veil (2014), pp. 545 et seq.

  144. 144.

    See Sect. 3.

  145. 145.

    See for an earlier assessment e.g. Moloney (2010), pp. 1320 et seq.

  146. 146.

    See also e.g. Wilhelmi (2014), p. 701.

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  1. HTW Berlin, University of Applied Sciences, Berlin, Germany

    Gudula Deipenbrock

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Mads Andenas

  2. HTW Berlin University of Applied Sciences, Berlin, Germany

    Gudula Deipenbrock

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Deipenbrock, G. (2016). The European Securities and Markets Authority and Its Regulatory Mission: A Plea for Steering a Middle Course. In: Andenas, M., Deipenbrock, G. (eds) Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32174-5_2

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