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Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets pp 299–336Cite as

The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): Selected Institutional Aspects and Liability Issues

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Abstract

In its role of supervisory authority the ECB enjoys no limitation of liability. This approach is unjustified in the light of the 2012 Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and it is also inconsistent with the unitariness of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). Within the SSM the ECB and the National Competent Authorities (NCAs) are vested with the same supervisory powers, allocated according to the criteria laid down under the SSM Regulation. In this regard it is expected that both the ECB and the NCAs will be subject to the same liability regime.

A limitation of the ECB’s liability should be inferred from the Member States’ legislations on the legal protections of supervisors or from the case law of the CJEU and the “sufficiently serious violation” criterion therein.

The ECB’s liability is without prejudice to that of the NCAs. The allocation of liability within the SSM basically depends upon the allocation of supervisory tasks and powers to the ECB and the NCAs. Nevertheless, there are cases where the allocation of tasks and powers is unclear.

In other cases, the ECB is the competent authority, but only the NCAs have the power to act. To the extent that the ECB has the power to give NCAs mandatory instructions liability lies basically with the ECB and not with the NCAs.

The ECB shall make good any damage caused to third parties by its staff and the members of its bodies. Both of them enjoy the immunities under Protocol 7 on the privileges and immunities of the EU, but may be sued for damages by the ECB to recover the costs it has to pay to third parties.

The Author is a lawyer of the Bank of Italy. The views expressed by the Author are his own and do not represent those of the Bank of Italy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Sect. 1.7 of the Opinion.

  2. 2.

    O.J. 2013, L 287/63.

  3. 3.

    As regards to EBA see Article 67 of Regulation No 1093/2010 (O.J. 2010, L 331/12) as amended by Regulation No 1022/2013 (O.J., 2013, L 287/5).

  4. 4.

    Regulation No 1060/2009 (O.J. 2009, L 30271) as amended by Regulation 513/2011 (O.J. 2011, L 145/30) and by Regulation 462/2013 (O.J. 2013, L 146/1).

  5. 5.

    See Regulation No 648/2012 (O.J. 2012, L 201/1) on OCT derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories (Articles 54 ff.), Regulation No 236/2012 (O.J. 2012, L 86/1) on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps (Article 28), Regulation No 600/2014 (so-called MIFIR; O.J. 2014, L 173/84) on markets in financial instruments and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (Articles 46–49 on the provision of investments services and the performance of investment activities by third country firms).

  6. 6.

    See Articles 9(5), 17(3), 18(4) and 19(4) of the EBA Regulation and the corresponding provisions of the other ESAs Regulations.

  7. 7.

    See Craig (2012), p. 150.

  8. 8.

    See ECJ, Case C-9/56, Meroni v High Authority, ECR 1957–1958, p. 133; Case C-98/80, Romano v Institut National d’Assurance ECR 1981, p. 01241; Joined cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural Health and others v. Secretary of State for Health, ECR 2005, p. I-645; United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. European Parliament and Council of the European Union, Case C-270/1222, §§ 44–54, electronic Reports of Cases (Court Reports—general).

  9. 9.

    On limitations of supervisors’ liability within Member States see: Nolan (2013), pp. 2 ff.; Dijkstra (2012), pp. 3 ff.; Athanassiou (2011), p. 12; D’Ambrosio (2008), pp. 249 ff.; Tison (2003), p. 11; Andenas (2002), pp. 411 ff.; Andenas and Fairgrieve (1998), 285 ff.

  10. 10.

    See Tridimas (2006), p. 478.

  11. 11.

    See Tridimas (2006), p. 478; see also Gaja (1986), pp. 542–544. In the same vein see the opinion of the Advocate-General Gand in Joined Cases 5, 7 and 13 to 24/66, Firma Kampffmeyer and other v. Commission, § II.1, ECR 1967, p. 320.

  12. 12.

    See Nolan (2013), pp. 195–196.

  13. 13.

    For an overview of the supervisors’ liability regimes across EU Member States see Dijkstra (2012).

  14. 14.

    Angeletti (1997), pp. 223 ff.

  15. 15.

    The requirement of sufficient proximity between the claimant and the wrongdoer is, in common law, tantamount to the German Schutznormtheorie.

  16. 16.

    See Andenas (2002), p. 525, footnote no 136.

  17. 17.

    See cases Wetterstein and Herstatt, in BGHZ, 74, pp. 144 ff., and 75, pp. 120 ff. See Hüpkes (2000), pp. 123–138.

  18. 18.

    See Andenas and Fairgrieve (2002), pp. 757 ff.

  19. 19.

    Section 4(4) stipulates that “the Federal Financial Services Authority exercises its tasks and competences only in the public interest”.

  20. 20.

    See Section 1(1) of the Amtshaftungsgesetz (the Public Liability Act: AHG).

  21. 21.

    See Section 19.

  22. 22.

    See McLean (1998), pp. 442 ff. and, in case law, Yuen Ku Yeu v. Attorney General of Hong Kong, WLR, 1987, 3, 776 ff.

  23. 23.

    See Schedule 1ZA, Section 30.

  24. 24.

    See Rossi (2003), pp. 650–651.

  25. 25.

    See Yuen Ku Yeu v. Attorney General of Hong Kong, WLR, 1987, pp. 785–787.

  26. 26.

    See United States v. Gaubert, 1991 [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537, 2001 SCC 79. See also Yuen Ku Yeu v. Attorney General of Hong Kong, WLR¸ 1987, p. 786 and Davis and other v. Radcliffe, 1990, in All.E.R., 1990, p. 536.

  27. 27.

    See Davis and other v. Radcliffe, quoted under footnote no 26.

  28. 28.

    See Caranta (1993), Milan, p. 543.

  29. 29.

    See Sect. 1.4.

  30. 30.

    See House of Lords, Three Rivers District Council and others v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England, WLR, 2000, 2 and UKHL, 2001, 16. In the literature see Andenas (2000), pp. 394–395.

  31. 31.

    See Andenas (2002), p. 519.

  32. 32.

    See Andenas (2002), pp. 519–522.

  33. 33.

    See High Court, McMahon v. Ireland, the Attorney General and the Registrar of Friendly Societies I.L.R.M. 1998 610 that explicitly followed the advice in Yuen-Kun-Yeu v. Attorney General of Hong-Kong.

  34. 34.

    See Section 33AJ of the Central Bank Act 1942 updated to 22 February 2013.

  35. 35.

    See High Court, July 23, 1984, Corliss v. Ireland, unreported.

  36. 36.

    See Conseil d’Etat 28 June 1963, Sieur Bapst, Recueil, 1963 411.

  37. 37.

    Fairgrieve and Belloir (1999), pp. 17 ff. Besides the supervisory powers, the French prudential authority is also vested with sanctioning powers. These latter were tantamount to judiciary powers. As a consequence of that, under a first stance of Conseil d’Etat case law, they did not raise to the State’s liability (Conseil d’Etat 28 June 1963, Sieur Baptst, Recueil, 1963, 412). As from Darmant case, the Conseil d’Etat applied to these “quasi-judiciary powers” the faute lourde rule: Conseil d’Etat 29 December 1978, Darmont, Recueil, 1978, 542. Besides the judgments above, see also: Conseil d’Etat, 4 January 1952, Pourcelet, Recueil, 1952, 4; Cour Administrative d’Appel de Lyon, 28 December 1990, Recueil, 1990, 963; Conseil d’Etat 12 October 1983, Consort Levy, Recueil, 1983,406 and Dalloz 1985 Informations Rapide, 203.

  38. 38.

    See Conseil d’Etat, 28 June 1963, Sieur d’André, Recueil, 1964, 329. See Fairgrieve and Belloir (1999), pp. 16 ff. Subsequent cases underline this requirement. See Conseil d’Etat, 29 December 1978, Recueil, 1978, 542; Tribunal Administratif de Marseille, 1 December 1998, Fauvry, JCP Edition Entreprise, 1989, II, 15480.

  39. 39.

    See Cliquennois (1995), pp. 4 ff.

  40. 40.

    See Conseil d’Etat, 24 January 1964, Achard, Recueil, 1964, 43.

  41. 41.

    See Cour Administrative d’Appel de Paris, 30 March 1999, El Shikh, AJDA, 1999/11, 951 and Cour Administrative d’Appel, 25 January 2000, Kechichian, unreported.

  42. 42.

    See Conseil d’Etat, 30 November 2001, Kechichian, Juris-Classeur Périodique, 2002, édition Générale., II, No. 10042.

  43. 43.

    See Article 2043 of the Italian Civil Code which foresees that “any wilful or negligent act that causes an unjustified damage to another obliges the person who has committed the act to pay damages”.

  44. 44.

    See the judgment no 3132 of 2001 (case Hotel Villaggio Santa Teresa di Gallura), in Foro it., 2001, I, c. 1139.

  45. 45.

    In the same vein see Rossi (2003), p. 663.

  46. 46.

    Nolan (2013), pp. 2 ff. For an analysis of hurdles claimants may incur where relying upon the tort of negligence rather than to that of misfeasance in public office see Andenas (2002), pp. 529–531.

  47. 47.

    See cases referred to under footnote no 25.

  48. 48.

    See the Conseil d’Etat’s case law under footnote no 37.

  49. 49.

    See Nolan (2013), pp. 212–213.

  50. 50.

    See House of Lords, Gorringe v Calderdale MBC, WLR, 2004, 1, p. 1057. See Nolan (2013), p. 213.

  51. 51.

    See Yuen Kun Yeu, 1987, WLR, 1987, p. 786, and Davis v. Radcliffe in All.E.R., 1990, p. 541.

  52. 52.

    See Yuen Ku Yeu v. Attorney General of Hong Kong, 1987, Davis and other v. Radcliffe, 1990 and United States v. Gaubert, 1991 quoted under footnote no 26.

  53. 53.

    French case law is here worth mentioning. See CAA Paris, El Shikh case, AJDA, 1999/11, 952, and Kechichian case of 25 January 2000.

  54. 54.

    See D’Ambrosio (2008), pp. 297–301. See also Athanassiou (2011), pp. 26–27.

  55. 55.

    See ECtHR, Golder v. UK, 21 February 1975, Appl. no. 4451/70, § 36, [1975] 1 EHRR 524.

  56. 56.

    See ECtHR, Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, (87/1997/871/1083), §139, [1998] EHRR 101.

  57. 57.

    See ECtHR, Z and others v. UK, 10 May 2001, Appl. no. 29392/95, § 87, [2001] EHRR 5.

  58. 58.

    See Athanassiou (2011), pp. 27–28.

  59. 59.

    See D’Ambrosio (2008), pp. 286–297; and Athanassiou (2011), pp. 22–26.

  60. 60.

    ECJ, Case C-222/02, Peter Paul and others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECR 2004 I-09425.

  61. 61.

    See footnote no 30.

  62. 62.

    Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes (O.J. 2014, L 173/149).

  63. 63.

    Regulations on ESA include the protection of depositors and investors in the main tasks of financial supervisory authorities as it emerges from: (i) Article 1, paragraph 5, let. f; (ii) Article 8.1, lit. h; (iii) Article 9, paragraph 1; (iv) Article 26.

  64. 64.

    See Article 5, paragraph 1, of Directive n. 2003/71/EU (O.J. 2003, L 345/64) on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading. See also the Directive 2004/39/EU on markets in financial instruments (the so-called MIFID1; O.J. 2004, L 145/1): Recitals 17, 26, 31, 44 and 61 and Articles 11, 13, paragraphs 3, 6 and 8, 18, 19 ff. The corresponding new provisions contained in the Directive 2014/65/EU (the so-called MIFID2; O.J. 2014, L 173/349) show the same rationale: see, among the others, Recitals No 3, 4, 39, 42, 45, 51, 74, 77, 86, 87 and 151, and Articles 16(3), (8) and (9), 23, 34–30, 74(2) and 75. In case law see ECJ, Case C-604/11, Genil 48 SL v Bankinter, 2013, WLR, § 39 and Case C-248/11, § 48, Nilaş and Others, European Criminal Law, 2013, 3, 257.

  65. 65.

    See ECJ, Joined Cases C-6 and C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, ECR 1991 I-5375, and Joined Cases C-178, C-179, C-188-90/94, Dillenkofer and Others v. Federal Republic of Germany, ECR 1996 I-4845.

  66. 66.

    See Sect. 1.6.

  67. 67.

    See Andenas (2002), p. 521.

  68. 68.

    See Andenas (2002), p. 529.

  69. 69.

    See ECJ, Case C-5/71, Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council ECR, 1971, 975.

  70. 70.

    See ECJ, Case C-352/98, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergaderm SA v. Commission of the European Communities, §§ 39–47, ECR 2000 I-2591.

  71. 71.

    This criterion has been followed by the ECJ starting from the Bergaderm case. See Tridimas (2006), p. 478.

  72. 72.

    See Tison (2004), p. 8.

  73. 73.

    See Tridimas (2006), p. 492.

  74. 74.

    See CFI, Joined Cases T-198/95, T-171/96, T-230/97, T-174/98 and T-225/99, Comafrica and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v. Commission, § 149, ECR 2001 II-1975.

  75. 75.

    See Sect. 2.

  76. 76.

    For further details see Sect. 2.3.

  77. 77.

    For further details see Sect. 2.3.

  78. 78.

    For further details see Sect. 2.5.

  79. 79.

    For further details see Sect. 2.5.

  80. 80.

    Recital 47 stipulates that “the ECB and the national competent authorities should have access to the same information without credit institutions being subject to double reporting requirements”.

  81. 81.

    See Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, §§ 56–57.

  82. 82.

    See Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, § 57.

  83. 83.

    Under Article 2, No (1) “‘participating Member State’ means a Member State whose currency is the euro or a Member State whose currency is not the euro which has established a close cooperation in accordance with Article 7”.

  84. 84.

    Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 (O.J. 2014, L 14171) of the ECB establishing a framework for the cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and the national competent authorities and national designated authorities.

  85. 85.

    Besides the Recitals 28 and 37 mentioned in the text, see also Recital 79 and SSMR. This latter suggests the idea that ECB would be only entitled to require an NCA to involve staff members of another NCA as well as to establish arrangements with NCAs to ensure an appropriate exchange and secondment of staff with and among the NCAs.

  86. 86.

    See Sect. 3.2.

  87. 87.

    Not surprisingly, the ECB’s banking license will cover neither the investment services activity nor other credit institutions activities in relation to the market of financial services.

  88. 88.

    See in the literature Lackhoff (2013), 454 ff.

  89. 89.

    Under Article 68 SSMFR ECB is not obliged to accept to take over the direct supervision of a less significant credit institution upon the NCA request.

  90. 90.

    See Recital 20 SSMR.

  91. 91.

    See Sect. 1.7.

  92. 92.

    See Napoletano (2014), pp. 185–197.

  93. 93.

    See Regulation No 1092/2010 (O.J. 2010, L 331/1) on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB).

  94. 94.

    See Lackhoff (2014), p. 21, footnote no 60.

  95. 95.

    Measures are limited to members of a credit institution management board or to any other individuals who under national law are responsible for a breach by a credit institution.

  96. 96.

    See French Conseil d’Etat 13 June 1964, d’André, La Semaine Juridique, 1965, Edition Générale, II, No 14416 and 19 January 1966, de Waligorski, La Semaine Juridique, 1966, Edition Générale, II, No. 14526.

  97. 97.

    This may be inferred a contrario from the French Conseil d’Etat judgement in the case Sieur D’André quoted in footnote no 38. See also, though in the different field of securities regulation, the Italian Corte di Cassazione, case Hotel Villaggio Santa Teresa di Gallura quoted in footnote no 44.

  98. 98.

    See French Conseil d’Etat, case Achard, quoted in footnote no 40.

  99. 99.

    See French Conseil d’Etat, case Kechichian, quoted in footnote no 42.

  100. 100.

    See D’Ambrosio (2012), p. 55.

  101. 101.

    See ECJ, Case C-175/84 Krohn&Co Import Export (Gmbh & Co KG) v Commission, ECR, 1986, 753.

  102. 102.

    See the Case Krohn quoted under footnote no. 101, § 23.

  103. 103.

    ECJ, Joined Cases 5, 7 and 13-24/66, Kampffmeyer and Others v. Commission ECR 1967 245.

  104. 104.

    In Unifrex, the EU Court referred to the need to exhaust national remedies where those remedies give effective protection to the individuals concerned and are capable of leading to compensation for the damage alleged. See ECJ, Case C-281/82, Unifrex v. Commission and Council, §§ 11–12, ECR 1984.

  105. 105.

    See ECJ, Case C-201/89, Le Pen and le Front national v. Puhl and others, §§ 12–15, ECR 1990 I-01183.

  106. 106.

    See ECJ, Case 9/69 Sayag and AG Zürich v Leduc and others, § 7, ECR 1969 329.

  107. 107.

    See Article 11(a) [former Article 12(a)] of the Protocol on the privileges and immunities of the European Union in the territory of each Member State.

  108. 108.

    Case 5/68 Sayag and AG Zürich v Leduc and others, ECR, English special edition, 1968 00395 and Case 9/69 Sayag and AG Zürich v Leduc and others, quoted under footnote no 106.

  109. 109.

    See Gruber and Benisch (2007), pp. 25–26.

  110. 110.

    See Gruber and Benisch (2007), p. 7. See Case C-2/88 J. J. Zwartveld and Others v Commission, § 19, ECR, 1990, I 3367.

  111. 111.

    See also the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A Roadmap towards a Banking Union, § 3.1, p. 8.

  112. 112.

    See Article 13 k, paragraph 1, of the ECB decision of 22 January 2014 (O.J. 2014 L 95/56) amending Decision ECB/2004/2 of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (O.J. 2004, L 080/33) (hereinafter ECB RoP), “the ECB shall carry out the tasks conferred on it by Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 without prejudice to and separately from its tasks relating to monetary policy and from any other tasks”.

  113. 113.

    See Wymeersch (2014), pp. 55–56.

  114. 114.

    See CFI, Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-137/00 and T-141/00, Artegodan GmbH and Others v Commission of the European Communities, § 197, ECR 2002, II-4945.

  115. 115.

    See the Chapter IVa of the ECB RoP.

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Acknowledgment

The author gratefully acknowledges suggestions from Marco Giornetti.

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    Raffaele D’Ambrosio

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway

    Mads Andenas

  2. HTW Berlin University of Applied Sciences, Berlin, Germany

    Gudula Deipenbrock

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D’Ambrosio, R. (2016). The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM): Selected Institutional Aspects and Liability Issues. In: Andenas, M., Deipenbrock, G. (eds) Regulating and Supervising European Financial Markets. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32174-5_13

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