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A Critical Overview of Biological Functions pp 1–15Cite as

What Is a Theory of Function Supposed to Do?

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Abstract

Biological functions are central to several debates in science and philosophy. In science, they play a role in debates in genetics, neuroscience, biomedicine, and ecology. In philosophy, they play a role in debates about the nature of teleological reasoning, biological information, trait classification, normativity, meaning and mental representation, health, disease, and the nature of artifacts. Yet philosophers and scientists disagree about what biological functions are, or whether there are different kinds of functions. One problem is that they do not agree about what, precisely, a philosophical theory of biological function is supposed to be or to do. I begin this chapter by discussing why functions matter to philosophy and science. I lay out three very traditional desiderata for a theory of function: namely, that the theory account for the function/accident distinction and the explanatory and normative features of function. I review three main approaches to thinking about what a theory of function should be: a conceptual analysis, a theoretical definition, and a Carnapian-style explication. I argue that it does not matter which one we accept so long as we agree that a theory of function should be reasonably constrained by actual biological usage.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Form and function [Editorial] Nature 495: 141–142 (March 14, 2013).

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Hunter College of the City University of New York, New York, NY, USA

    Justin Garson

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Garson, J. (2016). What Is a Theory of Function Supposed to Do?. In: A Critical Overview of Biological Functions. SpringerBriefs in Philosophy(). Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32020-5_1

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