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Carbon Leakages: A General Equilibrium View

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The Economics of the Global Environment

Part of the book series: Studies in Economic Theory ((ECON.THEORY,volume 29))

Abstract

The effectiveness of unilateral action to curb carbon emissions has been dismissed because of possible “carbon leakages”, this referring to the rise of emissions in non-participating countries. This paper offers a general equilibrium (GE) exploration of the key mechanisms and factors underlying the size of carbon leakages. We developed a two-region, two-goods simplified GE framework, incorporating three types of fossil fuels (coal, oil and low-carbon energy), international trade and capital mobility. The model was designed to make tractable extensive multidimensional sensitivity analysis. The results suggest that the coal supply elasticity plays a critical role, while substitution elasticities between traded goods and international capital mobility appear relatively less influential. The shape of the production function also matters for the size of the leakages. Confirming the results obtained with large computable GE models, for a wide range of parameters’ values carbon leakages appear to be small. Therefore, the argument that unilateral carbon abatement action taken by a large group of countries (such as the Annex 1 group) is flawed by significant carbon leakages is not supported by our sensitivity analysis. The likelihood of small leakages favours in fact the formation of a worldwide coalition to stabilise climate change.

The authors want to thank Graciela Chichilnisky, Jorgen Elmeskov, Peter Sturm and late Alan Manne for discussions and comments on early versions of this work. Anonymous referees also provided very useful suggestions. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD or its Member countries.

Reprinted with kind permission from the Authors: Originally published in Economic Theory, Volume 49, Number 2, February 2012.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Using the OECD ENV-Linkages model (see Burniaux and Chateau 2008).

  2. 2.

    The literature based on game theory shows that a high leakage rate reduces the size of a stable, self reinforcing coalition to reduce emissions (see, for instance, Carraro 1998; Botteon and Carraro 2001).

  3. 3.

    Using the OECD GREEN model (see Burniaux et al. 1992).

  4. 4.

    This article is part of a Special Issue of Economic Theory on the topic of the Global Environment, which includes also the following articles: “Unspoken Ethical Issues in the Climate Affair Insights From a Theoretical Analysis of Negotiation Mandates” by Lecocq and Hourcade, “Intergenerational equity, efficiency, and constructability” by Lauwers, “Detrimental Externalities, Pollution Rights, and the “Coase Theorem” by Chipman and Tian, “Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales?” by Ostrom, “Capital Growth in a Global Warming Model: Will China and India Sign a Climate Treaty?” by Dutta and Radner, “Taxes Versus Quantities for a Stock Pollutant with Endogenous Abatement Costs and Asymmetric Information” by Karp and Zhang, Sustainable recursive social welfare functions” by Asheim, Mitra, and Tungodden, “Sustainable Markets with Short Sales” by Chichilnisky, and “Sustainable Exploitation of a Natural Resource: A Satisfying Use Of Chichilnisky Criterion” by Figuières and Tidball.

  5. 5.

    This insight was put forward by Chichilnisky and Heal (1994).

  6. 6.

    High transportation costs, lack of infrastructure and other technical aspects have so far contributed to restrict coal trading to a fraction of the world coal production. Nonetheless, Light et al. (1999) argue that the international coal market is actually more integrated than it appears. More research would be needed to assess empirically this question. However, the analysis developed below shows that this result actually only holds for a narrow range of values of the coal supply elasticity. In other words, even if coal is treated as an homogenous commodity, a relatively elastic supply of coal still leads to low leakage rates.

  7. 7.

    Shale oil extraction for unconventional oil production would be even more carbon-intensive, although its scope has remained limited.

  8. 8.

    Note that the analysis of Light et al. (1999) was based on the assumption of a very inelastic coal supply (elasticity equal to 0.5). This assumption alone rules out the possibility of negative leakages.

  9. 9.

    This aspect has been somewhat overlooked, a significant exception being the G-Cubed model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen 1995).

  10. 10.

    For a discussion related to carbon abatement modelling, see Oliveira Martins and Sturm (2000).

  11. 11.

    Based on a usual linearisation procedure of CES functions, see for example Dixon et al. (1992).

  12. 12.

    The OECD GREEN Model was based on the GTAP-E data base for the year 1995 (see Hertel 1997). We could have calibrated the model with more recent data (using for example the OECD ENV-Linkages Model database), but preferred to stick with the 1995 database given that our simplified GE model uses GREEN as a benchmark. Given that this paper mainly focus on the general equilibrium mechanisms rather than an estimate of the leakage rate by itself, the flavour of the results would not have changed qualitatively.

  13. 13.

    In principle, given that our model is specified in a linearised growth rate form (see Annex) it should be possible to compute algebraically the functional form of the leakage rate as a function of the key parameters. However, even this simple model turned out to be too complicated to be solved algebraically. The calculations were carried out with Mathematica (Wolfram 2003) and further details can be supplied upon request.

  14. 14.

    Noteworthy, while the average leakage rate remains modest, the marginal leakage rates (or the incremental changes in the leakage rates) can be rather large. Important also to note, an optimal carbon tax depends on the marginal leakage rate and not on its absolute level (see Oliveira Martins 1995, footnote 11).

  15. 15.

    The standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade assumes that goods from different origins are homogeneous (infinite elasticity of substitution).

  16. 16.

    To simplify, the values of the supply elasticities are set equal in Annex-1 and non-Annex 1 regions.

  17. 17.

    Note that the marginal leakage rate can be quite large. For instance, with a supply elasticity of coal equal to 10, the leakage rate would almost double (from 3 to 5 %) when the trade elasticity increases from 0 to 100.

  18. 18.

    See Beck et al. 1991, p. 39.

  19. 19.

    This is an approximation, as the Mellish (1998) model has not been originally set up to estimate the supply response as a function of the price, but the reverse. However, given the large R2 of the equation both the direct and inverse specification of the supply elasticity should produce comparable results.

  20. 20.

    The joint sensitivity analysis with the coal supply elasticity was less interesting as the results would be anyhow dominated by the former parameter.

  21. 21.

    See Burniaux et al. (1992) for a literature review of estimated elasticity values.

  22. 22.

    Note that, according to Fig. 6b, a value of 2 of the inter-factor substitution elasticity would generate a leakage rate equal to almost 10 % (against 2 % with an elasticity value of 0.4).

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Correspondence to Joaquim Oliveira Martins .

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Annex: Specification of the GE Model

Annex: Specification of the GE Model

This annex provides the list of variables (Table 2), parameters (Table 3) and equations (below) of the simplified GE model used in the paper. All equations are expressed in a linearised growth rate form and variables in per cent changes, except the carbon tax, the price levels and carbon emissions in the base period (the level variables are in bold). The acronym ‘nC’ stands for low-Carbon Energy.

Table 2 List of variables of the GE model
Table 3 List of parameters of the GE model

Energy supply

$$ S_{j.r} = \varepsilon_{j.r} \cdot (P_{j.r} - PVA_{r} ),\quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal}},{\text{oil,}}\;{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(1)

Inter-regional capital allocation

$$ SK_{r} = \text{mig} \cdot (r_{r} - r)\quad \text{with}\quad r = \sum\limits_{r} {shk_{r} \cdot r_{r} } \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(2)

Consumer prices of energy (including the carbon tax).Domestic price

$$ \begin{aligned} Pd_{j.r} & = \left[ {\frac{{{\mathbf{Pd}}_{j.r}^{0} \cdot (1 + P_{j.r} ) + \gamma_{j.r} \cdot {\mathbf{CT}}_{r} }}{{{\mathbf{Pd}}_{j.r}^{0} }}} \right] - 1 \\ & \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\,{\text{oil,}}\;{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}}\text{-}\text{Annex1}. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(3)

Import price

$$ \begin{aligned} Pm_{j.r} & = \left[ {\frac{{{\mathbf{Pd}}_{j.r}^{0} \cdot (1 + P_{j.r^{\prime}}) + \gamma_{j.r} \cdot {\mathbf{CT}}_{r} }}{{{\mathbf{Pd}}_{j.r}^{0} }}} \right] - 1 \\ & \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\;{\text{oil}};\;r,\;r^{\prime } = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}}\text{-}{\text{Annex1}}\quad \text{and}\;r \ne r^{\prime } . \\ & \quad \text{Note}\;\text{that}\;\text{for}\;{\text{oil}}:P_\text{oil.Annex1} = P_{\text{oil.non}\text{-}{Annex1}} \quad \text{and}\;Pd_{{\text{oil}.r}} = Pm_{{\text{oil}.r}} . \\ \end{aligned} $$
(4)

Composite energy prices

$$ \begin{aligned} PC_{j.r} & = \alpha d{}_{j.r}\,.\,Pd_{j.r} + \alpha m_{j.r} \,.\,Pm_{j.r} \\ & \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\;{\text{oil}},\,{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. \\ & \quad \text{Note}\;\text{that}\;\text{for}\;{\text{nC}}:\;PC_{nC.r} = Pd{}_{nC.r} \\ \end{aligned} $$
(5)
$$ PE_{r} = \sum\limits_{j} {\alpha_{j.r} \cdot PC_{j.r} \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\,{\text{oil}},\,{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}} $$
(6)

Composite factor prices

$$ PVA_{r} = \alpha L_{r} .w_{r} + \alpha K_{r} .r_{r} \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(7)

Producer price of the non-Energy good

$$ P_{r} = \alpha E_{r} .PE_{r} + \alpha VA_{r} .PVA_{r} \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(8)

Consumption of the non-Energy good

$$ \begin{aligned} C_{{r,r^{{\prime }} }} & = - \sigma_{r} .P_{{r^{{\prime }} }} + (\sigma_{r} - 1) \cdot PC_{r} + Y_{r}\\ & \quad \text{for}\;r\;\text{and}\;r^{{\prime }} = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. \\ & \quad \text{and}\;\text{with}\;PC_{r} = \beta_{r.r} .P_{r} + \beta_{{r.r^{{\prime }} }} \,.\,P_{{r^{{\prime }} }} \\ \end{aligned} $$
(9)

Output of the non-Energy good

$$ X_{r} = \sum\limits_{{r^{\prime}}} {\delta_{{r.r^{\prime } }} \, \cdot \,C_{{r.r^{\prime } }} \text{for}\;r\;\text{and}\;r^{\prime } = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}}\text{-}{\text{Annex1}}.} $$
(10)

Total Energy demand

$$ E_{r} = - \kappa_{r} \,.\,PE_{r} + \kappa_{r} \,.\,P_{r} + X_{r} \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} $$
(11)

Total demand of the composite Factor (K, L)

$$ VA_{r} = - \kappa_{r} .PVA_{r} + \kappa_{r} \,.\,P_{r} + X_{r} \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} $$
(12)

Factor demands

$$ L_{r} = - w_{r} + PVA_{r} + VA_{r} \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} $$
(13a)
$$ K_{r} = - r_{r} + PVA_{r} + VA_{r} \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} $$
(13b)

Fuel specific demands

$$ \begin{aligned} E_{j.r} & = - \varphi_{r} \,.\,PC_{j.r} + \varphi_{r} \,.\,PE_{r} + E_{r} \\ & \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\,{\text{oil}},\,{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(14)

Demands for domestic and imported coal

$$ Ed_{{\text{coal}.r}} = - \sigma_{{\text{coal}.r}} \,.\,Pd_{{\text{coal}.r}} + \sigma_{{\text{coal}.r}} PC_{{\text{coal}.r}} + E_{{\text{coal}.r}} \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} . $$
(15a)
$$ Em_{{\text{coal}.r}} = - \sigma_{{\text{coal}.r}} \,.\,Pm_{{\text{coal}.r}} + \sigma_{{\text{coal}.r}} PC_{{\text{coal}.r}} + E_{{\text{coal}.r}} \quad \text{for}\;r = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} . $$
(15b)

Coal supply

$$ X_{{\text{coal}.r}} = shd_{{\text{coal}.r}} \,.\,Ed_{{\text{coal}.r}} + she_{{\text{coal}.r}} \,.\,Em_{{\text{coal}.r^{{\prime }} }} \quad \text{for}\;r \ne r^{{\prime }} = {\text{Annex1,}}\;{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(16)

World production of oil

$$ X_{\text{oil}} = \sum\limits_{r} {shd_{{\text{oil}.r}} } \,.\,E_{oil.r} \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(17)

Carbon emissions

$$ \begin{aligned} CEM_{r} = \sum\limits_{j} {\gamma_{j.r} \,.\,\chi_{j.r} \,.\,E_{j.r} } \\ & \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\,{\text{oil}},\,{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(18)

Carbon tax revenues (in percentage of base-year GDP)

$$ RCTAX_{r} = \frac{{(1 + CEM_{r} )\,.\,{\mathbf{CEM}}_{r}^{0} \,.\,{\mathbf{CT}}_{r} }}{{{\mathbf{Y}}_{r}^{0} }}\quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(19)

Regional incomes

$$ \begin{aligned} Y_{r} & = (shL_{r} \,.\,w_{r} ) + shK_{r} \,.\,(r_{r} + SK_{r} ) + \sum\limits_{j} {sh_{j.r} \,.\,(P_{j.r} + S_{j.r} )} + RCTAX_{r} \\ & \quad \text{for}\;j = {\text{coal,}}\,{\text{oil,}}\,{\text{nC}}\quad \text{and}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} \\ \end{aligned} $$
(20)

Market-clearing price of coal

$$ P_{{\text{coal}.r}} \quad \text{such}\;\text{as}\quad S_{coal.r} = E_{coal.r} \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(21)

Market-clearing international price of oil

$$ \begin{aligned} P_{\text{oil}} \quad \text{such}\;\text{as}\quad X_{\text{oil}} & = \sum\limits_{r} {shs_{{\text{oil}.r}} \,.\,S_{oil.r} \quad \text{and}\quad P_{oil.r} = P_{oil} } \\ & \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(22)

Market-clearing price of the low-carbon energy

$$ P_{nC.r} \quad \text{such}\;\text{as}\quad S_{nC.r} = E_{nC.r} \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}} . $$
(23)

Market-clearing price of labour

$$ w_{r} \quad \text{such}\;\text{as}\quad L_{r} = 0\quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(24)

Market-clearing price of Capital

$$ r_{r} \quad \text{such}\;\text{as}\quad K_{r} = SK_{r} \quad \text{for}\quad r = {\text{Annex1,}}\,{\text{non}\text{-}\text{Annex1}}. $$
(25)

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Burniaux, JM., Oliveira Martins, J. (2016). Carbon Leakages: A General Equilibrium View. In: Chichilnisky, G., Rezai, A. (eds) The Economics of the Global Environment. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31943-8_16

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