Abstract
Chichilnisky’s criterion for sustainability has the merit to be, so far, the unique explicit, complete and continuous social welfare criterion that combines successfully the requirement of efficiency with an instrumental notion of intergenerational equity (no dictatorship of the present and no dictatorhsip of the future). But it has one drawback: when applied in the context of renewable resources, and with a constant discount factor, there exists no exploitation path that maximizes this criterion. The present article suggests a way to cope with this problem. The idea is to restrict attention to the set of convex combinations between the optimal discounted utilitarian program and the stationary program leading to the green golden rule. It is shown that an optimal path in this set exists under rather weak sufficient conditions on the fundamentals of the problem. Some ethical properties of this approach are also discussed. In some cases, it turns out that the restricted solution implies no loss of efficiency and benefits intermediate and infinitely distant generations.
The authors would like to thank Hubert Stahn, Antoine Soubeyran, their collegues at LAMETA (in particular those of the PERENE team), the participants at the ISDG worshop in Segovia, September 2006, Gilles Rotillon, Katheline Schubert, Michel De Lara, Vincent Martinet and Luc Doyen, and Graciela Chichilnisky for interesting and helpful comments. Many thanks also to an anonymous referee for his/her constructive suggestions.
Originally published in Economic Theory, Volume 49, Number 2, February 2012 DOI 10.1007/ s00199-010-0573-7.
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- 1.
For other aspects, see Pezzey (1992).
- 2.
According to WP, an exploitation path should be deemed better than another if under the former all generations are strictly better-off. According to SP, an exploitation path should be deemed better than another if under the former all generations are better-off, with one generation at least being strictly better-off.
- 3.
This axioms requires that the evaluation of two streams of utilities which differ during only the first two periods not depend on what the common continuation stream is.
- 4.
When NDP, NDF, Pareto, linearity and completeness are required simultaneously, this is the only such criterion, or more precisely family of criterions. But other different possibilities appear if some of these conditions are relaxed. One may investigate, as Lauwers (2010), what maximal anonymity properties can be consistent with Pareto. On another hand, dropping Strong Pareto can end up to the recursive social welfare functions proposed by Asheim et al. (2010). Lastly, dropping linearity, Alvarez-Cuadrado and Ngo Van Long (2009) propose a weighted average of the maximin and the discounted utilitarian ordering, which they call MBR criterion (a shortcut for Mixed Bentham-Rawls).
- 5.
Li and Lofgren (2000) propose a foundation for the criterion with a decreasing discount factor, i.e. with individual variation in time preferences. They consider a society that consists of two individuals, an utilitarian and a conservationist. The utilitarian wants to maximize the discounted utilitarian criterion with constant discount. The conservationist wants to maximize the discounted utilitarian criterion with constant discount when this discount tends to zero. The society wants to maximize a convex combination of these criteria and end up with utilitarian criterion with a declining discount factor. The authors prove that the optimal solution exists and can be approximated by sequences. They characterize the steady state, that is the golden rule path, and prove that both, social and conservationist optimal solution, converge to the golden rule path. In particular the social optimal consumption is between the optimal utilitarian and optimal conservationist consumptions.
- 6.
Though in the case of an exhaustible resource, an optimal solution generally exists; see Chichilnisky (1997), Sect. 5.B, or Heal (1998), Chap. 6. With renewable resources, an optimal solution also exists generally if and only if the discount factor decreases to zero as time tends to infinity (Chichilnisky 1997, Theorem 3).
- 7.
“Marginal” here is to be understood in the sense of the Frechet derivative of the discounted utilitarian criterion.
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Appendix
Appendix
Appendix A: Existence of a Stationary Program Leading the Green Golden Rule
The green golden rule problem reads as
subject to
It is worth starting the analysis of this problem with an investigation of the possible steady states, noted generically \((c^{s},x^{s})\), before looking for those among them giving the highest utility. Fix \(c=0\). G(.) is concave, \(G^{\prime }(0)>1\) and lim\(_{\ x\rightarrow +\infty }\ G(x)<x,\) therefore there are only two steady states, \(x^{s}=0\) which is unstable and another one, \(x^{\sup },\) which is globally asymptotically stable: indeed, starting from a positive initial stock lower (resp. larger) than the steady state, the resource monotonically increases (resp. decreases) while consumption is constant (zero actually), therefore the utility function is non-decreasing (resp. non-increasing) along the trajectory and it can be used to construct a Lyapunov function to prove the global asymptotic stability of \(x^{\sup }\). Now for any non-zero stationary consumption, \( 0<c<x_{t},\forall t,\) applying the implicit function theorem to relation ( 31), one can check that the larger the stationary consumption, the lower the stable stationary stock:
where the inequality obtains since at any positive steady state, function G(.) crosses the 45\(^\circ \) line from above, hence \(0<G^{\prime }<1\). To summarize, as the stationary consumption increases away from zero, the locus of steady states \((c,x^{\sup })\) is characterized by lower stationary stocks. Then, in order to find the best steady state, note that the relevant space of stationary consumptions and stocks is compact:
Since the transition function is bijective, we can write:
Then rewrite the problem as follows:
There necessarily exists a solution since the function to be optimized is continuous and defined over a compact set. The solution cannot be zero since, by Assumption 4, the above function is strictly increasing at \(x=0\). Let us note \(0<c^{*}<x^{*}\) this solution (\( c^{*}=x^{*}\) is not possible because \(G\left( 0\right) =0\) would imply \(c^{*}=x^{*}=0\) for the second steady state as well).
It remains to show the existence of a stationary plan leading to the GGR. Clearly a possible, though not unique, such plan is the linear one:
Plugging back this plan into the dynamics, one has:
Function g(.) is similar to function G(.) upon a positive linear transformation of its arguments (since \(c^{*}<x^{*}\)): its dynamic properties are the same, the economy converges towards the golden rule \( \left( c^{*},x^{*}\right) .\) \(\square \)
Appendix B: Admissibility of Convex Combinations
To state that \(\left\{ c_{t}^{\gamma }\right\} _{t=0}^{\infty }\) is admissible it must be proven that: (i) \(c_{t}^{\gamma }\le x_{t}\ ,\forall t\) and (ii) \(\lim _{t\rightarrow \infty }c_{t}^{\gamma }=c^{\gamma }<\infty . \) Part (i) is true since
As for part (ii), note that
\(\square \)
Appendix C: Continuity of Convex Combinations
This property can be established recursively. Note first that
varies continuously with \(\gamma .\) Therefore, \(x_{1}^{\gamma }\) is also a continuous function of \(\gamma \) because G(.) is a continuous function. Now it is easy to see that if this property holds for \(x_{s}^{\gamma }\ ,\forall s\le t\) for some t, it must hold for \(x_{t+1}^{\gamma }\) as well by Assumption 2, which completes the proof. \(\square \)
Appendix D: Existence of a Restricted Optimal Program for CSWC
Under Assumptions 1, 2 and 3, each term in the series
is continuous in \(\gamma .\) Let \(U^{\sup }=\max \left\{ \left| \underline{U}\right| ,\left| \overline{U}\right| \right\} .\) Under the boundedness condition in Assumption 1
where \(\left\| .\right\| _{\infty }\) denotes the sup norm. By definition:
So the series
converges normally towards the function \(J^{s}\), which implies that it also converges uniformly, that is
This last property ensures that \(J^{s}\) is a continuous function of \(\gamma .\) The demonstration is then completed, since the continuous mapping of a compact set is itself a compact set, with a maximal point. \(\square \)
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 3
The problem is to show that the coefficient of the optimal linear feedback,
is actually a convex combination
of the coefficients of the discounted utilitarian optimal feedback and of the green golden rule.
Solving the equation
for \(\gamma \), one finds
where
Let us investigate the properties of the above expression, viewed as a function \(\gamma \left( \theta \right) \). Note first that
Also,
where
This means that \(\gamma \left( \theta \right) \in \left[ 0,1\right] ,\) hence the result. \(\square \)
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Figuières, C., Tidball, M. (2016). Sustainable Exploitation of a Natural Resource: A Satisfying Use of Chichilnisky’s Criterion. In: Chichilnisky, G., Rezai, A. (eds) The Economics of the Global Environment. Studies in Economic Theory, vol 29. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31943-8_11
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