Abstract
If physical time exists, it must be inferred from a number of physical criteria, which characterize temporal asymmetry in a physical sense, e.g. statistical-mechanical entropy, dynamic changes or the expansion of the universe. It is interesting to note that a debate in the metaphysics of time between Eternalism (Block Universe), Presentism (Moving Now) and Possibilism (fixed past, open future) has tried to muster the results of scientific theories (quantum mechanics, theory of relativity, thermodynamics) in support of these rival conceptions. According to Eternalism, past, present and future equally exist, while Presentism accords existence only to the momentary moving Now.
(…) experience makes it easy to confuse the egocentric now with something objective in a way experience does not allow that with the egocentric here.
Callender (2008: 360)
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- 1.
Above it was argued that mind processes are not to be regarded as identical with brain activity. We regarded it as a reasonable hypothesis that mind processes ‘emerge’ from brain processes but that much work is left to be done to identify a physical correlate of notions like ‘emergence’. What is assumed, in line with most contemporary philosophy of mind, is that the mind is not completely separate from the brain. For more on the mind-brain relationship, see Searle (2004) and Part II, Chap. 12; Part III, Chap. 17.1.
- 2.
Experimental investigations of the ‘stopped clock illusion’ (Yarrow et al. 2001) suggest that perceptual experience of a given event at a certain time, t 1 , may be influenced by later events. According to the authors the experimental ‘data support ideas of conscious experience as an ongoing, often post hoc reconstruction emerging from multiple cognitive systems’ (Yarrow et al. 2001: 304).
- 3.
The passage of time can be observed from irregular processes—the motions of particles in a liquid, and of mass molecules in a container, the movement of pedestrians in a city—because they constitute sequential change but such processes do not give rise to a measurable passage of time.
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© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
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Weinert, F. (2016). Physical and Phenomenal Time. In: The Demons of Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31708-3_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31708-3_23
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