Exploitation of HART Wired Signal Distinct Native Attribute (WS-DNA) Features to Verify Field Device Identity and Infer Operating State

  • Juan LopezJr.Email author
  • Michael A. Temple
  • Barry E. Mullins
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8985)


Infusion of Information Technology (IT) into Industrial Control System (ICS) applications has increased Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) challenges. A layered security strategy is addressed that exploits Physical (PHY) features to verify field device identity and infer normal-anomalous operating state using Distinct Native Attribute (DNA) features. The goal is inferential confirmation that Human Machine Interface (HMI) indicated conditions match the system’s true physical state. Feasibility is shown using Wired Signal DNA (WS-DNA) from Highway Addressable Remote Transducer (HART) enabled field devices. Results are based on experiments using an instrumented Process Control System (PCS) with smart field devices communicating via wired HART. Results are presented for two field devices operating at two different set-points and suggest that the WS-DNA technical approach is promising for inferring device physical state.


CIP ICS HART DNA Anomaly detection Process control 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Juan LopezJr.
    • 1
    Email author
  • Michael A. Temple
    • 1
  • Barry E. Mullins
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Electrical and Computer EngineeringUS Air Force Institute of TechnologyDaytonUSA

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