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Cyber Attacks in Power Grid ICT Systems Leading to Financial Disturbance

  • Yannis SoupionisEmail author
  • Thierry Benoist
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 8985)

Abstract

Decentralized Critical infrastructure management systems will play a key role in reducing costs and improving the quality of service of industrial processes, such as electricity production. In this paper, we focus on the security issues on the communication channel between the main entities of a smart grid, like generators, consumers and transmission/distribution operators and the energy market. We simulate the energy (spot) market auctions and the power grid network, but we emulate the ICT information part which is the focus of our work. We set in motion a well-known attack, Denial-of-Service (DoS), in Cyber-Physical systems and we are able to identify the consequences not only in power distribution network but also in financial area.

Keywords

Cyber physical Cyber security DoS attack Energy market 

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.European Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC)Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen (IPSC), Security Technology Assessment UnitIspraItaly

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