A Causality-Based Model for Describing the Trustworthiness of a Computing Device

  • Jiun Yi YapEmail author
  • Allan Tomlinson
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 9565)


The ability to describe the trustworthiness of a computing device is an important part of the process to establish end-to-end trust. With the understanding that the trustworthiness of a computing device relies on its capabilities, we report on and contribute a novel causality-based model. This causality-based model represents information about the dependencies between trust notions, capabilities, computing mechanisms and their configurations. In this work, the concept of causality within the model is defined first. This involves detailing the semantic meaning of the terms used in the model. A pictorial representation is then developed to show the causal dependencies as a graph. This step specifies the vertices and edges used in the causal graph. To implement the causality-based model, the causal graph was translated into an eXtensible Markup Language schema and added to the Metadata Access Point database server of the Trusted Network Connect open architecture. Finally, the trust assessment of the causal graph is explained.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Security Group, Royal HollowayUniversity of LondonEghamUK

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